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Abstract 
 
This research project explores how the concept of noise in medical visualisations 
is perceived through an analogue visual arts practice. Noise – which is the 
informational opposite to signal in science – is an unknown and visually 
ambiguous aspect of medical visualisations.  		
A residency in a medical imaging institution was undertaken to investigate 
scientists’ perceptions of noise and to identify its key attributes. Conversations 
with contemporary artists and an examination of their work, explored how noise 
attributes are used as a strategy in their practices. Theories from art history and 
the neuropsychology of vision were used to interrogate how noise is implicated in 
visual perception. Critically, my on-going drawing exploration using instruments of 
vision, biosensor technologies and responding to unknown stimuli was a primary 
method of investigation used to understand how an analogue drawing practice 
perceives noise.  
 
My research identified that unknown movements and interactions are deeply 
implicated in the generation of noise and that the distinction between signal and 
noise is unstable. My practice-based investigations revealed that all my sensory 
perceptions become heightened in response to noise, so that vision becomes 
inseparable from them. This was an important difference between scientists’ and 
artists’ perceptions of noise, for scientists do not recognise the full sensorium in 
their practice. The writings of Jean-Luc Nancy and Michel Serres were used to 
elucidate this process.  
 
This research demonstrates the differences between artistic and scientific 
perceptual responses to ambiguity, the unknown and to noise. It evidences that 
artistic responses to noise can be a catalyst for change, generating new ways of 
perceiving, working and making. It contributes to an under-represented area of 
research: how an analogue arts practice perceives the digital concept of noise. 
Furthermore, my project indicates that analogue drawing could be used as a 
method in scientific training to explore visual ambiguity. 
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Introduction 
 
     
Figure 0.1 (Left) Untitled, 2006, graphite on paper, 42 x 59cm, work by the author.  
Figure 0.2 (Right) Detail of Untitled, 2006. 
 
My drawings have engaged with medical visualisations for a number of years 
exploring the ways in which they map, measure and represent the human 
body. My on-going interest is underpinned by a desire to understand how an 
artist looks at scientific documents that visualise internal living bodies. The 
drawing of a neuron above (Figure 0.1 and 0.2) is produced by repeating the 
numerical symbols of binary code (0 and 1) to refer to its provenance – a 
visualisation that is constructed from data. I use systems of grids and lines to 
draw the organic forms of the internal body to explore ideas of what can and 
cannot be measured. Medical visualisations can be perceived and looked at 
in very distinctive ways. To a radiographer, they are scientific documents that 
are decoded by an expert eye searching for signs of abnormality. Patients 
undergoing treatment are likely to have a highly charged visual response to 
their own scan. And they are intriguing images that powerfully capture the 
changing relationship between technology and the human body. 
Furthermore, their absorption into contemporary visual culture generates a 
multitude of meanings that are unrelated to their original purpose. These 
diverse ways of seeing coexist as I look at medical visualisations through 
eyes that cannot decode or read them as scientific documents. They are, in a 
sense, unknown to me. Questions concerning the ways in which I perceive 
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medical visualisations as I draw underpin this research. Drawing is therefore 
a fundamental method of investigation for this research. 
 
 
 
Figure 0.3 Author undergoing an EEG brain scan in the Psychology Department, 
Northumbria University, Newcastle 2012. 
 
A critical moment that defined the focus of this doctoral project, was my 
experience of participating in a brain study EEG Investigations of Creativity 
and the Wandering Mind conducted at Northumbria University during the first 
year of my research. EEG (electroencephalogram) measures the electrical 
activity emanating from the surface of the brain using small electrodes 
attached to the scalp. I took part in order to experience being the subject of a 
medical visualisation investigation into the artistic mind. Furthermore, 
medical visualisations are images that have informed my practice for a 
number of years. The study explored the phenomenon of ‘Mind wandering’1 
in people working in the creative industries and consisted of a series of text 
based and listening tasks. At one point during the process, I was asked to 
draw for approximately ten minutes whilst the electrodes were attached to my 
scalp. I was of course very interested in what the EEG patterns of my 
drawing activity might reveal, but was surprised to learn later that the data 
was discarded and unavailable because my body movements had caused 
                                                
1 Mind wandering is a growing area of study in cognitive science and neuroscience that is 
widely defined as ‘task unrelated thought’ and was described to me simply as ‘day 
dreaming’. Please see: Baird, B. et al (2012) ‘Inspired by Distraction’ Psychological 
Science. Vol. 23, Issue 10, pp. 1117-1122. 
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too much interference or ‘noise’ in the signal. The concept of noise 
immediately intrigued and raised questions for me, which I will explore in the 
following chapters. Noise was described to me in terms of random and 
unknown information, which manifests itself as ambiguous visual traces 
during medical scanning processes. This resonated with my own interests in 
looking at medical visualisations as images that are unknown to me. 
 
Noise is expressed as patterns of visual interference in medical 
visualisations, and is widely defined as unintentional, unverifiable or unknown 
signals generated by the human body or technologies during the process of 
data transmission.2 Noise is always present to a larger or lesser extent; 
imaging practice and theory agrees that it cannot be fully eradicated. The 
binary signal-to-noise is a cornerstone of science, and medical visualisation 
practices largely (although not uniquely), focus on the signal and aim to 
reduce noise. However when I look at medical visualisations, I cannot 
distinguish between them. Consequently, they have an equal status as 
sources of visual ideas and meanings in my work. Nevertheless noise breaks 
down distinctions between scientist and artist, for it remains outside of 
knowledge to both disciplines. Given the close relationship between vision 
and the generation of knowledge in medical practice, noise has potential to 
provide an interesting interface between scientific and artistic practice. 
Furthermore, it allows me to understand and to negotiate the differences 
between artists and scientists through the ways in which they respond to it. 
 
Remarkably, scientists use a term that essentially refers to sonic qualities – 
noise – to describe ambiguous visual information. Their use of a non-visual 
term renders noise as metaphorically invisible and raises questions about the 
status of noise in medical visualisation practice. How do scientists look at 
noise when it resists legibility? And how can a visual artist respond to its 
symbolically non-visual status? Noise is an aspect of medical visualisations 
                                                
2	Definitions of noise in medical visualisations can vary and some are highly technical. The 
definition used here was provided to me during a residency in medical imaging at the 
University of Manchester – which I describe in the subsequent chapter – is widely 
accepted in imaging practice and theory.	
 4	
that is ambiguous and unknown to both scientist and artist. Ambiguity and 
uncertainty are understood differently in artistic practice,3 as is the 
relationship between sight and knowledge. This difference provides a lens 
through which to interrogate noise from other perspectives. My research 
project explores what a drawing practice and a theoretical investigation into 
artistic and scientific practices of looking (and not looking) can reveal about 
noise in medical visualisations.  
 
It is important to address the term ‘noise’ at the beginning of this enquiry 
because it has multiple meanings and associations, many of which are not 
directly relevant to my project. Noise is a slippery word that resists definition. 
Its etymology is visceral and harsh, deriving from the Latin nausea meaning 
disgust, discomfort or sea-sickness: an intense rejection from the body 
(OED, 2017, s.v. noise n). Noise in this sense is abject; it is something that 
cannot be contained.4 In recent history, noise has become widely integrated 
into technical language. The term white noise is used across disciplines such 
as statistical forecasting, acoustic engineering, physics, information theory 
and telecommunications, albeit with slightly different meanings, but 
nevertheless connected to ideas of random or meaningless information, and 
to denote information overload.5 In the field of electronics, a bewildering 
number of noises are defined. They include Gaussian noise, pink noise, 
popcorn noise, shot noise, poisson noise, avalanche noise and thermal 
                                                
3	William Empson’s Seven Types of Ambiguity (1949) is a key text that explores the use of 
ambiguity in poetry. It is ubiquitous in English studies, although less widely read in the 
visual arts. The TRACEY publication Drawing Ambiguity (Sawdon and Marshall, 2015) 
contains papers by contemporary artists exploring ambiguity in drawing practice. TRACEY 
is a drawing research network and site hosted by Loughborough University (School of 
Arts). It publishes and disseminates material concerned with drawing.		
4 Its later meanings are associated with discord, from the Old French noise, meaning din, 
disturbance, uproar, or brawl, again evoking a bodily response through sound or 
physicality. Its Middle English meanings include a loud outcry, clamour and shouting, 
whilst chercher noise is a modern French expression meaning to pick a quarrel. Noise is 
therefore associated with conflict. Contemporary English usage of the word includes 
phrases such as: to make a noise about something (to complain a lot about something) 
and empty vessels make the most noise (sound). There is an underlying sense in both 
phrases that noise is meaningless or of little value.	
5 In medical practice, white noise is a particular type of sound that is used to treat patients 
with tinnitus and sleep disorders.	
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noise6. A central premise of all the above usages is the idea of noise as 
unwanted or undesired interference in the information that is transmitted. 
Claude Shannon, widely understood as the founder of information theory, 
first theorised about noise in the 1940s, and presence of noise in information 
has since become an established focus of study. Whilst I acknowledge that 
noise is very closely connected to the notion of information and to digital 
technology in general, my project is not concerned with information theory. I 
am interested in uncovering what an artistic response to noise might reveal. 
 
Medical visualisations are part of a long history in medical science that link 
sight to the generation of knowledge. This relationship can be traced back to 
practices of anatomy in the sixteenth century7 which connected the 
disciplines of art and science in the examination of non-living bodies using 
the human eye. The development of instruments of vision such as different 
types of microscope, and, over time, the use of complex digital technologies, 
has intensified and strengthened the relationship between sight and the 
generation of medical knowledge. This in turn, has enabled increasingly new 
ways of visualising internal living bodies. The relationship between vision and 
medical knowledge has been theorised extensively, particularly within the 
philosophy of science. Michel Foucault and a large number of socio-politically 
oriented thinkers agree that a medical gaze emerged in the late eighteenth 
century out of the clinical practices of teaching hospitals. In The Birth of the 
Clinic (1973), Foucault argues that the medical gaze is bound up in complex 
systems of power, surveillance and the objectification of the body. Clinical 
practices produce relationships of power that circulate and define bodies 
through discourses.8 The medical gaze renders the body into a locus of 
disease, which is isolated, classified, regulated and ordered. In the process, 
the patient becomes a signifier of disease. According to Foucault, the 
medical gaze is presented as ‘silent and gestureless’, for ‘over all these 
                                                
6 For definitions of these various electronic noises see Vasilescu (2005).	
7 The publication of ‘De Humani Corporis Fabrica’ (On the Workings of the Human Body), by 
Andreas Vesailius in 1543 is a key point in the development of anatomy. 
8 For Foucault, discourse denotes a group of statements that form a system of knowledge 
and produce meanings, often making use of specialist terminologies and rules.	
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endeavours on the part of clinical thought to define its methods and scientific 
norms hovers the great myth of a pure Gaze that would be pure Language: a 
speaking eye’ (1973, p.141). Foucault’s critique of a seemingly ‘pure’ and 
objective medical gaze has been the subject of extensive academic enquiry. 
This enquiry does not take this well-worn pathway, but follows a more 
diverse theoretical route. 
 
This research is trans-disciplinary9 and encompasses literature from diverse 
fields of knowledge that are pertinent to this enquiry. My theoretical 
framework encompasses well-known academic sources such as James 
Elkins, W J T Mitchell and Bruno Latour, as well as the writings of new media 
theorist and artist Joseph Nechvatal. The diverse nature of this research 
reflects its subject matter (noise), which escapes from fitting neatly into one 
subject discipline. Throughout my thesis I shall rely on the notion of 
‘cognitively closed’ information (my own formulation) in order to describe the 
interpretive consequences of medical visualisation practices and, in turn, 
break down the well-established relationship between vision and the 
generation of knowledge. Firstly, key texts from the medical humanities, 
social studies of science and the philosophy of science are used to analyse 
the relationship between medical visualisation practices, vision and the 
construction of medical knowledge within cultural and social frameworks. 
Secondly, cultural and new media theorists interrogate how medical 
technologies of vision change how the human body is understood, and how 
noise affects these perceptions. Thirdly, theories about vision from art history 
and the psychology of visual perception that explore how the acts of looking 
and seeing can be understood as interactive, multiple and ambiguous are 
examined, to show that they are implicated in key characteristics of noise. 
Writings (and conversations) of artists, particularly concerning drawing 
practice and its relationship to vision are also an important strand of 
investigation. Lastly, the thought of the philosophers Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Michel Serres provides a theoretical framework for analysing how artists 
                                                
9 I use the term trans-disciplinary following the definitions and discussions in McGregor 
(2004) and Buntaine (2014).  
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perceive ambiguous visual information (noise). Their ideas are furthermore 
used as a way to conceptualise noise in order to elucidate the practice-led 
research of this project. Paradoxically, both philosophers draw on sound and 
the act of listening which provides an analogy for how I look when I respond 
to noise.  
 
My methodology reflects the trans-disciplinary nature of the research project. 
I placed myself in different environments during this enquiry to investigate 
noise from the positions of art and science. These environments included a 
residency within a medical visualisation research institution, the artist’s studio 
(mine and others artists) and bio-medical laboratories to explore how they 
engendered different acts of looking at and conceptualising noise. I looked 
through microscopes in scientific laboratories and constructed devices for 
looking in my studio to explore different methods of looking and to investigate 
visual ambiguity. I experimented with technologies such as biosensors, by 
working with a creative coder to develop new ways of visualising biomedical 
data. This aspect of the research enabled me to engage directly with medical 
visualisation technologies that are relatively simple and accessible, since 
large-scale technologies precluded artistic experimentation. Face-to-face 
conversations with scientists and other artists, along with email 
correspondence, provided opportunities for primary research into day-to-day 
scientific and artistic practices that engaged with concepts of noise. The 
records I kept of this first-hand contact allows me to support my discussion 
with direct quotes rather than rely entirely on secondary literature. Primary 
research was also undertaken in my studio, where I experimented with 
artistic methods and processes to test ideas about noise through drawing 
practice. This provided a counterpoint to scientific methodologies for 
investigating noise, and offered a space to reflect upon, explore and 
demonstrate ideas through my own practice. Secondary research was 
undertaken through an examination of other artists’ work and through a 
literature review.  
 
Chapter 1 reflects upon my residency in medical imaging at the University of 
Manchester, which enabled me to converse with scientists about their 
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practical and theoretical engagement with noise. This central experience of 
my research provided opportunities for me to view a variety of scans of the 
human body produced from different imaging modalities, and to learn about 
the ways in which noise is generated in medical visualisations. My dialogue 
with different scientists leads me to assert that noise is cognitively closed to 
scientists, and diagnostically irrelevant in their practice. As I negotiate 
scientific ideas and practices from my artistic perspective, I identify key 
attributes and characteristics of noise. They are concerned with movement, 
indirect methods of measurement and unknown interactions within and 
without the environments of the human body. Throughout the residency, I 
reflect upon these ideas and explore how noise changes acts of looking 
through drawing activities in the studio. 	
 
The second chapter considers the diverse ways in which contemporary 
artistic practice engages with the characteristics of noise that I identified in 
the preceding chapter. It examines the methods and processes that artists 
employ to complicate acts of seeing and looking, often in ways that involve 
movement, interaction with their environment and slippages in their visual 
perception. Perception is a complex and largely unconscious fusion of 
sensory information and its assimilation into cognitive processes. In this 
project, I focus upon theories of visual perception because of its centrality in 
medical visualisation practice, and in order to question how noise can be 
visually perceived. I consider theories concerning the psychology and 
neurophysiology of visual perception to examine the relationship between 
noise and human vision. Elkins’ and Mitchell’s ideas about multiple and 
interactive ways of looking and seeing provide a theoretical framework to 
investigate whether noise can be perceived through active and dynamic 
styles of looking.  
 
The subsequent chapter reflects on phases of activity in my studio that make 
use of scopic instruments to explore how they frame my vision. I experiment 
with different acts of looking, such as looking into a microscope, looking at 
projections and looking through a magnifying lens. I test a box construction to 
explore how visual perception changes in response to Latour’s concept of a 
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‘black box’. I experiment with drawing materials such as clay and oil, and 
unusual drawing grounds such as seaweed and latex. These methods 
enable me to immerse my drawing process in unpredictable changes and 
movements, or unknown interactions between the drawing and its 
environment as I draw. Through this, I test how my drawings respond to 
unknown movements and interactions: the conditions that generate noise. 
Lastly, I work with a creative coder and biosensors to develop a drawing 
performance in response to bio-data that is deliberately noisy. I reflect upon 
how unknown, unpredictable and ambiguous interactions with the 
environment change my visual perceptions.  
 
In Chapter 4, my wish to understand and contextualise the changes in my 
perceptions in response to the attributes of noise, lead me to examine Jean-
Luc Nancy’s text Listening (2007). Although Nancy is theorising about the 
sense of sound and ‘being as resonance’ (p. 21), I assert that my 
experiences are analogous to Nancy’s concept of listening. His writing 
provides a theoretical framework to contextualise my contention that my 
visual perceptions change in response to (the characteristics of) noise. 
Scientific theories about noise cannot account for its impact upon my 
perceptions as I respond through drawing. However philosopher Michel 
Serres’ text Genesis provides phenomenological insights into noise that 
elucidate my experiences. He theorises about noise as the environment of 
the universe and asserts that it is multiple and contains the possible. For 
Serres noise is ‘the trace of the observer’ (1995, p. 61). These ideas 
resonate with my experience. Lastly, I refer to recent scientific studies 
investigating levels of tolerance of ambiguity in medical students. These 
studies make use of artistic methodologies to explore how they might be 
used to build tolerance of visual ambiguity and consequently change 
perceptions of noise in scientific practice. 
 	 10	
Chapter 1. Noisy Bodies (A residency in medical imaging) 
 
This thesis begins with my reflections on an artist residency in medical 
imaging at the University of Manchester (cf.	University of Manchester, n.d.). 
The initial call-out in 2014 was an open brief for collaborative projects 
between scientists and artists, and after making contact with Rebecca Elliott, 
who is professor of Neuroscience and Psychiatry to discuss my interests, a 
proposal that focused upon my research into the concept of noise was 
accepted. The reader will note that the residency was undertaken 
approximately halfway through my project, but it is positioned at the 
beginning of this thesis. This is because the questions and issues it raises 
are central to my enquiry and structure my process of reflection upon earlier 
stages of this research project. 
 
The residency was set up as a series of conversations with imaging 
scientists. They took place in their respective offices, at their desks and in 
front of a monitor to enable us to look at (anonymised) scans as we talked. I 
asked each scientist to describe noise in medical visualisations, both as a 
theoretical concept and phenomenon encountered in their day-to-day 
practice. This provided a counterpoint to the widely accepted definition I refer 
to earlier in the introduction. The scientists I engaged with were from a wide 
variety of backgrounds and disciplines, and reflect the multi-disciplinary 
nature of medical visualisation research. They included physicists, 
mathematicians, electrical engineers, neuroscientists and radiologists. In 
general, they avoided too much specialist terminology in their accounts to 
acknowledge the trans-disciplinary nature of our dialogue. Inevitably, I 
negotiated a delicate balance between gaining a good enough level of 
knowledge and understanding of core scientific processes and concepts, 
without becoming immersed in unnecessary technical information for my 
project. This negotiation also involved making sense of scientific concepts 
from an artistic perspective. Nevertheless, my first conversations with 
scientists left me feeling quite overwhelmed by the complexity of information 
that was being conveyed to me. It was almost as if I was attempting to 
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understand something which was continually shifting and changing its shape; 
it refused to form a legible picture.  
 
Noise is unknown, unverifiable and ambiguous information that is entangled 
in a signal, i.e. the useful and available information. It is important to make a 
distinction here between ‘cognitively closed off’ and ‘cognitively closed down’. 
The latter can be thought about as information that is completely unavailable, 
whilst the former refers to information that has the potential to be available to 
knowledge. In this thesis, when I state ‘cognitively closed’ I refer to it in the 
former sense, as potentially available information. For, as I discuss later, 
noise can change into signal as perceptions and knowledge change. Despite 
advances in technologies, noise or unknown information cannot be 
eradicated from medical visualisations and is continually minimised or 
filtered. However, the distinction between signal and noise is not always clear 
and ambiguity remains. Noise is widely defined as random information, yet I 
learn during the residency that visualisation processes also involve 
measurement methods that are inherently random. This inherent 
contradiction destabilises the signal/noise dichotomy and raises questions 
about the distinctions between them. If the methods used for ‘seeing’ 
(visualising) the body and the nature of what is being seen are both to some 
extent unknown and random, in what ways does this change the status of 
signal as the informational opposite to noise? The distinction between signal 
and noise is perhaps more closely connected to perception – cognitive and 
visual – than a sharp division between them. 
 
The interactions and movements of the internal body caused by the 
circulatory, digestive or respiratory systems for instance, are known to 
generate noise. Similarly, noise can also be generated by interactions 
between scanning technologies and their environment, which is manifested 
as visual ambiguity in the scan. How then do scientists look at noise when it 
breaks down the relationship between sight and the generation of 
knowledge? It is noteworthy that noise is a non-visual term that is used to 
describe a visual phenomenon in medical practice.  
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The residency provided opportunities for dialogue with scientists working 
across different imaging modalities such as MRI (magnetic resonance 
imaging) and PET (positron emission tomography), to develop my 
understanding of different processes. Magnetic resonance imaging utilises 
magnetic fields and radio waves to generate images of the internal body, 
whilst positron emission tomography utilises radioactive drugs that are 
inhaled, swallowed or injected to generate images. A more detailed 
description is provided later in this chapter. The medical visualisations I saw 
were from large studies involving volunteers at the University of Manchester, 
and not from diagnostic scans of individual patients. They comprised of lung, 
brain, liver and heart imaging. Throughout the residency, I continued to make 
drawings in the studio. I reflected on my conversations with scientists and the 
questions that they raised for me, as my understanding of noise in scientific 
practice developed, through practice and through notes I made during the 
residency. Consequently this chapter is divided into four sections, each of 
which begins with my dialogue with scientists about different aspects of noise 
and is followed by my reflections upon those conversations in my studio.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Shane McKie, senior research fellow, Institute of Brain, Behaviour and Mental 
Health, University of Manchester and the author, 2015 
 
 
1.1 Dynamic imaging, movement and noise 
‘Noise is something without structure. There is not much information in it, you 
can’t actually measure it; it is randomly moving around.’  
(McKie, 2015) 
 
My first conversations with scientists, particularly when speaking with Shane 
McKie, were quite intense and overwhelming. He is a physicist and his 
responses to my questions often involved making diagrams to elucidate a 
 	 13	
particular point. It was like learning a new language and required intense 
concentration from me. I found myself continually trying to uncover what lay 
beneath the scientific explanations, to reveal how scientists perceived 
(visually and cognitively) the ambiguity of noise. Yet somehow the 
conversations remained within a scientific framework, and crucially, answers 
to my questions described scientific processes that were largely structured to 
minimise noise. Thinking about noise directly was circumvented, even side-
stepped. As Shane (McKie, 2015) stated ‘you can’t actually measure it’. 
Perhaps this is why it is thought about indirectly and circumvented. However, 
noise is always present in the background: sifting through the noise to get to 
the signal is what imaging scientists do on a daily basis. It is embedded in 
their structures and processes of looking. But to me, noise is intriguing in 
itself. What is it, why is it there, what does it look like and why is it so 
elusive? These questions continue to hold my imagination. 
 
I began by exploring the relationship between noise and movement, because 
movement is one of the chief causes of noise in medical visualisations as 
evidenced by my own experience of taking part in an EEG brain study. 
Shane confirmed that the physiological functions of the human body, such as 
breathing, heartbeat, circulatory and digestive systems, produce noise as a 
result of their intrinsic movement. All imaging modalities require the body to 
be as still as possible during the scanning process. Whilst external body 
movement can be controlled to some extent, internal body movement cannot, 
and calls for faster scanning speeds. Medical visualisations fall largely into 
two main groups: static imaging and functional or dynamic imaging. Static 
imaging visualises the structures of the body (e.g. X-ray of bones or the 
structure of the brain); it involves slower scanning speeds with relatively high 
image resolution. Dynamic imaging looks at function rather than structure, for 
instance by visualising the volume of oxygen inhaled into the lungs, or the 
blood flow in parts of the body. Consequently, dynamic imaging involves a 
faster scanning speed that can last just a few seconds. It produces images 
that are of a lower resolution and typically contain higher levels of noise. 
There is a continual tension between movement (noise) reduction and image 
quality.  
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This is further complicated when patients are asked to perform tasks inside 
scanners, such as pressing a button – a common task in brain imaging: 
‘When they press the button they move, and that movement creates noise, 
but it’s completely correlated with the signal you are interested in. We tend to 
assume we know where about in the brain the motor signal is, and we’ll try to 
take that out. But there may be a motor component in memory. So exactly 
what you keep and throw away can be very tricky’ (Elliott, 2015). She 
continues: ‘The difficulty is [that] you don’t know what’s noise and what’s not. 
If you knew what was noise, it might be much easier to get rid of. You see 
this signal, and you have to decide what’s noise and what’s real.’ I am 
interested in the use of the word ‘real’ here, because the implication is that 
noise is of a different ontological order than signal; as if it is unreal and does 
not exist in some sense. And yet noise is enmeshed in the signal, in the 
‘real’. Shane (McKie, 2015) states ‘Noise is inherent in all data, its what’s in 
the background. You can’t get rid of it - it is always there. What you have to 
maximise is the signal using your probabilities’. Noise then has an 
ambiguous status, it is both present (in the signal) and absent (cannot be 
measured and is not ‘real’). A similar dichotomy is evident when one 
considers movement in the physical body and emotional change. Rebecca 
points out:  
 
We are interested in emotional response; we’ll show people emotionally 
salient images. But when you see an emotionally salient image, you’ll move, 
you’ll jump. Your heart rate will have a little blip. And if you then try and throw 
away anything that’s to do with heart rate, or startle, you’re actually throwing 
out what you are potentially interested in. But if you let too much of that come 
through, you are looking at a startly, jumpy thing. (Elliott, 2015) 
 
Noise is therefore part of systems of knowledge development in medical 
visualisation technologies and is intrinsic to data generation. Yet it sits 
outside diagnostic relevance because it is cognitively closed and cannot 
generate knowledge. I learn that certain interfaces, such as the border 
between air and tissue (inside the lungs for instance), are known to generate 
very high levels of noise: lung imaging is particularly noisy. This type of noise 
is manifested visually as cloudy, indistinct areas with low definition. However, 
cloudy areas in medical visualisations can also define different types of 
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tissue. A trained eye is essential in recognising noise from signal. A trained 
eye is, nevertheless, a human eye: interpretations can vary. It is pointed out 
to me that two radiologists looking at the same scan can read them – see 
them – differently. Consensus and collaboration through discussions 
between different specialists plays an important role in diagnosis and is a 
process that acknowledges the inherent ambiguity in imaging practice.1 
 
The bodies of technologies also generate noise. Hardware noise cannot be 
fully eliminated, as the new-media theorist Sue Ballard points out: 
 
In every model of information there is noise. This is because information 
travels through technology. Technology cannot exist without movement, 
and without movement there is no information. Movement no matter how 
imperceptible introduces noise. As soon as something moves it picks up 
traces of dust and dirt, glitches, mistakes, and error. Without movement 
there is no information, and without noise there is nothing to hear. One 
seizes the other. (2011, p. 60) 
 
A scanner heats up and uses more energy when scanning speeds are high; 
in the process it produces more noise. However slower scanning speeds can 
lead to higher levels of noise produced by the human body. There is a 
continual balancing act between generating visualisations with the best 
definition and relatively low levels of noise. Furthermore, the more sensitive 
the scanning technology, the more it will pick up noise as well as signal. The 
flows and ebbs of systems within the body, and the flow of data in non-living 
systems can both generate random interferences that are cognitively closed. 
Scientists are familiar with seeing high levels of visual ambiguity in medical 
visualisations, as well as uncertainty about the underlying data. Artists, too, 
are familiar with looking at (and generating) ambiguous marks in a drawing. 
However, there is no equivalent for decoding or reading visualisations in the 
artistic drawing. Interpreting a drawing is always fluid: there is no fixed 
outcome. To apply scientific ways of thinking to the artistic: a drawing can be 
cognitively open (for all interpretations are valid), but not cognitively closed 
                                                
1	Bleakely (2015, p.338) states: ‘pondering ambiguity and uncertainty may prevent 
premature closure in diagnostic reading … in radiology, where a high level of ambiguity is 
often present in reading images, uncertainty can be used as a resource to encourage 
collaborative readings dependent upon generating dialogue rather than competitive debate’.	
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(for it disallows the information contained within it to be used for complete 
closure or fixed meaning). Nevertheless artists and scientists share – albeit 
through different methods and systems of knowledge – practices of looking 
at visual traces in images that are ambiguous. But once a visual trace is 
identified as ‘noise’, scientists move away from seeing ambiguity and create 
a sense of closure. Noise can become invisible when it is designated as 
noise. Yet ambiguity remains in the visualisation and practices of 
collaborative diagnosis acknowledge this as they work towards a consensus 
(and closure) in meaning. How do artists respond to visual ambiguity in their 
practice? And can artistic approaches towards ambiguity suggest other ways 
of looking at noise?  
 
1.2 Drawing on interaction 
 
    
Figure 1.2 (Left) Untitled, 2015, graphite on paper, 84 x 59 cm, work by the author. 
Figure 1.3 (Right) Detail of Untitled, 2015. 
 
In my studio, I reflect on the relationship between movement and the 
phenomenon of noise by exploring ideas through drawing. I am looking at a 
scan of a torso. It is comprised of cloudy ephemeral forms that suggest 
organs within the body, which are however indistinct and difficult to separate. 
I imagine that I am immersed in the space of a moving, pulsing, changing 
body and that each mark I make is a living thing that interacts with the next 
mark. Looking at a drawing involves looking at relationships between 
 	 17	
different areas of tone, form, texture etc. The act of imagining the interaction 
between marks does not feel strange to me. I look at the drawing as if it is 
continually shifting. Keeping my gaze slightly off-focus helps me to do this. I 
start making marks from the inside of the image, and by thinking of each 
mark as a unit of information or as a cell, which is repeated with subtle shifts 
in pressure, time taken and density. The drawing grows slowly without a 
clear sense of direction. I try not to ‘see’ the finished drawing in my 
imagination, but instead keep my gaze fixed upon close details and 
relationships between different areas in the composition. I am attempting to 
not know the drawing; to lose control of where it is going. This process 
evolves out of relationships and perceived interactions between marks. 
Nevertheless, I make choices at each step of the way, which is not dissimilar 
to making a distinction between signal and noise. Is it possible to let go of the 
choices I instinctively make, and to allow the movement and energy of the 
drawing itself to dictate the mark making? It seems to me that I am 
continually looking at the drawing to direct me. Yet, I am also looking into my 
imagination to dictate the next step.  
 
Is there a similar process when the scientist looks at noise – a process of 
allowing the visualisation to direct which area of the image to focus upon? 
The social scientist Nicolas Rose (2012), theorises about two opposing styles 
of thought in the life sciences: reductionist and dynamic. He argues that a 
reductionist style typically visualises parts of the body in isolation2 and not 
immersed in their living environment. He calls this environment a ‘milieu’ and 
states that 'an organism develops through constant transactions with its 
environment – its cellular, organic, biographical, ecological milieu' (Rose, 
2012, p 12). The milieu is the context of living things, and consists of 
movement and change. Reductionist styles of visualisation typically suggest 
static forms. In the drawing above (Figure 1.2), I imagine that I am immersed 
in the milieu of the body being represented, as well as inhabiting my own 
body through the movements it makes whilst I draw. This implicates the 
                                                
2 For instance, highly magnified images of cells, viruses or bacteria, are typically presented 
in isolation, resembling abstract and static objects.	
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environment of my studio as changes in light and sounds around me 
influence how I feel, think and respond. 
 
Dynamic styles of thought, according to Rose, conceptualise the body as 
‘located in a dimension of temporality and development, and constitutively 
open to their milieu – a milieu that ranges in scale from the intracellular, to 
the psychological, biographical, social and cultural’ (2012, p. 3). He is 
proposing movement and change at a scale that moves beyond the body and 
into the social and cultural world. Dynamic styles of thought are 
unquestionably highly complex and difficult to measure with certainty. They 
are unverifiable and unknowable; noise is intrinsic to them. A dynamic style, I 
would like to suggest, includes the noise. It includes extraneous contextual 
information that is diagnostically irrelevant. A reductionist style suggests a 
completely transparent and noise-free view into the body.  
What is at stake if one represents the internal body using a dynamic as 
opposed to a reductionist approach? Images are key tools in the 
dissemination of scientific knowledge, as many theorists have pointed out 
(Kemp, 2006; Latour, 2010; Sturken and Cartwight, 2001; Zwijnenberg et 
Vall, 2009). Dijck (1998, p. 11) observes that science is not only a ‘fact-
producing process’, but is also an ‘image-producing process’. Images enable 
scientists to communicate complex abstract information in a simplified form 
and, as such, are implicated in scientific insights and the scientist’s ability to 
‘see’, understand and generate knowledge.3 My conversations with Shane 
affirm this. His work involves processing and analysing data from large 
numbers of brain scans taken of many participants. The results of his studies 
cannot be presented as numerical data or diagrammatically because of the 
volume and complexity of information involved. They are presented as a 
composite scan. He states (McKie, 2015): ‘We have to get across our 
findings in a meaningful way, and most if the time that means using an 
                                                
3 On the importance of images in scientific practices, see for example Rheinberger (2002, p. 
520), who argues that ‘The decisive phase in scientific insight happens only by means of 
images, for images allow a reduction in complexity, a condensation in representation, and 
they produce visual clarity’.	
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image. The visual gives meaning and location to the data.’ 
The medical visualisation is, however, more than a scientific document in 
terms of the meanings it can generate. It is important to note that it can also 
simply generate visual pleasure as an aesthetic image. But there is one 
meaning that can become lost or hidden, particularly outside of scientific 
contexts: the understanding that all medical visualisations contain elements 
of noise. Although the non-expert may be aware of concepts of signal and 
noise, the ways in which medical visualisations can be presented – for 
instance on the covers of magazines, or prominently on the websites of 
scientific institutions and in sci-art exhibitions – has the effect of concealing 
the presence of unknown and cognitively closed information – noise – within 
them. Perhaps this is partly due to the fact that images produced by imaging 
technologies are understood as being unmediated and considered objective 
depictions in public perceptions.4  
 
Conversely, the artist’s drawing is perceived as full of noise because it is 
profoundly subjective; it cannot be decoded or interpreted in fixed ways. The 
knowledge within it is ambiguous and contingent, it demands the participation 
of the viewer in making meaning. My process of drawing evolves out of 
relationships and interactions between marks. I allow the dynamic energy of 
the mark-making to direct the drawing. Ambiguity becomes a resource for 
generating work, and is valued (rather than tolerated) in my methods. Both 
artistic and scientific practices involve engaging with uncertainty and 
ambiguity, which at times cannot be cognitively processed and consciously 
understood. However, ambiguity has a different status in artistic practice, as 
artist and curator Derek Horton points out in his introduction to the TRACEY 
publication Drawing Ambiguity:  
 
Without ambiguity, art lacks depth, subtlety and richness. Ambiguous 
artworks, in our case in the field of drawing (recognising of course that 
                                                
4 These perceptions mask the relationship between medical visualisations and an ‘objective 
reality’: ‘Scientific images refer to data and to algorithms by means of which they are 
generated. Their level of reference is indeed a reality – not the reality of phenomenal 
reality, as is usually assumed, but of their medial construction’ (Rheinberger, 2002, p 522).	
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the correlation of drawing and art is ambiguous territory in itself), offer a 
potentially complex cognitive experience in which we have to navigate 
multiple meanings and cope with indeterminacy. (2015, p. 3).  
 
 
1.3 The indirect gaze 
‘What we actually measure is an indirect measurement of what we want to 
know. Often it's a projection.’  
(Matthews, 2015) 
 
 
I have established that the movement of the human body – particularly in 
dynamic imaging modalities – is highly implicated in the generation of noise. 
Furthermore, the movements of the bodies of technologies, both the 
hardware and data, can also generate noise. Ambiguous visual information 
that is cognitively closed is therefore part of the structures of medical 
visualisation systems of knowledge development. However, ambiguity has a 
different status in arts practice, it can be used as a method to generate 
artwork. 
 
During the residency, I was surprised to learn that the processes by which 
visualisation technologies capture data were remarkably indirect and also 
involved unknown movements and ambiguity. Data was not captured as a 
result of direct measurements from the body, but rather generated from the 
side-lines and off-centre. I would like to clarify by giving a short account of 
the MRI process. The MRI scanner consists of an extremely powerful magnet 
that can be 10,000 times more powerful than the earth’s magnetic field 
(Pope, 1999). When the human body is placed within it, the magnetic field 
stimulates protons in the nucleus of hydrogen molecules present in the body. 
The average human body mass consists of approximately 10% hydrogen, 
largely within water molecules (Pope, 1999). The protons, which are 
positively charged, spin along an axis within the nucleus and are ordinarily 
randomly aligned. The magnetic field aligns all their spin states so that their 
axes line up. A radio frequency pulse is applied next. When it is switched off 
the protons return to their original spin states or resting state. In short, (a part 
of) the body is stimulated to produce a response, and the time that it takes 
for it to return to its original ‘resting state’ is measured. An image is 
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constructed out of the difference between two states: the percentage of 
signal change is fundamental to the process. Although this account is an 
over-simplification of a complex process, I am nevertheless struck by the 
indirectness of the measurement and the obliqueness of the process, as well 
as the necessity for movement and change in the measurement process 
itself. Furthermore, the movement of individual protons is random and not 
measureable. Therefore, unknown movements and interactions play a 
significant role in the ways in which signal is collected. This indicates that the 
dichotomy between noise and signal is unstable, and arguably a false one. I 
would like to suggest that the term ‘signal/noise’ more accurately reflects the 
status of signal. 
 
I learn that fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging measures brain 
activity through oxygen uptake in blood flow) and PET, which are both 
dynamic imaging processes, involve stochastic measurement. In a stochastic 
system, the outcome of repeated experiments or scans, under the same 
conditions can be variable.5 Within a deterministic system on the other hand, 
repeated experiments or scans will produce exactly the same results given 
the same starting conditions. Therefore, not only is noise random, but 
random processes are implicated in dynamic imaging measurement. These 
processes are described to me as ‘random variables’ (Epstein, 2008). When I 
probe further about the meaning of ‘random variable’ the definitions and 
explanations are framed as mathematical formulae.6 I am conscious that my 
way of making sense of this is to translate the numbers into words (and 
questions), and ultimately into images – drawings. But it is also the case that 
scientists too cannot make sense of vast amounts of numerical information 
without putting it into images. I am reminded of another conversation during 
my residency with Alex Morgan, an imaging physicist, who describes her 
frustration at clients who request the outcomes of large imaging studies to be 
                                                
5 I refer to the Handbook of Medical Imaging: Physics and Psychophysics, which states: ‘a 
stochastic system, when presented with two identical inputs, may produce similar outputs 
but they will not be exactly the same’ (Beutel et al, 2000, p. 109).	
6 For a more detailed account and definition of random variables, see the ‘Probability theory 
and random variables’ chapter in Epstein (2008, pp 525 – 574).	
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presented to them as numerical information instead of as (composite) 
visualisations: ‘But you are losing all that spatially interesting stuff. There are 
more interesting ways of doing that then calculating a mean number. We 
have fought quite hard to keep those images, considering there is so much 
noise in them’ (Morgan, 2015). Scientists as well as artists, can value the 
presence of ambiguous visual information, because it reflects a reality. 
 
Similarly, PET (a functional imaging modality) utilises small amounts of 
radioactive substances called radioisotopes, which are introduced into the 
human body (injected, swallowed or inhaled). They ‘attach’ to different 
molecules in the body and undergo radioactive decay (half-life7) whilst in the 
body. As they decay, they release positrons, and this process is measured8. 
However the radioisotope’s rate of decay is not fixed and can vary. The half-
life of large numbers of radioisotopes is predictable, but for the smaller 
numbers that are typically introduced into the body during PET the half-life is 
variable and the decay process is random. Consequently, a sequence of 
stochastic events that are intrinsically random and noisy is used to map the 
location and timing of radioactive decay within the body. ‘If you look at a 
population of such isotopes it looks to us as if the decay is exponential, but 
each one is random.’ (Matthews, 2015). This data is in turn used to construct 
images. It is a process that demands a certain style of looking: a looking for 
patterns to emerge.  
 
The tension between fixed and stable measurements, and fluid, unstable and 
variable measurement processes are important to this enquiry because they 
change how one looks. If the scientist is looking at a visualisation that is 
produced using methods that involve indirect and random elements, it is, I 
                                                
7	A half-life is the amount of time required for a radioactive substance to lose fifty percent of 
its activity through decay.	
8 As a positron moves through the body it loses energy until it comes into contact with an 
electron. When electron and positron encounter each other, they release energy in the 
form of two photons moving in opposite directions. Photons travel with kinetic energy 
through the body, moving in different directions and through different angles of deflection 
as they interact with the body. This phenomenon is called Compton Scattering and this is 
also a random process. Although patterns do emerge and can be analysed and mapped, 
the behaviour of photons (these are the basic units of measurement in MRI, PET, SPECT 
and CT) is, I am told, stochastic (Pope, 1999).	
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would like to suggest, an inherently fluid and open process. Shane McKie 
often uses the phrase ‘a close fit’ when speaking to me about medical 
imaging processes. He (and others I speak to) acknowledges that 
measurements are not exact but close enough: probability and estimation are 
key factors. It is important to point out that random variables are not only 
implicated in dynamic (functional imaging) processes, but to a lesser extent 
also in static imaging such as X-ray too (cf. Epstein, 2008, pp. 543-565).  
How the body is visualized is therefore contingent and variable. The same 
scan repeated twice would vary, however slightly: ‘Every time you do an 
experiment the data isn't the same’ (McKie, 2015). Being able to predict – 
with some accuracy but without absolute certainty – is a cornerstone of this 
style of scientific looking. Perhaps it is a style of looking that has something 
in common with artistic styles of looking. Scientists are looking for something 
that may be hidden or not apparent; they are searching for patterns to 
emerge by looking through the noise to some extent. Perhaps in the same 
way that an artist looks for something hidden to emerge from a multitude of 
visual stimuli by looking into their imagination.  
 
Olaf Breidbach, writing about the scientific representation of dynamic 
systems, calls for new ways of visualising an ‘imaginative science’: ‘If we 
take them not as representations of something else but as their own reality, 
as some hypotheses about the world that is described by them, that would be 
the first step toward an extended use of imaginative sciences’ (2011, p. 117). 
Whilst ‘imaginative’ is too far a leap to describe the contingent nature of 
medical visualisations, I would like to suggest that an element of intuition is 
involved when the scientists looks at and ‘reads’ a scan. Many times during 
my residency, scientists seem to respond instinctively to certain scans as 
being particularly noisy; they immediately know something is not quite right. 
They are after all, highly visual people who spend long periods of time 
examining images. It is an intuitive response, which is immediately felt and 
largely unconscious in a way that is very similar to the artist’s intuition. 
Intuition is not explicit knowledge; it is an embodied way of knowing what is 
diagnostically irrelevant in scientific contexts. However, it also plays a part in 
imaging practice. The artist makes aesthetic decisions, whilst the scientist is 
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making decisions about the underlying data that is visually portrayed. In this 
way, the scientist looks through images to perceive the data, in a perceptual 
leap between numerical and visual information. This suggests an 
‘imaginative’ leap that is not dissimilar to Breidbach’s ‘imaginative science’. It 
is an indirect method of looking, which moves between data and image, from 
visual representation to measurement. 
 
Scientific systems of measurement are, in general, perceived as fixed and 
stable, as precise and objective. I am surprised to learn about the 
indirectness of the methods of visualisation technologies used to capture 
data about the body, as well as their intrinsically stochastic nature. This is 
perhaps a necessity when measuring living systems, but nevertheless, there 
is an inherent conflict between the aims of measurement – to produce an 
accurate rendition of the internal body – and the methods employed. How 
does one reconcile indirectness with the idea of measurement? It 
complicates the process of diagnosis and the visual perception of medical 
visualisations. Fluid rather than fixed measurement processes blur 
boundaries between signal and noise, creating visual and cognitive 
ambiguity. Medical education theorist Alan Bleakely (2015) calls for practices 
that develop a higher tolerance of ambiguity in medicine.9 Such practices 
could change perceptions of diagnostically irrelevant visual material in 
scientific practice, potentially by rendering it more visible and open to new 
readings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Chapter 4 contains a more detailed account  of recent studies exploring tolerance of 
ambiguity in medical students. 
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1.4 The indirect drawing 
 
    
Figure 1.4 (Left) Untitled, 2015, graphite on paper, 84 x 59 cm, work by the author. 
Figure 1.5 (Right) Detail of Untitled, 2015. 
 
 
To reflect on medical visualisation methods that are stochastic, ideas about 
indirect measurement and indirect looking are next explored in the studio. I 
experiment with glancing sideways at my source material whilst drawing. 
Selections of images of the same scan at different magnification levels are 
placed upon the wall next to my drawing board. I need to turn my head to 
look at them and glance up at different ones as I draw. Looking sideways and 
indirectly at them is quite an uncomfortable method of drawing. As I move 
between them, I am layering different glimpses upon each other in the 
drawing. The different registers of images require different types of response 
through the drawing and it feels necessary to make use of a variety of 
drawing materials. Pencil is combined with graphite powder, which is used 
with a dry brush. This allows a more fluid and rapid response to my indirect 
glances. As I draw, I am thinking about Martin Kemp’s concept of the ‘fuzzy 
picture’ as I draw, a term he uses to describe the visualisation of dynamic 
and chaotic systems:  
 
Much modern science may be uncomfortable with the ‘fuzzier’ pictures 
arising from chaos and self-organised criticality, but they seem to 
represent something that is real. There is no indication that the fuzzy 
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shapes of such a system at, say, the larger scale of an ecosystem are less 
significant than the neat geometrical pattern woven by DNA at the 
molecular level. (2006, p. 161) 
 
Inevitably patterns begin to emerge from my initial apparently chaotic marks, 
and I find myself building upon them by creating abstract shapes and forms. 
It is difficult to completely avoid this process, which directs my looking and 
the drawing. Perhaps it can only be avoided by not looking at the drawing. 
However, my intention is to explore indirect looking and my responses tell me 
that I make connections between marks to build up patterns of forms. Pattern 
recognition is profoundly connected to human visual perception and is an 
important element of the drawing process. It is also connected to how 
medical imaging scientists look at scans. Siân Ede observes:  
 
We take in signals and interpret them. And so too with the discipline of 
science itself. Concepts are tested through pattern recognition – visual, 
behavioural, mathematical. In turn patterns suggest new concepts. 
Reason and logic, the detective work implied in ‘the scientific method’ play 
an important part but it comes as a surprise to learn how much scientists 
need to see or visualise ideas in order to understand. (2000, p 21) 
 
According to Kemp (2000, p. 2), pattern recognition is closely connected to 
an ‘aesthetic impulse’, which he claims is part of a ‘feedback mechanism’ 
that is designed to gratify and reward us for the continual effort involved in 
making sense of the visual world. Whether this can be proved is unclear, 
nevertheless, pattern recognition is a selective method of looking that 
inevitably filters visual elements that do not fit within the overall pattern. 
Noise, I would like to suggest, is particularly likely not to fit into an overall 
pattern, and consequently, remains unseen. When scientists identify traces 
of noise in medical visualisations, it may become necessary to focus upon 
the larger visual patterns at the expense of the noise in order to make 
coherent sense of the whole image. Perhaps inevitably, an unconscious 
blindness10 to visual signs that do not make sense and do not fit into a 
pattern may also be involved as scientists look. After all, if visual (and 
numerical) information refuses to make sense, if it is cognitively closed and 
                                                
10	An interesting counter-point here is offered through Derrida’s conceptualisation of the act 
of drawing (and of the drawing itself) as blind. (1993).	
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diagnostically irrelevant, it has to be disregarded. This motivation drives how 
the scientist looks.  
 
However, there are not always clear-cut definitions between the noise and 
the signal, but rather many shades of grey exist. Negotiating the grey areas 
involves looking through uncertainty. One way in which scientists negotiate 
this uncertainty is by changing how they look. The manipulation of data and 
modes of seeing the data through the use of different algorithms is an 
important part of medical visualisation practice. Complex interactions 
between scientist and data determine what scientists see: the medical 
visualisation is not a fixed image. The next series of conversations is 
concerned with the relationship between algorithms and scientific acts of 
looking. 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Professor Rebecca Elliott, Neuroscience and Experimental Psychology, 
University of Manchester and the author, 2015. 
 
 
1.5 Looking through algorithms 
 
The use of algorithms (sets of rules that are followed in problem-solving 
operations and calculations by a computer) is fundamental to the processing 
of medical visualisation data. By manipulating the numerical information, 
algorithms change the image. They are typically utilised to make adjustments 
to data linked to body movement and as such are implicated in the reduction 
of noise. I outline some key processes below to emphasise how data 
manipulation is central to how the scientist looks. It is important to note 
however, that algorithms can only detect what they are designed to do:  
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The measurement equipment you use will only measure what it has been 
programmed to do. This is why we have to keep testing... There are so 
many parameters that you can change, and many unknown parameters. 
We make all these assumptions, but we don’t know if we've got the 
equations right. If you don't know if it’s meant to be there, then it won’t be 
in the equation to start with. (McKie, 2015). 
 
The inexorable growth and innovation of imaging technologies indicates that 
the scientific community is continually addressing this issue. During my 
conversations, scientists refer repeatedly to algorithmic processes that are 
used to reduce noise. They are largely concerned with adjustments for body 
movement. I will briefly give an account of one such process – Normalisation 
– to outline the relationship between data manipulation and the image that is 
seen.  Normalisation is an algorithm that co-registers a functional scan and a 
structural scan, and is concerned with spatial resolution. It is described to me 
as: ‘basically it is averaging out; placing the functional brain on top of the 
structural brain, in the same space’ (McKie, 2015). Normalisation combines 
interpolations from a structural scan with a mean11 of the realigned images. 
The use of interpolation is interesting to explore a little further here, as it is a 
method that underpins many of the mathematical calculations involved in 
medical visualisations. It plays an important role in defining what is seen. 
Interpolation is the mathematical method of constructing new intermediate 
data points between sets of known values. It is based upon probability and 
‘an informed estimate of the unknown’ (Thevenaz, 2000, p.393). Thevenaz 
perfectly sums up the tensions involved in capturing data (and generating 
images) from living bodies by describing interpolation as: ‘the link between 
the discrete world and the continuous one’ (2000, p. 394).  
 
 
Figure 1.7 fMRI scan of dead salmon. Image is taken from poster (2012) Bennet, C. et. al.  
                                                
11 ‘Interpolation’ is defined as: ‘The process of determining a value of a function between 
two known values without using the equation of the function itself’ and ‘Mean’ as ‘A 
measure of location or central value for a continuous variable.’ (Everitt & Skrondal, 2010)	
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However the use of algorithms can be controversial, as the following 
intriguing study demonstrates. In a recent paper concerning the process of 
‘phantom imaging’, which is a procedure for checking whether a scanner is 
calibrated correctly’12, neuroscientists devised a unique test to check a 
scanner prior to a study measuring changes in blood-oxygenation levels in 
the brains (of humans) during tasks involving looking at different images 
inside a scanner. In a much-publicised study (Bennett, et. al. 2012), a dead 
salmon was placed in the scanner and projected a series of images whilst it 
was being scanned. To their surprise, the fMRI scan registered brain activity 
in the (dead) salmon, despite no evidence of malfunction in the scanner and 
the use of noise removing algorithms. This incidence has sparked much 
debate in the neuroscience and brain-imaging community about the use of  
‘multiple comparisons’13 algorithms in fMRI processes. Advocates point out 
that it is essential to reduce false positives, such as in the case of the dead 
fish. Opponents, on the other hand, argue that it is a conservative tool that 
can generate ‘false negatives’ and mask valuable information. Debates about 
which algorithms are best placed to enhance signal and reduce noise are not 
of significance to my project. What is of interest however, is the persistence 
of noise despite the use of algorithms. 
 
Medical visualisations 'picture' the body through many acts of filtering, 
masking or re-organising numerical information. This can perhaps be 
compared to the way in which human visual perception functions by making 
choices about what it focuses upon and what it discounts or filters from the 
visual field. Looking is like hunting, James Elkins (1996) asserts. It is a 
process of actively searching as one looks for patterns and meanings to 
emerge. But searching is highly selective; it also involves filtering visual 
information that is not the object of the search. ‘Each act of vision mingles 
seeing with not seeing, so that vision can become less a way of gathering 
                                                
12 This typically involves the use of vials filled with agar gel, which contain measured 
amounts of different contrast agents with pre-set values that have been prepared under 
laboratory conditions. These vials are placed in the scanner to check their values and to 
test and calibrate the scanner.	
13 The use of multiple comparisons correction in medical imaging is, for example, discussed 
in Bennett et. al. (2012).	
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information than avoiding it’ (Elkins, 1996, p. 201). The human eye and 
visualisation technologies are both actively making sense of the visual field. 
‘Ideas about control and lack of control are played out differently in artistic 
and scientific practice. Crucially, scientists look at ‘pictures’ of data, which 
they have set parameters for using mathematical methods and rules 
designed to reduce noise and to enable them to see clearly. Nevertheless, 
the images still contain some noise. The push and pull in this way of looking, 
and of producing images is in a sense creative, although it may not be 
perceived as such by scientists. They are searching for something to reveal 
itself by manipulating data. Is there a similar process as I manipulate my 
analogue drawing materials and search for images to be revealed? I reflect 
upon the idea of looking though algorithms and through the human eye in the 
studio. 
 
1.6 Drawing algorithms 
 
    
 
Figure 1.8 (Top Left) Untitled, 2015, graphite on paper, 84 x 59 cm. Work by the author. 
Figure 1.9 (Top Right) Detail of Untitled, 2015. 
Figure 1.10 (Below left) Image of original scan. 
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The starting point for the drawing above (see Figure 1.8) is a particularly 
‘noisy’ brain scan (see Figure 1.10) in which high levels of body movement 
were involved. Despite the use of algorithms for motion correction, it was 
considered to be unusable for the study. The ‘noisy’ areas of the scan were 
pointed out to me; they consist of misalignments that resemble fault lines in 
the image. It is a visually arresting image; its abstract composition and formal 
qualities are far removed from a living brain. I find myself responding to the 
variations of tone – its subtle shifts in density and powdery greyness. I render 
the different tones of grey in the pixelated image by using a variety of pencils 
from 6H to 6B. It is slow, meticulous work, requiring control of hand 
movements and an awareness of how breath and slight tremors of the body 
can disturb the process. Small areas of tone are worked over again and 
again, until the graphite has a slight sheen. I am giving a material presence 
to the abstracted digital image: it is a way of reaching into the data back to a 
body. The drawing becomes a bridge between the body that is scanned and 
data. Its material presence demands a different style of looking. It invites one 
to take time in its viewing and requires a close look (literally moving close to 
the paper) which is quite different to looking at the original scan. This style of 
looking feels more like loosing oneself in the marks (in the body of the 
drawing), rather than picking out overall patterns and meanings, and through 
this, I would like to suggest, invites an engagement with not knowing (noise) 
is opened. 
 
The hand-made image is inevitably associated with subjective and open 
readings, and conversely, the scientific visualisation carries with it 
associations with objectivity and knowledge making. But as Briedbach (2011) 
argues, an emphasis upon advances in computation capacities, technical 
performance and the production of life-like images of the body (from data) is 
not always the same as advances in the underlying analysis. An emphasis 
upon visualisations has a tendency to conceal the very close relationship 
between human decision-making, visual perception and the production and 
analysis of the technological image. Raw data files require ‘extensive 
processing, analysis, and interpretation as well as massive reduction in size 
to become meaningful at all’ (Burri & Dumit, 2008, p. 303). Thus, medical 
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visualisations are images that are ‘part of making data meaningful’ (ibid). 
However they can also have other relationships with data. Images can 
communicate in ways that data cannot as Elkins points out: ‘An image is not 
a piece of data in an information system. It is a corrosive, something that has 
the power to tunnel into me, to melt part of what I am and re-form it in 
another shape’ (1996, p. 42). Elkins is referring to our unconscious 
responses to images, which art historians (and psychologists) have theorised 
about extensively. Although medical visualisations have not been studied in 
this way, they are nevertheless images of the human body, and unconscious  
– cognitively closed – responses to images of the body have been theorised:   
 
We tend to look first at bodies and only afterwards let our eyes take in 
whatever else is there. It may be that the unthinking search for bodies is 
the most fundamental operation of vision, and that, even when there are 
no bodies present, we continue to understand the world in terms of bodily 
forms, textures, or metaphors.  (1996, p. 13)  
 
The material presence of a drawing demands different styles of looking to the 
digital scan displayed on a monitor. In my experience, a close observation of 
its surface qualities leads to a heightened sense of my own body as I look. 
An interesting comparison between two linear images, an EEG scan and a 
Hokusai drawing, in	David Griffin's paper ‘On not defining drawing’ (2012) is 
noteworthy. Griffin observes that both images contain lines that oscillate as 
they move across the image, but the weight, density and texture of the 
Hokusai lines – material presence – are integral to its reading. The lines of 
the EEG on the other hand, are read solely for the path they travel through a 
data field and any other information, such as the weight of the line, is 
cognitively irrelevant. This information is central to the drawing's meaning. 
However, the logical structure and rational environment of data-field 
pathways in the EEG scan do not reflect the ambiguity (and noise) that is an 
integral part of medical visualisations. The environment of the drawing allows 
for a wider interpretive field and, I would like to suggest, more complex ways 
of communicating ambiguity. My next conversations with scientists explore 
how noise is part of the environments of scanners. 
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1.7 The environments of noise 
‘As you lose noise you also lose image resolution. It’s a balance.’  
(Matthews, 2015) 
 
A central characteristic of noise is that it is random; its behaviour cannot be 
predicted. Perhaps one of the most random and unpredictable manifestations 
of noise is concerned with the interactions between scanning technologies 
and their environments. It is a well-established fact that MRI technology 
detects not only radiation from protons in the body, but also from the CMB 
(cosmic microwave background).14 This is a diffuse electromagnetic radiation 
that is the after-glow from the ‘big bang’ of cosmology, and which fills the 
universe. CMB signals 'contaminate' the scan; they can be filtered using 
algorithms, but cannot be entirely eliminated. CMB is perhaps the ultimate 
expression of Rose’s concept of a ‘milieu’; it is the environment from which 
life itself emerged. A similar process takes place in other image modalities 
such as X ray, which can detect radiation signals from their geological 
environment. As Ede points out:  
 
Current scientific research, and simultaneously the most recent expression 
in contemporary art, both depend on an increasing conviction that nothing 
can be fixed in time or place or isolated from its environment… Activity 
within the individual living cell, neurons firing in the brain, the inter-
relationships between subatomic particles … are all dynamic systems in a 
perpetual state of flux. (2000, p. 22) 
 
Flux suggests an environment of interactions (milieu) that is constantly 
changing and unstable. They extend from the immediate to the cosmic. The 
actions of cells, organs and systems within the body, as well as interactions 
between radiation in the external environment and the scanner generate 
noise. Noise is a trace of the ‘perpetual state of flux’ that Ede refers to. It is 
contextual information about the milieu of medical visualisations.  
The artistic image is understood as contextual, as being fundamentally 
connected to the social, geographical, political and cultural environment of its 
making. The scientific image is less likely to be understood in this way in 
                                                
14 Cosmic microwave background (CMB), also called cosmic background radiation, is 
electromagnetic radiation filling the universe that is a residual effect of the big bang of 
cosmology. The background radiation is in the microwave region of the electromagnetic 
spectrum. (Shu, 2017).	
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public perceptions, despite widespread agreement amongst social scientists, 
historians and philosophers of science that it is embedded in the social world. 
Perhaps the use of complex technologies is one of the main reasons that 
medical visualisations are not perceived as contextual images. And yet the 
sensitivity of these technologies is precisely why they can pick up signals 
from their contextual environments. I am reminded of previous conversations 
with scientists: the more sensitive the technology, the more likely it is to pick 
up noise as well as signal. Perhaps this is inescapable. But more importantly, 
as Matthews (2015) points out, when you reduce noise, you also lose 
valuable information. It is always a balance. Throwing away information that 
is perceived as cognitively irrelevant information can be problematic. 
 
Why then do scientists use the term 'noise' – which is at heart a sonic term – 
to describe ambiguous visual information? Why do scientists, who have 
historically connected knowledge to vision, choose a non-visual term? Is 
there a quality in sound – as opposed to vision – that is more closely aligned 
to information that is not available to cognition? Or is it more to do with not 
looking at (seeing) diagnostically irrelevant information? In the studio, I reflect 
upon these questions as I draw in response to the idea of an environment of 
noise. 
 
1.8 Drawing the milieu 
 
    
Figure 1.11 (Left) Untitled, 2015, graphite on paper, 84 x 59 cm, work by the author. 
Figure 1.12 (Right) Detail of Untitled, 2015. 
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How does the artist imagine a milieu or environment of flux and change? Flux 
is essentially a temporal phenomenon; it is rooted in change over time. How 
do I suggest the temporal in a still image? I explore time-based media in the 
form of a hand-drawn animation later in this thesis, but it also seems 
important to work with static drawings to uncover what they can do. Medical 
visualisations are largely still images. I begin by imagining that I am 
immersed in an environment that is continually moving and changing. 
Particles of dust caught in the sunlight, changes in temperature and the 
sounds around me in the studio become heightened as I draw. Although my 
focus is upon looking at the drawing, my alertness to the environment of the 
studio informs my drawing.  
 
I do not look at images of scans as I draw, there is no external image as 
stimulus for this drawing. It is built up very slowly over time, allowing each 
mark to connect with another. The idea of networks of interactions drives it 
forward, without a clear idea of its form or shape. I avoid thinking about the 
drawing as a whole and try to stay in the moment of making each mark. I 
also avoid gestural responses, and attempt to stay continually receptive and 
alert. Drawing in this way is strangely arduous, for I am continually blocking 
out internal images of how the drawing might proceed. It is difficult to know 
when the drawing is finished, because I could in a sense build upon it 
indefinitely (until the paper disintegrates) by continually making connections 
between marks. The choices I make are rooted in momentary perceptions 
that are visual and also material, because this drawing pulls me in very close. 
My marks are small enough to allow me to feel minute variations on the 
surface of the paper. The delicacy of individual marks reflects the unknown 
quality of my looking. 
 
As discussed previously, scientists use a sonic term – noise – to describe 
visually (and numerically) ambiguous information. Perhaps this is connected 
to its unknown visual status and its position outside of scientific knowledge. It 
may also be connected to the invisibility of noise within signal, and to the 
somewhat false dichotomy between them. The collection of signal from the 
human body involves unknown interactions and random movements. Noise 
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is, arguably, part of the process by which scientists gather data that they call 
signal.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored how noise is generated by and deeply implicated in 
complex movements and exchanges within the milieu of the human body and 
by interactions between visualisation technologies and their environment. 
Despite the use of algorithms to reduce noise, it cannot be fully eradicated 
from medical visualisations. Thus, noise is embedded in the structures and 
processes of looking developed by science and can neither be excluded from 
the concept of a medical visualisation, nor the interpretive practices 
associated with the technologies involved. 
 
I investigated how scientists create the informational category of noise when 
they look at medical visualisations. Noise always sits outside diagnostic 
relevance. It is therefore cognitively closed but still part of the system of 
knowledge developed in the technologies of science. However, the 
boundaries between noise and its informational opposite, signal, are not 
always clear-cut, and some ambiguity remains. The collaborative practice 
between different scientists during diagnosis and their statements in 
conversations with me demonstrated this. Later in this thesis, I refer to 
examples of scientific enquiry where noise changes into signal over time.  
 
My negotiation of noise in medical visualisation practices led me to observe 
that noise is implicated in the generation of signal. The positive and negative 
values attached to signal and noise in medical science can mask the grey 
areas between them. Random movements and interactions within and 
without the environment of the body not only generate noise, but are also 
embedded in the production of signal. Therefore, I assert that signal/noise 
more accurately describes the nature of signal, for it destabilises the 
dichotomy. 
 
The instability and visual ambiguity of noise was explored in my studio 
through drawing processes that engaged with different acts of looking. 
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Artistic practice, I assert, responds to visual ambiguity in different ways to 
scientific practice and can provide different perspectives upon noise. Thus 
the aim of this first chapter has been to argue that noise-signal ambiguities in 
science constitute an interesting interface with creative practices. 	
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Chapter 2. Noise On Vision (Talking about artists) 
 
The previous chapter focused on noise from the environment of a medical 
visualisation research institution, and considered how imaging scientists 
conceptualise and respond to it in their practice. Building on this information, 
this chapter interrogates how contemporary artists conceptualise and engage 
with noise to investigate how their approaches may offer different insights 
into its workings. The residency raised some key questions about how noise 
is perceived, recognised and seen by scientists; I argue that it complicates 
perception because it is difficult to separate it from the signal. The historical 
link between medical science, visual perception and the acquisition of 
knowledge suggests that vision is the primary sense in scientific enquiry. 
How does noise, which is unknown and unknowable, change this relationship 
in medical science? And how does the contemporary artist visually perceive 
noise? I consider the interactions within the human body,1 and between the 
bodies of technologies and their environments (milieu) that are understood to 
generate noise in scientific practice, and explore how they also change how 
noise is perceived. Theories about an ecological approach to visual 
perception by James J. Gibson (2015) contextualise my ideas about the 
relationship between the milieu, noise and vision. Furthermore, I explore 
James Elkins' (1996) and W. J. T. Mitchell's (2005, 2015) ideas about active 
and multi-directional ways of seeing, to interrogate how they can provide 
models for considering how vision can be thought about in the context of 
noise. Their ideas are from the discipline of art history, which has historically 
prioritised vision over the other senses. This approach is shared by many 
imaging scientists, who also do not privilege multi-sensual methods when 
analysing medical visualisations. 
 
                                                
1 I would like to clarify my use of the terms ‘human body’ and ‘body’. In art history, the term  
‘body’ is associated with ideas about the human body as a contested site of identity, 
particularly representations that construct identity (gender, race, class etc). Signs of 
identity are primarily seen and performed upon the surface of the body. Notions of ‘the 
body’, which carry with them the weight of art history, are less relevant to my project. I use 
the terms ‘human body’ and ‘body’ interchangeably to refer to the internal body as it is 
represented in medical science.	
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How do contemporary artists engage with acts of looking and seeing through 
practice and theory? What kinds of methods do artists employ to perceive 
unknown, ambiguous or unpredictable visual material? If looking is 
understood as the anatomical function of the eyes, and seeing as that which 
is seen or perceived when one looks, it is impossible to distinguish between 
them.2 However, in general, I use the term ‘looking’ to describe acts of 
observation such as looking through an instrument of vision, and ‘seeing’ as 
that, which is cognitively perceived. Nevertheless, this is not a fixed 
distinction, but fluid and variable, much as the eye itself is in continual 
movement. Marilène Oliver’s installations problematise a transparent view 
into the body (Dijck, 2005) by creating ambiguous visual environments. Artist 
Claude Heath's drawing practice complicates vision by using indirect 
methods of looking and (not) seeing, as well as slippages in his perceptions. 
His use of visual instruments such as stereoscopic glasses disrupts the 
functions they were originally designed for, leading him to perceive his 
subject matter in unknown ways. He actively generates drawings that break 
down the relationship between vision and knowledge. Beatriz Olabarrieta’s 
video Bolas sets up a process whereby acts of drawing and looking become 
entangled in unexpected and difficult to control movements and interactions. 
Whilst the scientist’s own body movements are not explicitly acknowledged 
and implicated when looking at noise in visualisations, I consider whether 
artistic processes that respond through unknown or unpredictable body 
movements whilst drawing can generate new ways of connecting with noise. 
Noise is an emerging theme within new media art, particularly in the work of 
Joseph Nechvatal who directly engages with key themes in my project. He 
theorises and produces artwork about the concept of noise, using algorithms 
that interact with his artworks in unexpected ways. Through this process, he 
actively generates noise to change how his artwork is seen. Imaging 
scientists also manipulate algorithms to determine how medical visualisations 
are seen. How could artistic strategies and methods involving the 
manipulation of data change perceptions of noise? This chapter interrogates 
                                                
2 James Elkins states that ‘the more neurological evidence is taken into account, the harder 
it is to separate anatomy from history, manners, or psychology’ (1996, p. 19).	
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what kinds of knowledge artistic processes that engage with the concept of 
noise (both directly and indirectly) can reveal. The writings of artists, art 
historians, new-media and visual-culture theorists, who interrogate vision and 
perception and explore the concept of noise provide a framework for this 
chapter. 
 
2.1 Noise as error  
 
At the heart of all attempts to reduce noise is the attempt to reduce error. But 
is noise merely error? Is it simply a glitch in the system? Glitch is theorised 
as an 'aesthetics of error' in new media art, one that 'mines what was once 
the erroneous’ (Nechvatal, 2011, p. 18). This process transforms what was 
once valueless into something valuable, thus changing perceptions. Whilst 
the incorporation of error (noise) has produced new forms of art, it is difficult 
to reconcile the use of error in scientific practice. Certainly, it would appear 
that error is inimical to scientific enquiry. However we also learn through 
errors (and failure). Finding a solution to a problem involves finding out what 
does not work, and trial and error is a cornerstone of laboratory experiments. 
In this sense, error is central to learning and the acquisition of knowledge. 
Moreover, error (noise) is inseparable from information (signal), and is 
embedded within the methods that scientists use to gather data, as I point 
out in Chapter 1. Noise can generate signal and therefore, is not simply an 
interference in signals. The media theorist Mako Hill points out that error and 
noise in systems can reveal their invisible workings: 'errors can reveal the 
affordances and constraints of technology that are often invisible to users' 
(2011, p. 29). He compares this to looking through a lens: ‘When technology 
works smoothly, its nature and effects are invisible. But technologies do not 
always work smoothly. A tiny fracture or smudge on a lens renders glasses 
quite visible to the wearer' (2011, p. 27). Noise can therefore, reveal the 
limitations of visualisation technologies.  
 
An interesting example of this is an account by the artist Marilène Oliver in 
her thesis, which is concerned with MRI (2008, pp. 26-34). She recalls 
looking at scans of her own body and noticing what she describes as ‘blobs’ 
around the heart. Upon asking the radiographer about them, she was told 
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that they are ‘noise’ - cardiac motion artefacts (a type of noise) - caused by 
the movement of her heart. She is intrigued and attempts to find out more: 
 
This phenomenon caught my imagination and I was keen to return and 
try and develop this work further ... but struggled to find a research 
partner willing to work with me. At one meeting I found myself in a very 
bizarre situation where I was showing a radiographer one of my 
heartbeat scans pointing out the very pronounced blobs but he kept 
insisting that ‘there is nothing there to see’, that it was ‘displacement. 
Just displacement. Nothing.’ Sensing his frustration I moved on to a 
different topic of conversation. In another meeting the radiographer 
explained that for him it would be a complete waste of time to embark on 
a project that scanned for artefact and that ‘besides, I am such a good 
radiographer I never get artefact’. (Oliver, 2008, p. 33, italics in original) 
 
The statement by the radiologist, that ‘there is nothing there to see’ is 
revealing. His use of language – notwithstanding that he is using the phrase 
metaphorically – is telling. One can simply deny the existence of and not see 
something in front of ones eyes if prior knowledge tells us it is erroneous. By 
labelling a part of the scan as ‘noise’, it disappears from view. It is cognitively 
irrelevant and therefore the radiologist can deny his visual perception. There 
is of course a considerable difference between a radiologist working in a 
hospital diagnostic unit and one working in a research institution. In research 
environments, radiologists are more likely to examine noise or to retain it in 
the visual field; in diagnostic radiology, the pressure to remove traces of 
noise is high. Nevertheless both environments are focused upon generating 
knowledge, whether it is about an individual scan or a large research study 
involving numerous scans. Oliver states that as an artist, she is attracted to 
the ‘faults’ in the image (2008, p.34), and this is perhaps a luxury afforded to 
an artist who can look without the pressure of diagnosis. Nevertheless it is 
common practice in hospitals for a group of specialists to discuss potential 
readings of a scan prior to diagnosis. Consensus is arrived at by 
acknowledging multiple ways of looking at and seeing the scan, and the 
possibility of uncertainty and ambiguity between signal and noise that I have 
drawn attention to in Chapter 1 as a signal/noise dichotomy. They are closely 
bound together. Noise is not so much error but ambiguous information. How 
does one look when there is uncertainty about what is being seen?  
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Figure 2.1 (Left), Marilène Oliver, Family Portrait, 2003, ink on acrylic sheets. 
Figure 2.2 (Right) Detail of Family Portrait, 2003. 
 
Oliver’s work Family Portraits is a manifestation of the ambiguous and 
uncertain nature of looking into the body through medical visualisations. The 
work is produced from MRI scans of the artist and her immediate family, 
which are printed in sections upon transparent acrylic sheets to reconstruct 
to form the whole body at actual size. The use of transparent materials such 
as glass, acrylic and architectural film is a recurring theme in the work of 
many artists whose work responds to medical visualisations. They evoke a 
dematerialised and technological body which is further emphasised by the 
use of complex technologies to construct artworks based upon 
visualisations.3 As one walks around the figures in the installation, slight 
changes in the viewer’s position seem to trigger shifts inside the bodies. A 
trick of the light caused by reflections upon transparent surfaces creates the 
illusion of movements. The body emerges from connections between cross-
sections that are not seen individually and facing the eye, but are angled 
away from the direct gaze causing patterns of interference. Bodies appear 
out of an environment of shifting planes and positions, clouding vision. 
 
The new-media theorist José van Dijck (2005) investigating how medical 
visualisations can generate perceptions about a fully visible and transparent 
body, argues that peering into the body is not an innocent activity. She 
                                                
3 Examples of artists working with transparent materials and images of visualisations include 
Katherine Dowson, My Soul, 2005; Annie Cattrell, Capacity, 2008; Angela Palmer, Self 
Portrait Crouching, 2007; and Justine Cooper, Rapt 11, 1998.	
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asserts that the transparent body is ‘a cultural construct mediated by medical 
instruments’, which ‘feeds into a desire for a manipulative body [that] 
perfectly fits a material, technological culture in which imitation has been 
replaced by modification’ (2005, p. 42). According to van Dijck, this apparent 
transparency is a contradictory and layered concept, which transforms the 
interior body into technologically complex visual information, which can 
confront people with agonising dilemmas and ethical choices. The notion of 
transparency in this context complicates understanding and renders the body 
more opaque.  
 
2.2 Tracing noise 
Artist Claude Heath’s practice continually experiments with visualisation 
technologies such as laser range-finding instruments, stereoscopes, aerial 
photography and stereo glasses to destabilise and create uncertainty about 
what is seen. His methods foreground lack of control and the tension 
between looking and not looking, for instance by using both hands to draw an 
object upon different planes that are hidden from view. Touch and body 
movement, particularly proprioception – the sense of the body in space – are 
important elements in his methods. Heath moves between seeing and not 
seeing, knowing and not knowing. In the process, he produces drawings that 
are difficult to read because of the ways in which he disrupts the relationship 
between sight and knowledge: 
 
Heath's work resists clear sense. It never fully translates. It seems to carry 
with it the groping darkness in which it was made, as if what was 
intelligible there can never emerge into the light of visibility... The 
knowledge embodied in these images is knowledge that we're just not up 
to using. (Lubbock, 2002) 
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Figure 2.3 (Top Left) Claude Heath drawing eucalyptus plant without looking at paper.  
(Top Right) Claude Heath, Eucalyptus, 2001, acrylic ink on paper, mounted on board, two 
panels, each 45.8 x 56cmm. 
Figure 2.4 (Below) Stereoscopic glasses with map of Ben Nevis, 2003. 
 
 
Heath’s drawings are difficult to decode because he breaks down the 
relationship between sight and representation. His methods are deliberately 
indirect. I am reminded of the indirect ways in which medical visualisations 
both measure and produce images of the internal body during my residency. 
Whilst indirect methods are perhaps understandably required when imaging 
technologies interact with living bodies, their ultimate aim is to accurately 
depict their subject matter. Heath’s methods, on the other hand, ensure the 
experimentation with error and invite slippages between vision, touch and 
representation. He points out that these slippages allow him to ‘see’ what the 
eye cannot: 
 
When drawing blindfold, one thing that strikes you is that it is possible to 
draw the far side of an object, which is ordinarily out of sight, or 'behind', 
simply by reaching around with your hand. By drawing it in this way, the 
hidden surfaces are made visible. This also brings things into view in such 
a way that they might compete with those up front which are normally 
visible to sight. So making something visible does not always make it 
easily available. (Heath, 2016) 
 
His drawings demand new ways of looking; it is difficult to recognise the 
object that is being represented. They are traces of not knowing and, as 
such, can be thought about as cognitively closed. As the unseen pencil in his 
hand follows his perceptions, it produces a material trace of slippages 
between sight and representation. He takes the emphasis away from the 
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representation and into a response to the object that is from the imagination 
– a looking inward. However looking inwards is not inseparable from looking 
outwards. Human vision is fraught with contradictions and is impossible to 
reconcile with ideas about ‘objectivity’ as many theorists have observed 
(Elkins, 1996,1998; Kemp, 1996, 2006; Latour, 1986; Mitchell 2005). 
 
2.3 Noise and human vision 
Noise, I would like to suggest, is implicated in everyday vision. The 
physiological function of the eyes generates images that are full of noise in 
the form of highly ambiguous visual information. Simple forms can become 
‘distorted’ in a multitude of ways. The angle of vision, light conditions, texture 
and tonal contrast are just some of the factors that can change the 
appearance of a spherical form in dramatic ways, as Martin Kemp observes: 
 
It is remarkable how many variations can be introduced without destroying 
our ability to compute the basic sphericity of the form. Depending on our 
cognitive interest at any particular time …we can selectively pick out one 
or more of the ‘interferences’ which affect the basic ‘signal’. We can, for 
instance, mentally filter the image to concentrate on variations in surface 
colour or tone. (Kemp, 2006, p. 68) 
 
The act of looking is a continuous process of interpretation and meaning-
making, while the appearance of objects may change dramatically when 
viewed under different conditions. Movement complicates everyday vision. 
The ‘interferences’ that Kemp refers to are analogous to noise; they are 
‘signals’ that cannot be clearly read or understood. We are continually 
filtering such signals – visual information – in order to function in the world. 
This is largely an unconscious process that allows us to disavow the noise in 
our visual perception. Looking is deeply connected to recognition, prior 
knowledge and processes of filtering and not seeing.  
 
How does one see something (recognise something) that is completely 
unknown and outside our frame of visual reference? It becomes perceived as 
noise I would like to argue. For noise is a relational phenomenon: it is 
perceived in relation to signal. If we take the example of looking at something 
that is unknown, this process is revealed more clearly. Kemp gives the 
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example of looking at the moon through the early telescope at a time when 
the earth was understood to be the centre of the universe, and where 
‘strange things were becoming visible for which no ready frame of 
interpretative seeing existed' (2006, p. 45). The dark patches on the surface 
of the moon were initially understood as patterns of discolouration, and not 
as patterns of light and shade across a spherical object, as Galileo asserted.4 
Consequently, the telescope became ‘vulnerable to the charge that what was 
seen through it was in whole or in part produced by the instrument itself … 
rather than showing in an accurate manner what was out there’ (ibid). 
Technologies of vision are ultimately mediated by the human eye and brain, 
and in this sense, what they reveal is filtered through existing knowledge and 
cultural attitudes. The idea that vision is principally mediated by social and 
cultural attitudes is however contested by ecological theories of visual 
perception. 
 
It is well established in neurophysiological study that visual perception is 
comprised of two systems, the ventral and the dorsal, which are located in 
the cortex (Norman, 2002).5 The dorsal is more sensitive to motion and is 
speedier in its responses, but is not as efficient at storing long-term (visual) 
memory. We are more conscious of the ventral system in everyday life, whilst 
the dorsal system is implicated in unconscious visual perceptions (Norman, 
2002). I outline this highly simplified account of the two systems to provide a 
context for two opposing theories in the psychology of visual perception: the 
constructivist and the ecological. Constructivist theories of visual perception 
emphasise the role of prior knowledge in making meaning. They assert that 
the information reaching the eye is insufficient to make sense of the world, 
and that many stages of cognitive processes, which involve hypothesising, 
are necessary prior to making sense. Ecological theory asserts that the 
                                                
4	For another account of Galileo's encounters with the telescope, see Umberto Eco's (2000) 
description of his drawings of the rings around Saturn. Eco emphasises that the process of 
drawing becomes Galileo’s method of conceptualising and structuring something that is 
outside his prior knowledge. 	
5 The function of the ventral system is ‘the recognition and identification of the visual input’ 
whilst the dorsal system is concerned with ‘the analysis of the visual input in order to allow 
visually guided behaviour vis-à-vis the environment and objects within it’ (Norman, 2002, p. 
74).	
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information from the environment is largely sufficient. It proposes a more 
immediate and direct response to the environment that does not require high 
levels of cognitive processing (McLeod, 2008). This is an interesting 
distinction with regard to noise, for if one wants to visually perceive it, prior 
knowledge is not helpful. Each visual encounter with noise is in a sense new. 
However it is also problematic to assume that no prior knowledge is 
implicated in visual perception, as critics of ecological theories of visual 
perception argue. Nevertheless it is a matter of emphasis, for ecological 
theory does encompass perceptions of memory and expectation.  
There are many resonances in Gibson’s (2015) influential The Ecological 
Approach to Visual Perception with the phenomenon of noise. He 
emphasises the flows of light and the key role of body interaction within 
environments as central components of visual perception. For Gibson, the 
movement of the head upon the body, and the body supported by the ground 
are all implicated in visual perception. Furthermore he refutes theories of 
vision as perspectival, for as the body moves there is no fixed point of 
observation. He argues that paths of observation are generated by 
ambulatory vision. As we move through the environment changes in the 
flows of light – what he terms as the optic array – provide a rich source of 
information about textures, distances of objects, the edges of things and our 
bodily relationship to them. Gibson proposes that light itself can ‘convey 
information about the world and hence, the phenomenal world does not have 
to be constructed by the mind’ (2015, p. 44). Recent studies suggest that 
there are limitations to both constructivist and ecological theories, and that a 
combination of both can explain visual perception more accurately (Norman, 
2002). My aim here is not to get caught up in these debates, but to explore 
the relationship between bodies moving and interacting in space and visual 
perception. Bruno Latour suggests: ‘What is needed to fathom scientific 
image making is probably the equivalent of what Gibson started to study for 
ordinary vision: an ecological interpretation that manages to focus not on 
vision per se but on the deambulation of active bodies registering features of 
a landscape by judging the relative proportion of what changes and what is 
transformed’ (2014, p.349). 
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2.4 Movement and noise 
There is a further sense in which the act of looking is understood in terms of 
movement, if one considers the constant saccadic movement of the eye. As 
the eye scans and maps the visual field, it makes a series of involuntary 
rapid eye movements known as saccadic (Bach, 2012). Human vision 
consists of a continual series of rapid and involuntary eye movements; it is 
not a fixed and static stare. Visual perception is accordingly, inseparable 
from movement. Furthermore, the brain processes two sets of information, 
one from each eye, by moving between them to generate an image with a 
sense of depth. But what do we actually see when the eye is actively darting 
around between different points? According to neuroscientist Jan 
Lauwereyns, a process of saccadic suppression takes place: ‘visual 
perception shuts down during eye movements … as no useful sensory 
information can be registered while the eyes are in mid-flight; we would get 
nothing but senseless streaks of light on the retina’ (2012, p. 139). Saccadic 
suppression has been researched widely since the 1970s and there is a 
general consensus that a process of active suppression as well as a 
desensitising to stimuli (not seeing) is involved during rapid eye movement.  
Lauwereyns argues that active suppression involves too high a price in terms 
of the energy required through biological processes, and that human vision 
has adapted to filter the noise and simply not see it: ‘Instead of expending 
precious molecular resources on suppression, the visual system can simply 
let the noise be’ (2012, p. 138). 
To ‘let noise be’ is perhaps not so simple, a Kemp-like ‘fuzzy’ image or noisy 
data can be problematic in the disciplinary frameworks of science. But artistic 
practice and disciplines can ‘simply let noise be’. Olabarrieta’s video Bolas 
captures the dynamic interplay between unpredictable movement and its 
representation through drawing. She holds two pens, one in each hand, and 
attempts to keep two marbles rolling upon a sheet of paper as she draws. 
The marks that she makes are traces of missed connections between hand 
and eye, sudden changes and interrupted lines. They are a record of her not 
knowing the direction of the drawing from moment to moment. She describes 
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the work as extending the body and as ‘losing authorship, when the subject 
becomes the object and visa versa’ (Olabarrieta, 2013).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 (Top and Below) Beatriz Olabarrieta, Bolas, 2012, two stills from video. 
 
 
In Bolas, drawing, looking and touching are held in a tight relationship that is 
performative. Mitchell extends this idea to the image itself: 
 
An image is a relationship and an appearance: it might be better, in fact, 
to think of images as events or happenings rather than as objects, in 
order to register their often fleeting temporality (appearing and 
disappearing, going in and out of focus, or, in Galison's lovely metaphor, 
scattering and gathering). (2015, p. 30) 
 
The video is both an event and its representation. Olabarrieta’s pens trace 
the movement of her hands and eyes across the paper; the drawn marks are 
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a trace of her visual perception and her body’s active response in time. She 
is, I would like to suggest, looking through her whole body and not just her 
eyes. As the viewer’s eyes follow the lines, they retrace the drawing activity. 
This brings to mind a process that Steve Garner calls spectatorship: ‘drawing 
as a means of tracing that act of spectatorship and recognition’ (2012, p. 17). 
For him, trace is understood in terms of what remains of the original act of 
looking by the artist. Her marks can also be thought about as traces of an 
'ecological' visual perception, for the speed and immediacy of her process 
suggests Gibson's theory about the directness of vision. She has no time to 
think. Whether or not Gibson's ideas accurately describe visual perception, 
Olabarrieta chooses to immerse herself in a highly interactive and ecological 
form of looking and drawing that is very evocative of the milieu. 
 
The act of drawing is, perhaps, one of the most immediate ways of tracing 
the act of looking, particularly when one considers the example above. The 
act of tracing becomes a reaching into the unknown, as if the hand is trying 
to feel something through the pencil that is not apparent. Mitchell speaks 
about the artist ‘breathing life’ back into the lines: 'Desire just is, quite literally, 
drawing, or a drawing – a pulling or attracting force, and the trace of this 
force in a picture' and points out ‘the double meaning of drawing as an act of 
tracing or inscribing lines, on the one hand, and an act of pulling, dragging, or 
attracting, on the other' (2005, p. 59). The activity of tracing can enable the 
artist to focus upon re-animating an unseen aspect of the image or extracting 
a different kind of meaning from it. 
 
Furthermore, drawing is closely associated with thinking as Deanna 
Petherbridge points out: ‘since Classical times in the West, drawing has been 
understood by artists, philosophers and theorists to be linked to idea and 
contrasted with the sensational aspects of paint/colour that work more 
immediately upon the physical responses of the onlooker through value, hue 
and saturation’ (2010, p. 88). Drawing’s ability to respond directly to ideas, 
using simple means, such as a pencil (a tool that scientists and artists use to 
make sense of and understand the world around them), allows me to engage 
with the concept of noise without distractions, such as colour or associations 
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with the histories of painting for instance. It is a medium that has historically 
connected art and medical science through practices of measuring and 
mapping the internal body such as anatomical drawing. I do not claim that 
drawing has unique properties for this project, although I refer to its 
immediacy and directness, watercolour or video can also be very immediate 
and responsive media. My reasons for focusing upon drawing are primarily 
because it is a process that enables me to work with ideas about looking and 
seeing fluidly and directly.6 Thinking-through-drawing is a primary 
methodology in this research, one that is manifested through a number of 
strategies that are demonstrated in the next chapter. I create structures for 
looking as I draw, and set up rules and methods that shape what I see. At 
times, I introduce unexpected movements and interactions into the drawing 
process, creating a sense of loss of control. My methods involve a conscious 
working out of drawing processes, as well as more intuitive responses that 
are an embodied form of thinking. In this, my strategies can be described at 
times as cognitively open and as cognitively closed in that they are not 
consciously available to me. There is a certain quality about drawing which 
artists and theorists recognise and that lends itself to my project. In the 
introduction to Drawing Now, the editors of TRACEY observe: 
‘Unencumbered by more sophisticated or “finished” processes such as 
painting or more “advanced” technological methods, drawing’s simplicity 
seems more able to demonstrate the complexity of conceptual possibilities. It 
can be remarkably and peculiarly potent’ (Downs et. al, 2007, p. x). 
Nevertheless, these qualities are not unique to drawing and can be 
experienced in other creative practices. 
 
Olabarrieta’s lines fluidly respond to the dynamic nature of her looking. She 
sets up an environment where she is compelled to look and draw in a highly 
interactive way. Unexpected movements set up certain styles of looking. 
Theories about looking, seeing and representation in visual studies are 
numerous and diverse. Some are interconnected and share a framework, 
                                                
6 The artist Michael Craig-Martin states: ‘There is a cultural as well as a physical density that 
characterises painting and sculpture that is in contrast to the fluidity of drawing’ (Craig-
Martin, 1995, p. 9).  
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whilst others take different positions and can be somewhat contradictory. 
Definitions and terminologies compete or coexist with each other.7 They are 
concerned with power relationships and with how bodies become objectified. 
However, noise sits outside theories such as the medical gaze (Foucault, 
1973), because it cannot be assimilated into scientific knowledge or, 
consequently, into relationships of power. As I consider the diverse range of 
theories connected to vision, I am conscious of critiques of ocularcentric 
approaches that do not acknowledge the other senses and the material 
presence of the body in visual perception. I wish to argue that my project is 
exploring a phenomenon – noise – that is perceived visually (without 
acknowledging the other senses) in medical visualisation practice and theory. 
I am interested in exploring the differences between how scientists and 
artists visually perceive noise, particularly by considering how noise 
complicates vision.  
 
To examine this further, I would like to refer to Bruno Latour’s ideas about 
how scientists work with visual material. Latour (1986) examines the ways in 
which scientists work with images and argues that science builds visual 
knowledge through a system of signs, symbols and diagrams, which taken 
together he calls ‘inscriptions’.8 He argues that inscriptions are images that 
are used in specific ways to construct ‘harder facts’ (p.17). They have an: 
‘optical consistency’ (p. 7) which allows them to be combined with each other 
and with text. Most importantly, inscriptions ‘have the properties of being 
mobile but also immutable, presentable, readable and combinable with one 
another’ (p.7). Thus, they can be mobilised to ‘win an agonistic encounter 
between two authors’ and to build ‘statements’ (p. 4) over time. These 
properties, he argues, create very favourable conditions for the construction 
                                                
7 One example is the concept of the ‘gaze’, which is theorised in a multiplicity of ways. They 
include the clinical/medical gaze (Foucault, 1973), the male gaze (Mulvey, 1975), the 
post-colonial gaze (Said, 1978), the panoptic gaze (Foucault, 1977), the virtual gaze 
(Friedberg, 1998), the haptic gaze (Marks, 2002) and the molecular gaze (Rose, 2006). 
For an extensive analysis and history of theories about ‘the gaze’, see Elkins (2002-
present).	
8 The term ‘inscription’ has been extensively used in post-structural theory. However my use 
of it in this thesis is confined to Latour’s conceptualization (1986) which is linked to how 
scientific images accrue knowledge as described. 
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of scientific knowledge. Networks9 and associations of immutable inscriptions 
allow knowledge to be built cumulatively, and for Latour, they are the key 
differences between scientific and non-scientific images. It can be argued 
that scientific visualisations are today increasingly mutable, particularly when 
they are projecting change over time in such network systems as the spread 
of diseases for instance. However, this can also be thought of in terms of the 
incremental changes in visual units – signs and symbols in a statistical model 
for instance – that are reused or adapted by building upon previous versions. 
Optical consistency allows one to build upon previous knowledge. Latour 
gives the example of the early printing press which he argues, generated a 
sense of accuracy simply by being optically consistent and immutable. The 
hand-made copy or drawing is not consistent. It does not accrue knowledge 
in the same way. In contemporary drawing practice, multiplicity and mutability 
are more likely to be a valued than consistency. Symbols and signs can be 
reused to reference former artworks, but they are more likely to destabilise 
previous meanings and contexts; they do not function as inscriptions. Noise 
too does not function within a system of inscriptions, and in this, it is more 
closely aligned to the artistic image. 
 
In contrast to the above account, art historians Elkins and Mitchell, have both 
written extensively about looking and seeing as active, interactive and 
multiple. Their ideas are of particular interest because they suggest that 
vision is itself enmeshed in unknown and multiple interactions (a milieu) that 
could shed light upon how noise can be visually perceived by the artist. 
Although I acknowledge that multi-sensory approaches are important to 
contemporary arts practice, I would like to first examine how far ocular 
approaches can elucidate how noise functions in relation to acts of looking 
and seeing. I am also conscious that Latour contests the validity of applying 
art-historical theories about visual perception to the scientific image, which is 
                                                
9	According to Latour (1996), networks are central to the acquisition of knowledge and can 
include human and (somewhat controversially) non-human actors. Although it is 
interesting to consider the hardware of imaging technologies as 'actors' in a network that 
generates noise, the focus of this enquiry is how scientists and artists look at noise. Actor-
network theory is not a methodology for this enquiry.	
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defined by its immutability, mobility and ability to be combined with other 
images. But I would like to assert that noise in scientific practice is a special 
case in point, because it does not function as an ‘inscription’ as defined by 
Latour. Its cognitively closed status and its elusiveness from the generation 
of scientific knowledge means that it does not function in the same way as 
scientific images. 
 
2.5 The milieu and multiple looking: James Elkins and W J T Mitchell 
Elkins and Mitchell propose models of looking and seeing10 in which the 
object ‘stares back’ (Elkins, 1996) or has ‘desires and wants’ (Mitchell, 2005). 
Their ideas about multi-directional, unconscious and consequently cognitively 
closed visual processes are, I would like to suggest, particularly appropriate 
to my subject matter. Noise breaks down the subject-object relationship; it 
escapes from becoming the ‘object’ of sight by evading comprehension and 
measurement. It emerges out of the milieu of interactions between living 
systems and energies such as magnetic waves and radiation; it is a visual 
trace of unknown interactions. Elkins concept of multi-directional lines of 
sight, which can move between object to viewer in both directions in 
unpredictable and unknown ways evokes the movements of photons, 
electrical impulses and magnetic waves that are implicated in the generation 
of noise in medical visualisations. Furthermore, to think about acts of looking 
and seeing as multi-directional is to situate them in their environments, where 
the actions of bodies as well as the actions of photons are enmeshed in each 
other. To perceive noise, I would like to suggest, one needs to conceptualise 
acts of looking and seeing as within an environment of interactions – a 
milieu.11  
                                                
10 Theorists use the terms ‘looking’ and ‘seeing’ differently. In general, Elkins and Mitchell 
conceptualise ‘seeing’ as socially and culturally constructed, and ‘looking’ as the 
anatomical function of the eyes. Sturken and Cartwright (2001) on the other hand, reverse 
meanings by describing ‘seeing’ as automatic and somewhat arbitrary, whilst ‘looking’ is 
defined as actively making meaning. For Hal Foster, visuality is the social function of 
sight, and vision is the physical operation of sight. Nevertheless, despite the differences 
between definitions, all theorists affirm that social and anatomical vision is inseparable 
and completely entangled. I therefore move between the two terms fluidly. 	
11 As the reader will note, I am using the terms milieu and environment interchangeably. 
Whilst Rose’s concept of the milieu is concerned with interactions in living systems, I 
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There is no such thing as ‘just looking’ according to Elkins. Looking is highly 
problematic and complex. He deconstructs the phrase – ‘the observer looks 
at the object’ – and argues that to look is also to be seen. It is a continual and 
multiple ‘cat’s cradle of crossing lines of sight’ (1996, p. 70). He states: 
 
Looking is much too complex to be reduced to a formula that has a 
looking subject and a seen object. If I observe attentively enough, I find 
that my observations are tangled with the object, that the object is part of 
the world and therefore part of me, that looking is something I do but also 
something that happens to me – so that the neat architecture of the 
sentence becomes a morass. (Elkins, 1996, p. 35) 
 
This complexity is not consciously experienced he asserts, and perhaps it 
would be impossible to function if one was aware of it. I am reminded of film 
theorist Laura Marks, who asks: ‘What if our perceptions were so embodied 
that we could feel every step of our digestive process, the twitching of our 
neurons. We would be so attuned to the universe within that it would be 
impossible to focus upon the world around us’ (2000, p. 132). Does focusing 
one’s attention on a specific visual task, such as identifying a particular 
shape within an assortment of different forms, lead to less awareness of 
other senses such as the sounds or smell around us? Unquestionably, in 
scientific practice, there is nothing to be gained from the other senses, as the 
scientist looks at an image of the scan on a monitor. Scientific enquiry does 
neither acknowledge wider sensual perceptions such as touch, smell or 
sounds in this specific context, nor the understanding that looking is 
something that happens to me. Other senses are diagnostically irrelevant for 
the scientist. When scrutinising a scan to identify noise from signal, visual 
perception is understood as moving in one direction – from scientist to scan. 
However, measurement systems in medical visualisation practices and the 
actions of noise itself are multi-directional and highly interactive. Perhaps an 
acknowledgement of the multi-directional and interactive environments (both 
inside and outside the body), with which scientists are engaging with through 
acts of looking can change what is perceived? 
                                                                                                                                     
would like to suggest that the interactions of photons or magnetic waves in the 
environment is analogous to the milieu.	
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Mitchell’s ideas suggest another way of thinking about how noise could be 
perceived as a visual phenomenon. He argues that images are not static 
fixed things, but have agency and can interact with the viewer: 
 
The philosophical argument … is simple in its outline: images are like 
living organisms; living organisms are best described as things that have 
desires (for example, appetites, needs, demands, drives); therefore, the 
question of what images want is inevitable. (2005, p. 11) 
 
Mitchell is proposing images have special powers and can affect us in 
extraordinary ways,12 but not that they literally have desires and wants: 
Art historians may "know" that the pictures they study are only material 
objects that have been marked with colours and shapes, but they 
frequently talk and act as if pictures had feeling, will, consciousness, 
agency and desire. (ibid, p. 31) 
 
Artists and art historians can look at an image in heightened ways, as if it is a 
living thing. This is not to literally assign agency and life to non-living objects, 
but to look at them as if they have agency, which is an important distinction. I 
am conscious that Mitchell's ideas, and particularly Latour's theories about 
the agency of non-human actors in actor-network theory can be understood 
as advocating living properties to inanimate objects. However, this enquiry 
does not propose that images are living things with agency. I am speculating 
whether noise in images – ambiguous visual material that is cognitively 
closed, and which consequently, it could be argued, escapes from the 
multitude of associations that images carry with them – could be looked at in 
terms of Mitchell's ideas about the desires and wants of images. Carl 
                                                
12 It is necessary here, to address the idea of images as having magical properties, 
particularly questions about animism and vitalism. Vitalism is the philosophy that all living 
things contains a life force that is separate from their physiochemical properties; it is this 
vital force, that it claims, distinguishes living beings from inanimate matter: (Merriam-
Webster, n.d., s.v. vitalism n.). Whilst vitalism has long been discredited as a hypothesis 
in biomedical science, it still influences thinking in holistic medical practices. Similarly, 
animism is an ancient philosophy that attributes special powers to non-human entities; it is 
a belief that plants, animals and inanimate objects have spirits that are separate from their 
physical properties (ibid, s.v. animism n.). Mitchell acknowledges that his theory does 
advance magical properties for images and pictures, but he does so by arguing that this is 
based upon ‘a deep and abiding feature of human responses to representation’ (2005, p. 
31). Furthermore, he also asserts that this idea is not a novel idea (Mitchell in Grønstad 
and Vågnes, 2017).	
 			 57	
Knappett (2005) problematises the boundary between the animate and the 
inanimate by questioning whether self-organising systems13 are indeed 
animate, for they clearly display signs of agency and structural organisation. 
Nevertheless, when considering inanimate objects, Knappett argues that 
they cannot have agency but that humans can imbue them with the attributes 
of agency when they trigger psychological responses. Noise, I would like to 
suggest, is likely to generate such responses, whether it is through frustration 
or curiosity. If one considers the desires and wants of noise, they appear to 
be to evade knowledge. It raises questions rather than provides answers. 
What if noise was looked at as if it had agency? To look at something as if it 
is alive is to acknowledge that it can look back and has the potential to 
interact and change in unexpected ways. It gives an equal status to image, 
and the one who looks. And a curiosity about the image that is centred upon 
not knowing how it may change. As previously noted, scientists can stop 
seeing something once it is called ‘noise’. What if they perceived noise as 
something with agency? This approach would deny the ‘unconscious 
blindness’ that I suggest in Chapter 1 may be a response by scientists to 
visual marks that do not fit into the overall pattern of information. However 
the implication of thinking about noise as if it has agency is to overlook that it 
is simply a back-formation of signal, it is random data that cannot be 
decoded. Noise is not a different category of order to signal: the difference is 
between information that is available or closed. 
 
Looking at images as if they have agency is arguably more common in 
artistic practice.14 If our perceptions are modified to avoid an over-sensitivity 
to stimuli in our visual field, then the artists I refer to appear to do the 
opposite: they emphasise the multi-directional nature of looking and seeing. 
The viewer of the artwork is in turn invited to participate in similar styles of 
                                                
13	Examples of self-organising systems in nature include the flocking behaviour of birds, the 
social behaviour of insects and schoaling of fish.	
14 Michael Craig-Martin comments that ‘for artists, a work of art is alive, a living reality, or it 
is only of marginal interest. To be truly experienced, the work of art needs to be felt, more 
than understood’ (1995, p. 9).	
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looking. Or perhaps, it is more accurate to state that the artwork activates 
certain styles of looking. 
 
2.6 Looking for rhythms 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Emma McNally, Choral Field 2 (detail), 2014, graphite on paper, 215 x 304cm.  
 
The artist Emma McNally’s practice is an interesting example to consider in 
relation to Elkins’ ideas about multiple looking. Her densely layered, large-
scale drawings evoke diagrams of constellations, digital networks or circuit 
boards but are constructed out of the artist’s imagination (an inner looking) 
using the most basic of materials – a graphite pencil or chalk on a 
blackboard. They seem to be measurements of something yet it is unclear of 
what. Marks merge, emerge and disappear; some are hard edged, precise 
and crisp, others soft and cloudy. Looking at McNally’s drawings induces a 
sense of being immersed in an environment of signs that cannot be decoded 
but which nevertheless, insistently communicate. She describes her drawing 
process in terms of: ‘rhythms of making and unmaking… always being in the 
middle… disrupting hierarchy… a restless space’ (McNally, 2017).  
Lines criss-cross the surface constantly forming new relationships with each 
other. The apparent infinite possibilities for connection seduces the eye into 
restless movement across the surface. McNally returns again and again to 
the idea of rhythm: ‘When you make rhythmic marks you start inhabiting a 
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certain space… as fast as you’re receiving you are transmitting. Everything 
becomes a feedback loop of reception and transmission. You become 
circuitry’ (McNally, 2017). She calls her lines ‘pulses’, as if they are living 
things or transmissions of energy, and this seems a very fitting way to 
describe them. Her drawings resemble maps of energies, models of potential 
interactions between unknown forces. In an interview for Artforum, she talks 
about her drawings in terms of ‘turbulence’ and complex inter-relationship 
and contradictions between noise and signal: 
 
I think of these drawings as fugitive, heterogeneous grey areas. They are 
the turbulence between noise and signal. They are a space of difference 
and deferral, a weather system of graphite. They are also broadband 
realms where signals at multiple frequencies are being transmitted and 
received—including those not usually within our ‘range’: sonar, ultraviolet, 
the very fast and the very slow. I’m constantly trying to disrupt the figure-
ground relationship to make blurred areas where the conditions of 
focusing are undone. (McNally in McNally and Soin, 2014) 
                    
Figure 2.7 Emma McNally, 2012, Residency at Maths House, University of Warwick. 
The photograph Figure 2.7 is from a residency she undertook in the Institute 
of Mathematics at the University of Warwick in 2012. She is drawing upon 
extended curved blackboards that line the walls of one of the Maths Houses. 
McNally attended lectures and seminars in the Institute as part of her 
residency, and she has stated that the drawings are influenced by the 
mathematical concepts she encountered during this time. However she 
asserts that they do not illustrate mathematical concepts but were produced 
from a purely intuitive process. The blackboards are large and the work 
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encompasses her field of vision. She immerses herself in a complex system 
of lines and dots, activating the surface of the board by looking for – and 
seeing – connections and pathways between each mark. However she does 
not proceed from a position of (consciously) knowing, but rather through the 
way in which she looks at the drawing. The drawing emerges out of the 
interplay between marks, the materiality of the chalk and black board, as well 
as McNally’s own response to these elements. Here I would like to propose 
that the artist looks at the drawing in a particular way – as if it has agency – 
and that she visualises this sense of agency through the marks she makes. 
She is immersed in a milieu of movements and flux by looking within herself. 
Whilst Heath and Olabarrieta actively engage their bodily perceptions as they 
draw (here the sense of touch and of the body in space is important, and not 
accounted for in Elkins’ and Mitchell's theories), McNally looks within herself 
to produce drawings that seem to be manifestations of multi-directional ways 
of looking.  
2.7 Noise as productive: noise as destructive  
The media artist Joseph Nechvatal explores the idea of the artwork as a 
living thing in a unique way. He makes use of algorithms that are based upon 
living systems to degrade his digital artworks in unexpected and 
uncontrollable ways, thus choosing to incorporate cognitively closed and 
cognitively irrelevant information in his artworks. He gives up control of his 
artworks to noise and allows it to act upon them. Nechvatal writes extensively 
about noise as a cultural, spatial and visual phenomenon, using diverse 
examples such as the stone-age artworks in the Lascaux caves and Antoni 
Gaudí’s Casa Batlló in Barcelona. His central concern is a state of 
consciousness that occurs when one is immersed in ‘noise art’15 which he 
defines as the ‘conditions and orders of conscious awareness in which 
perception-cognition (i.e. awareness linked to the process of forming 
intelligence) is found to consist of more than everyday (non-conceptual) 
vision or hearing typically reveals, by merging with some manifestation 
suggestive of a magnificent more (2011, p. 59, italics in original). According 
                                                
15 Nechvatal (2011) uses the terms ‘art noise’, noise art’ and ‘art in noise’ inter changeably.	
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to Nechvatal, the ‘magnificent more’ is a transformational experience that 
immerses the viewer in an intense and confusing environment of cultural 
meanings and signifiers. He argues that the experience of immersion into an 
art of noise creates a 'vacuole of non-communication’ (p. 15), (as opposed to 
the excessive communication of digital technology) that induces self-
reflection and transformation in the 'immersant' (p. 59), it is not clear whether 
this is the viewer of the artwork, the artist, or both. Noise art, according to 
Nechvatal, is both disruptive and productive. It moves between subject/object 
as well as internal/external positions, and privileges art processes that are 
unpredictable.  
 
 
Figure 2.8 Joseph Nechtaval, 2002, Computer Virus Project 2.0, video still  
 
His series of ‘Computer Virus Project’ artworks are formed by computer 
viruses based upon artificial life16 interacting with his work. A virus is not 
unlike noise in that it is information without meaning that is random and 
difficult to control. Nechtaval’s original image files are therefore degraded by 
diagnostically irrelevant information (noise), which is given the role and 
status of cultural creator. It acts upon his artworks in real time, and this 
seems fitting, for by its refusal to be contained within knowledge, noise 
                                                
16 Stéphane Sikora’s paper ‘Balancing art and complexity: Joseph Nechvatal’s Computer 
Virus Project’ (n.d.), provides a good description of this process: ‘Artificial life is a field that 
studies artificial objects that exhibit properties of life... Here, viruses are modelled as 
autonomous agents inhabiting an image (the host) and try to survive by consuming or 
‘eating’ the colours contained in the image.’ 	
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demands that one remains in the present (for there is no prior knowledge to 
fall back on). Artistic practice can therefore have very different attitudes 
towards noise, which seem in opposition to scientific approaches. However it 
could be argued that both approaches – artistic and scientific – perpetuate a 
binary opposition: noise is made invisible or made visible. Yet noise, through 
its refusal to communicate, remains beyond dualism; it simply is. 
 
Nechvatal argues that an ‘art of noise’ produces new meanings by 
transforming the viewer’s (immersant) state of consciousness. In scientific 
practice, noise typically destroys meaning and is framed in opposition to 
signal (meaning), as in 'signal-to-noise ratio'. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that although noise reduction is generally the overall aim in 
medical science 17, there is an implicit understanding within medical imaging 
practice that reducing noise inevitably reduces information (and meaning). 
And it is the perception that there may be some potential (information) 
embedded within noise, which I would like to argue, refuses dualism. The 
relational and contingent nature of noise is central to this; noise refutes 
dualism by refusing a fixed definition. The cultural theorists Greg Hainge 
(2013) and Paul Hegarty (2007) assert that the ontology of noise is 
profoundly relational: ‘[noise] does not exist independently, as it exists only in 
relation to what it is not’ (Hegarty, 2007, p. 5).  
 
The science writer Sandra Blakeslee provides a good example of its 
relational status. She points out that there are many instances in the recent 
histories of science, where data that was initially considered to be noise, is 
later reassessed as signal after changes in scientific knowledge. In the 1970s 
data about the ozone layer that was captured by NASA was initially 
dismissed as noise (Blakeslee, 1990). This data was reassessed in the 
1980s after scientists recognised – and could see patterns of – the thinning 
of the ozone layer: ‘what is noise now will not necessarily remain so’ 
(Hegarty, p. 17). Information that does not fit within existing knowledge 
                                                
17 Medical scientists are increasingly studying noise to understand how biological systems 
can vary. The study of noise is more established in the disciplines of physics and is an 
emerging area of interest in medical science.	
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systems is not recognised and cannot be seen; it becomes signal once it is 
recognised within a framework of knowledge and can be seen. Sandra 
Blakeslee (1990) observes: ‘[the original data’s] greatest value, researchers 
say, may lie in the light it can shed on scientific questions that have not yet 
been posed.’  
 
The final statement is revealing – for not only does noise raise questions, but 
more importantly, it can point to questions as yet unframed. And it resolutely 
does not provide answers. This is perhaps why an artistic approach is 
valuable when considering noise, because questioning without looking for 
answers, through materials, methods and processes is embedded into 
artistic practice. Artists are more likely to remain with the questioning and to 
accept multiple answers rather than one, in what McNally describes as ‘a 
restless space’. 
 
Nechvatal's ideas about an 'immersion into noise' can be linked to Gibson's 
theories about environmental perception, which describes visual perception 
in terms of immersion in an environment of signals (flows). However his 
methods separate the body of the artist from the viewer and also, I would like 
to suggest, distance the viewer from experiencing a sense of immersion 
when looking into the monitor at the work. This is unlike Olabarieta's video, 
which evidences the movements of her hands and, in my experience, pulls 
the viewer into the environment she creates. In the next chapter, I test ideas 
and experiment with methods of engaging with noise using different drawing 
strategies in the environment of the studio, to investigate how they change 
my perceptions.  
 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter investigated the concept of noise in medical 
visualisation practice. This chapter explores whether artistic practice has an 
equivalent to noise. Do artists perceive certain kinds of visual information as 
cognitively closed and diagnostically irrelevant? 
 
My survey suggested that while many artists do not address or acknowledge 
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noise specifically as a subject, their practices do engage continually with the 
key characteristics of noise as defined in the first chapter. They experiment 
with slippages in visual and cognitive perceptions, as well as with 
movements and interactions in the environments of the drawing that 
precipitate a lack of control. Thus diagnostic irrelevance and cognitive 
closures seem to be as embedded in aesthetic structures of looking as they 
are in science. 
 
An important discovery has been that noise in the visual arts involves the 
interaction of the artist’s sensory body with the material environment. As a 
result, this chapter considered theories of interactive and dynamic styles of 
looking in order to propose that noise is a perceptual tool with trans-
disciplinary potential. Scientists, nevertheless, do not recognize the full 
sensorium of human perception when examining medical visualisations. This 
is a key difference to even the most visual of visual-arts practice.  
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Chapter 3. Phases of Activity (Thinking through practice) 
 
This chapter investigates the concept of noise through phases of artistic 
activity. It explores acts of looking and seeing1 through different optical 
instruments, and responds to unintentional, unexpected or unknown 
movements and interactions through drawing. I test methods that emphasise 
interactions between my drawing ground and drawing materials, and involve 
unexpected movements that are difficult to control. The animation Mind 
Wandering 3, is produced by looking through a macro lens and drawing with 
graphite powder upon a ground that is continually moving. The resulting 
animated drawing takes on a peculiar quality; it resembles a living thing such 
as a bacterial growth. I draw upon vellum, an organic material that is very 
responsive to the temperature and humidity of its environment. It changes 
shape as it expands and contracts in response to the heat of the light box. 
Looking through a macro lens accentuates this phenomenon. The 
interrelationship between a drawing and the environment of the paper is 
explored by drawing with animal fat. These methods demonstrate how 
drawing can be used as a tool for thinking, as Petherbridge and others have 
observed, and for testing ideas connected to my research into the 
phenomenon of noise. 
 
My use of instruments of vision, such as a microscope, macro lens and light 
box in this chapter, acknowledges the mediation of technologies of vision in 
medical visualisations. I respond to the notion of the transparent body (Dijck, 
2005) through the materials I use and the ways in which I look. Magnification 
and scale are similarly explored through my use of macro lens or 
microscope, and through large-scale drawings. The ways in which 
visualisation technologies frame and determine how the body is seen are 
investigated by using a hand made construction: a cardboard box that I look 
through. This simple device, which stands in for the 'black boxing'2 of 
                                                
1	See my previous discussion of looking and seeing in Chapter 2 page 39. The next chapter 
explores ideas about looking and seeing from a theoretical perspective in more detail.	
2	See my notes about Latour’s (1987, 1999) concept of black boxes later in this chapter on 
page 55. 
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technology, enables me to look through the space between instrument of 
vision and the object being looked at. To explore how the environment 
changes the ways in which I look, my drawing activities take place in different 
environments such as the studio, the laboratory and the public spaces of a 
university and arts organisations. Finally, I test drawing methods that 
investigate the relationship between data manipulation and noise. During my 
residency at the University of Manchester, I observed that there is a close 
relationship between the use of algorithms in medical visualisation practice 
and acts of looking. They determine what is seen and are a key tool used to 
filter and reduce noise. The phenomenon of noise is implicated in the 
manipulation of data and in its movement through technology. New-media 
artist Joseph Nechvatal utilises algorithm processes in his artworks to 
generate rather than to reduce noise. In this chapter, I test methods that not 
only generate noise in data, but also explicitly implicate my body in the 
drawing process. This is achieved by using live data from body sensors, such 
as skin galvanometers, whilst drawing and through a performative drawing 
process that involves my whole body in an active response to unpredictable 
and unknown signals as I draw. Throughout this chapter, I interrogate what 
constitutes cognitively closed and diagnostically irrelevant information in my 
methods, and explore what a contemporary drawing practice can reveal 
about noise in medical visualisations. 
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3.1 Drawing in the laboratory: looking through the microscope 
 
                    
Figure 3.1 (Left) Author drawing while looking through microscope in laboratory, Manchester 
Metropolitan University, Manchester, 2014.  
Figure 3.2 (Right) Sketchbook drawing produced by looking through microscope in 
laboratory at King’s College, London, 2012, work by the author. 
 
The laboratory, with its focus upon close observation, is the environment for 
a series of drawings which are made by looking through confocal and light 
microscopes at Kings College and at Manchester Metropolitan University. 
Confocal microscopes provide sharper and more detailed images than a 
conventional light microscope, but focus upon smaller points (Bisen & 
Sharma, 2013). Drawing in the laboratory is, of course, a very different 
context to being in the studio. I am wearing a lab coat and conscious that this 
is a space where other disciplines are intensively focused on the act of 
looking. There is a shared process of selecting, isolating and framing areas 
of visual interest, albeit with the aid of technologies that are not typically 
found in an artist’s studio. Scientists work with coloured dyes to stain 
samples and can choose between various visual styles to look at samples on 
the computer screen. In both laboratories, I am first given a detailed 
description of each slide – which part of the body, which type of tissue, its 
function etc. It is evident that this knowledge – cognitively relevant 
information – is considered to be vital before one looks. It is a style of looking 
– building upon existing knowledge – that defines this environment.  
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Consequently, the sketchbook I am using includes notes and information 
about each slide; it begins to resemble a journal, possibly changing the 
perceived function of the drawings. Nevertheless the drawings I produce are 
not scientific illustrations; I am responding to the slides as images rather than 
elucidating their function as specimens from the human body (although this 
may happen indirectly). However, when scientists see the drawings I 
produce, they speak about them in terms of how they illustrate scientific 
knowledge. They see things into them that I simply don’t see; they read them 
differently. It is clear that the function of the drawing changes radically 
depending on its upon context, with the consequence that its meaning also 
changes. However, this is part of a scientific process of making images 
meaningful. Latour and Woolgar observe that laboratory ‘practices widely 
regarded by outsiders as well organised, logical, and coherent, in fact consist 
of a disordered array of observations with which scientists struggle to 
produce order’ (1979, p. 36). They argue that scientists work with visual 
information in specific ways to construct knowledge. Latour describes this as 
a process by which they move from looking at ‘confusing three-dimensional 
objects’ to looking at ‘inscriptions’, which are ‘two-dimensional images that 
have been made less confusing’ (1986, p.16). This approach towards images 
is perhaps in opposition to artistic methods, which often retain the ‘confusion’ 
or ambiguity, and emphasise multiple meanings. Artistic methods can 
nevertheless be highly conceptual ways of looking as Siân Ede observes: 
 
Visual information in laboratories is conveyed by technological media – 
through microscopes, telescopes, various scanning instruments – and how 
you set up the instruments and how you interpret the results may well be 
open to opinion. Artists are used not only to perceiving shapes and 
structures quickly, a skill which, after all, anyone might acquire with 
training and experience, but they are accustomed to see more than meets 
the eye, to see beyond a focused or perspectival viewpoint, to look ‘off 
screen’, on the edges or even in the imagination. They are used to 
recognising that ‘pictures’ have depth, layers and multiple meanings 
because conceptual thinking plays as much, or more, of a part in seeing 
as simple visualising – as experts in experimental psychology and 
consciousness studies know. Suggesting alternative interpretations is the 
artist’s natural way of working. (2000, p. 61) 
 
The light microscope I am looking through contains four different lens, each 
set at a different magnification (x4, x10, x40, x100). I move between the 
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different magnifications, keeping the slide in the same position, and layer 
drawings upon each other. The change in the image as it is magnified is 
quite startling: unexpected details appear and come into focus. I try not to 
look at the drawing except for a quick glance and locate the edges of the 
sketchbook through touch to orient myself around the paper. The confocal 
microscope produces a sharper image in three dimensions, however it 
seems to have a shallower depth of field. The edges of the image seem out 
of focus, but when I readjust the focus it seems to change the image 
profoundly, as if I am looking at a different slide. It is quite disconcerting how 
a slight movement of my hand can produce an enormous change in what I 
see; it is as if my hand is disconnected from the eye. I explore this further by 
continually changing the focus as I draw, and am surprised by how much this 
disorients me. Moreover, when I look into the eyepiece of a microscope for 
an extended length of time, I experience a sense of detachment from the 
physical space of the laboratory, and a curious sensation of being in the 
space of the microscope develops. It is as if the body falls into and occupies 
the space that I am intently looking at. When I look up, it takes a moment for 
my senses to adjust back to being in the laboratory. Upon describing this 
experience to a microbiologist, I realise that it is not uncommon: ‘What I 
always find when I’m looking down a microscope, [is that I feel] I’m not a big 
person looking in, I’m a little person. I’m in there. It’s very seductive’ (Parry, 
2015).  
 
Looking through an instrument of vision by intensely focusing the eye 
appears to separate and distance the body from its environment. The 
process seems to desensitise the other senses – I am less conscious of the 
sounds around me. Although my body is quite still, I have a peculiar 
sensation of falling into the space of the image I am looking at. However, 
when I move images in and out of focus, I experience an uncomfortable 
sense of not knowing where my body is in relation to its environment. 
Proprioception is the largely unconscious sense of the body in space that is 
independent of vision and relies upon the physical sensations of body 
movements. It becomes disrupted when one is looking through an instrument 
of vision. Perceptual slippages between vision and proprioception are 
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cognitively irrelevant as the scientist makes sense of what is seen through 
the microscope: yet as I move between different magnifications, I allow them 
to inform my drawing process. I am attempting to access a process that Ede 
describes as seeing ‘more than meets the eye’ (2000, p. 61). It feels as if I 
am searching for something that is invisible by using slippages in my vision 
to trigger other ways of seeing. Perhaps everyday vision is full of these 
slippages, but we do not perceive them. Elkins states: ‘But vision, I think, is 
more like the moments of anxious squinting than the years of effortless 
seeing’ (1996, p. 18). Claude Heath’s drawing experiments similarly explore 
this phenomenon through disjunction between sight and the movements of 
his hands in the previous chapter.  
 
I am also interested in how being in this laboratory environment changes how 
I look. Strategies of drawing without looking at the paper are quite familiar to 
me, and they consequently do not feel strange. I make some drawings 
without looking at my sketchbook while keeping my eyes focused upon the 
microscope. I make others by using a drawing tube microscope (Hodges, 
2003, p. 47) that projects the image onto my sketchbook. But drawing without 
looking in this environment does feel strange; it is a place that is designed for 
objective acts of looking. Although I have set out to test these methods, I feel 
uncomfortable and less able to connect to more experimental – and less 
logical – drawing processes in this environment. If I think about my residency 
and the environment of medical imaging research institution, I imagine a 
similar sense of unease would occur. Both spaces seem to have a protocol, 
a set of practices and procedures for looking. The laboratory is a highly 
structured (and hierarchical) environment with rules and regulations (printed 
upon posters as one enters the laboratory) about how one works with 
materials and visualisation equipment. I feel constrained in my ability to take 
risks here, for instance, by drawing with unusual materials such as animal 
fat, which I explore in my studio. This is not only to do with health-and-safety 
constraints, but perhaps more to do with working with processes that would 
be considered cognitively closed and meaningless in this environment. 
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Such environments place less emphasis upon creative experimentation in 
acts of looking, seeing and representation. ‘Happy accidents' – unexpected 
outcomes in arts practice whereby mistakes or accidental slippages can be 
recognised as valuable – are less likely to be recognised in scientific 
environments. And yet accidents, such as contaminated petri dishes, have 
led to significant breakthroughs in scientific knowledge.3 Arguably, there is a 
close link between the phenomenon of noise and this type of looking and 
seeing. The ability to tolerate multiple ways of looking and seeing may be 
linked to the ability to perceive (visually and cognitively) potential (signal) in 
ambiguous visual material. This may also be linked to an environment that 
enables multiple ways of seeing to coexist (rather than dismissing visual 
ambiguity as error or noise). How then is an artistic environment different to 
the scientific; in what ways does it change how I look and draw? 
 
 
3.2 Drawing in the studio: seeing through memory and imagination 
 
         
Figure 3.3 (Left) Exemplar, 2012, graphite on paper, 60 x 42cm, work by the author. 
Figure 3.4 (Right) Memoria 3, 2012, graphite on paper, 60cm x 42cm, work by the author. 
The environment of the studio feels very different; the quality of my looking 
feels more reflective. The studio space is a familiar space where I regularly 
practice this kind of looking and seeing. This familiarity and regular practice 
                                                
3 Alexander Fleming’s discovery of penicillin in 1928 is a notable example.	
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creates an environment that seems to activate a reflective and embodied 
style of looking. There is an intense sense of looking inwards as well as 
looking outwards, and I move fluidly between the external image of the 
drawing and an internal image that shifts and changes. There is a dialogue 
between the two which is unspoken but intensely felt. Crucially, this dialogue 
is manifested through the body, through subtle changes in pressure as I look 
and draw. I often pace around the studio between marks or walk away from 
the drawing to see it from different perspectives. The space around the 
drawing is an environment that becomes charged. 
 
To explore this phenomenon I make a series of drawings that begin with a 
response to a computer-generated model of the internal body. The starting 
point for these drawings is an image from the Blue Brain project. It declares 
that its goal is ‘to build biologically detailed digital reconstructions and 
simulations of the rodent, and ultimately the human brain’ (Blue Brain Project, 
2017).4 The image is a computer-generated model of neural structures in the 
brain.5 The contrast between the trailing dendrite forms, the entangled 
neurons and the visual formality of squared, straight edges highlights the 
constructed nature of the image. Practices of computer modelling and 
simulation in imaging research complicate the relationship between real 
bodies and medical visualisations. They can appear very organic and life-like 
to the non-expert eye (Rose, 2006). Peter Galison describes the opposition 
between image and data, abstraction and concrete bodies in science as ‘that 
sudden, powerful opposition-attraction between wanting to know with eyes-
open and wanting to know with eyes-closed’ (2002, p. 301). 
 
Simulations make use of data from real scans to develop models. They are 
constructed from vast amounts of data – a memory bank of information – 
accrued over time. To explore the ways in which technologies ‘see’ and an 
                                                
4	The Blue Brain Project is a large-scale European-funded research project that has received 
some criticism from the scientific community concerning the rigour of the research and its 
leadership. However, my aim is not to get caught up in these debates. I am rather 
particularly interested in the image because of its formal qualities and the questions it 
raises about how one looks at an abstract ‘map’ of the brain which is constructed from data.	
5	See the image at: http://www.visualcomplexity.com/vc/project.cfm?id=145	
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artist sees, the next series of drawings test strategies that 'simulate' drawings 
from an unpredictable and arguably 'noisy' source of information: my visual 
memory. The first drawing is highly detailed and made by projecting the Blue 
Brain image upon paper, transforming it into a screen as I trace the imagery. 
I choose to work in this way because it replicates the conditions in which 
simulations and digital reconstructions of the body are viewed. Looking at a 
computer screen is very different to looking at paper in natural light. My 
process is a slow and meticulous transferral of complex imagery onto paper; 
muscles tire, eyes become strained. As I work, the studio space is flooded 
with light from the projector, yet there is a strong sense of not being able to 
see clearly. The drawing disappears beneath the projection; it is competing 
with the simulation for the same space. My body blocks the light from the 
projector at the moment when I am making a mark, so that I am intuiting its 
position. I use a variety of hard (1H-6H) pencils for the tonal range, they give 
me greater control over the line and the hard graphite produces a glassy 
greyness, which evokes the cold greyness of the projected image.  
 
Subsequent drawings are spaced approximately six weeks apart and made 
without looking at the first drawing and without a projection. They rely upon a 
memory image that is unstable and unpredictable, which is in a sense 
diagnostically irrelevant and not unlike noise in its attributes. Visual memory 
is comprised of multitude interactions over time in individual histories and 
bodies. They can be comprised of physical, psychological or social 
experiences, which influence each other and change visual (and other) 
perceptions in largely unconscious ways. James Elkins (1996) asserts that 
seeing is irrational, inconsistent and undependable. Perhaps looking into my 
visual memory as I draw is a way of experiencing noise.  
 
There is a very different quality to the making of subsequent drawings, as I 
try to look at my memory image, there seems to be a stronger sense of 
myself being present in the act of drawing. I’m interested here not only in the 
loss of detail (a surprising amount of visual information is lost), but also in the 
changing shape and quality of the drawing. The memory drawings seem to 
have become more about the act of drawing rather than the act of 
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representation; the mark-making feels more assured. The edges are no 
longer contained and enclosed. There seems to be a relationship between 
looking into an unstable and unpredictable image, and the presence of the 
drawing. It is as if the drawing emerges from and through an acute 
awareness of the body, and not from something external.  
 
I consider whether I could make this type of drawing in scientific institutions. 
Certainly the time and space needed for quiet reflection would be difficult to 
achieve in the busy working environment of a laboratory. But it is much more 
than that. I experience the studio as a place that supports reflective practice; 
it seems to facilitate the process of thinking through drawing. I am highly 
sensitised to my environment as I work, and register subtle changes in light, 
temperature and sound around me. This is quite different to the idea of 
focusing my attention as I look through a microscope, where there is a 
narrowing down of my attention and a desensitisation to the wider 
environment. Here my senses are widening, and despite my aim to focus 
upon vision as a primary sense, it becomes impossible to separate it from my 
other senses. This is a largely unconscious phenomenon over which I have 
no control. When this phenomenon changes I often stop drawing. I 
instinctively know that the quality of my looking has changed and that this will 
affect the drawing. 
 
I begin thinking of the interactions between bodies and their milieu, which 
typically produce noise. It could be argued that drawing in the studio 
sensitises me to the conditions that generate noise, in that I become more 
attuned to interactions in my environment through my senses. Although 
these interactions are not directly connected to my drawing activity (and are 
therefore diagnostically irrelevant) they seem to be linked to my ability to 
respond to my memory images, which are continually changing and shifting. 
My alertness to the studio environment, without a point of focus or specific 
outcome in mind, seems connected to my imaginative looking. There seems 
to be a link between my sensitivity to my surroundings and my receptivity to 
ambiguous visual information that can at times be cognitively closed or not 
consciously available to me. In my experience, the environment of the studio 
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supports my process of looking inwards into my imagination as I draw, whilst 
the laboratory makes me more self-conscious and less likely to take creative 
risks. But scientific institutions are not the only environments that can 
determine how one looks. What of technologies of vision such as MRI 
scanners, how do they create environments for looking and how do they 
change what is visually perceived? My next experiments explore how 
technologies of vision can create environments for looking. 
 
 
3.3 Black boxing: looking inside instruments of vision 
 
   
Figure 3.5 (Left) Artist in studio with box construction, 2013. 
Figure 3.6 (Right) Box construction in the studio, 2013. 
 
I would next like to consider how visualisation technologies frame the human 
body and determine how it is seen. My subject matter – noise – is 
inextricably linked to the technologies that are used to look into the body. 
They not only generate noise through their interactions with their 
environment, but also play a central role in the methods used to reduce 
noise. Throughout this phase of activity, I make use of instruments of vision 
that enable me to ‘look through’ or ‘look into’ my subject matter. Through 
these methods I wished to enact how medical visualisation technologies look 
at the body. However I am conscious that technologies such as MRI or PET 
are ‘black boxes’6 to me. Latour (1987, 1999) states that a black box stands 
for the unknown inner workings of technologies (hardware and software), 
which are normally only seen through their inputs and outputs. He argues 
that black boxes seal the exchanges between technology and the external 
                                                
6	I am using the term ‘Black box’ as Latour (1987, 1999; Latour and Woolgar, 1979) 
conceptualises it, rather than, for instance, how it is used in fine-art practice as a term for 
a video-installation space.		
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world once any form of knowledge becomes established. The closing of the 
box conceals the workings of knowledge (its successes and its failings) and 
stops it from evolving and changing. Through this process, which involves 
networks of associations that validate and strengthen the knowledge 
contained within the box, it becomes impossible to challenge its power. A 
black box, I would like to suggest, disavows the presence of noise in its 
workings, because its function is to conceal. In the next phase of activity, I 
symbolically open up the ‘black box’ of technology. 
 
The use of a cardboard box is motivated by my desire to counter ideas about 
complex technologies and specialist knowledge by using an everyday 
material. It is constructed with a small hole on one side, into which a camera 
lens is inserted. The opposite side is cut out to allow paper to be taped 
across. A light source is placed beyond the paper, so that the view through 
the camera resembles a backlit screen. The fibrous structure of the paper 
suggests a membrane or skin tissue. A drawing is lightly taped on the paper 
stretched over the side of the box opposite the camera lens, so that it 
resembles a frame within a frame. Some drawings are made by creating 
small pinpricks in the paper, while others are executed with graphite. I take a 
photograph after making each new mark, and a series of still images is used 
to construct an animated sequence of drawings. To give my body a presence 
in the sequences, the shadow of my hand is at times seen. The taped 
drawings move slightly between sequential photographs, giving the animated 
sequence a fluttering movement that resembles a pulse. The box-
construction strategy is primarily a way of thinking through drawing; it allows 
me to experiment with different ways of looking as I draw with materials or 
images that are continually moving and changing. Through this process, I 
explicitly acknowledge the context through which noise is generated in 
medical visualisations by bodies and body systems that constantly move and 
change. Furthermore, the fragility of the box alludes to the interactions 
between imaging technologies and their environments, which also generate 
noise. 
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As the camera looks through the body of the box to the backlit drawing of a 
visualisation, the enclosed space inside the box induces a strong sense of 
seeing a body from the inside. Although the construction is quite simple, its 
effect is quite powerful. Looking through the lens induces a peculiar 
sensation of my body being positioned inside the box. From there, it looks 
out to the drawing of a scan (another body) and the external environment. 
This is not unlike my experience of looking through a microscope, which also 
felt as though I was positioned inside the microscope. The ways in which I 
look can therefore, precipitate profound changes in my bodily perceptions. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 3.7 (Top) Still from test animations using box construction with pin prick drawings, 
2012, work by the author.  
Figures 3.8 (Below) Still from test animations using box construction with drawings upon 
paper taped on surface, 2012, work by author. 
There is another sense in which my body in implicated in this drawing 
method. As I work, I am continually moving between different sides of the 
box – from the drawing on one side of the box to the camera on the opposite 
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side. As I walk, I am preoccupied with the next stage of the drawing: I am in 
transition between what I have just seen and what I can see in my 
imagination. The slight fluttering of the paper taped to its support resembles 
a pulse in the animated drawing.  
 
I continue experimenting with different drawing grounds (seaweed, latex) and 
drawing materials (oil and water). My aim is to heighten the embodied quality 
of my materials, and a sense of looking through a body. Many of the 
materials I test have interesting visual properties but it is difficult to make 
marks upon them and drawing becomes restricted. The box construction is 
also tested, by placing a wooden frame inside it to stabilize it because after 
time the cardboard box becomes unstable. However the wooden frame gives 
a cinematic quality to the drawing ground and is excluded from my process. 
This series of tests are outlined below with footnotes (Figures 3.9 – 3.13) to 
give an indication of my process and to point to the role of trial and error as a 
method of finding out through doing.  
 
 
    
Figures 3.9a and 3.9b (Above) Stills from test animations using box construction with 
seaweed chosen for its organic quality and resemblance to skin folds. The author ‘draws’ 
into this ground by cutting shapes out of it, 2012, work by author. 
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Figures 3.10a and 3.10b (Above) Stills from test animations using box construction with 
sugar paper and drawing with black ink and oil, 2012, work by author. 
 
    
Figures 3.11a and 3.11b (Above) Stills from test animations using box construction with a 
wooden frame positioned inside the box frame. Drawing ground is tracing paper, and 
drawing materials are black ink and oil, 2012, work by author. 
 
    
Figures 3.12a and 3.12b (Above) Stills from test animations using box construction with a 
wooden frame positioned inside the box frame. Drawing ground is latex, and drawing 
material is acrylic paint, 2012, work by author. 
 
    
Figures 3.13a and 3.13b (Above) Stills from test animations using box construction drawing 
with black ink upon latex and plastic, 2012, work by author. 
 
The tests lead me to identify vellum (calf and goat skin) as a material with 
great potential as a drawing ground. When examined closely, minute traces 
of hair follicles and pores can be seen on its surface; I particularly like the 
way this breaks down the distinction between the representation of a body 
and its reality. Furthermore, vellum is very responsive to its environment; it 
changes shape unexpectedly and curls into itself during variations in 
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temperature or humidity in the studio. This responsiveness makes it an 
unpredictable material to work with; it feels as if I am drawing upon a living 
material. The tests also lead to my recognition that the structure of a box 
creates a sense of distance between the drawing and me.  I wish to heighten 
the sense of a moving, changing and pulsing drawing, to get closer to its 
movements. Is it possible to feel as though I am positioned inside the 
drawing being looked at? My aim is to activate a style of looking that is highly 
responsive to interactions and movements within the body of the drawing. 
The next animations bring me closer to my drawings, almost as if I am 
immersed in them. 
 
3.4 Drawing on movement 
In order to emphasise movement and interaction between the drawing, its 
environment and myself, a macro lens is used for the next series of 
animations. This enables me to magnify and get very close to the drawn 
mark: it feels as if I am in the drawing. I tape a sheet of thin cartridge paper 
on a lightbox and take a photograph each time I make a new mark. The 
drawing is backlit by the lightbox and its fibrous structure is accentuated. The 
macro lens has a shallower depth of field, and I am consequently working 
very close to the drawing with the lens just a few centimetres above its 
surface. The paper is purposefully taped lightly, so that it moves slightly 
between shots producing a faint vibration throughout the animated drawing. 
The ground of the drawing is therefore in continual movement. The macro 
lens encompasses my field of vision and creates a sense that I am looking at 
something much larger than its actual size. My body movements feel 
accentuated and slight movements of the pencil in my hand are magnified 
enormously. Consequently, my perceptions of my body in space becomes 
disoriented in a similar way to looking through a microscope.  
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Figures 3.14a & 3.14b (Top and Below) Two stills from Mind Wandering 1 animation, 2013, 
work by the author. 
 
I complete a series of three animations (Mind Wandering 1-3), which are all 
based upon drawings of cross sections of the brain. At the centre of Mind 
Wandering 1 is a small hand-drawn cross that remains in position throughout 
the animation as a still point. It refers to a computer tool which is used to 
navigate the coronal, horizontal and sagittal planes7 of the brain in a linear 
‘journey’. It is taken from a three-dimensional computer-generated model of 
the brain, which is used for teaching purposes. I am interested in this model 
because it is an example of a visualisation that has its origins in real brain 
                                                
7 The coronal plane divides the brain from front to back, the horizontal plane is parallel to the 
ground and the sagittal plane divides the brain from left to right. Please see: 
http://accessmedicine.mhmedical.com/content.aspx?sectionid=45395988&bookid=673&ju
mpsectionID=45401969&Resultclick=2 	
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scans. It is used to simplify, clarify and map the brain without the presence of 
noise (or living brains). Its function is to map a linear journey through the 
brain across different planes. My drawings appear from the central cross, 
they grow and change without logic or linearity. They jump between different 
planes, expand and contract, appear and disappear. I deliberately introduce 
cognitive irrelevance into the logical structure of the computer model that is 
my reference point. The charcoal and soft pencil is brought into sharp focus 
by the macro lens. By continually making and erasing marks, I can work 
upon the same drawing ground throughout. The marks of erasure remain on 
the surface. At the end of the clip, the image begins to break up, it dissolves 
into a ball of mark-making and appears to implode as it moves across the 
paper and disappears from view. It is as if the image can no longer hold 
together, and the drawing finally lets go of making any meaning. Noise 
returns and the drawn mark takes precedence over representation (of the 
brain). The abstractedness of the final marks holds more potential for 
meaning making to me. I am reminded of Mitchell’s asserting that pictures 
want: ‘to be seen as complex individuals occupying multiple subject positions 
and identities’ (2005, p. 47). 
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Figures 3.15a & 3.15b (Top and Below) Two stills from Mind Wandering 2 animation, 2013, 
work by the author. 
 
In the next animation Mind Wandering 2, I foreground the movement and 
interactions of my materials. I work with vellum, which is made out of calfskin, 
and increase the magnification so that pores, follicles and traces of blood 
vessels on its skin can be clearly seen. It is impossible to keep the vellum 
flat, it curls and bends as it expands and contracts in response to the 
changing temperature of the lightbox. As it changes, it moves in and out of 
focus giving a sensual and haptic quality to the animation. I have placed 
drawings on tissue paper under the vellum, as it moves and shifts glimpses 
of the drawings can be seen. Movement and flux suggests interactions and 
exchanges between the materials, allowing partial looks and partial 
knowledge.8 It is an intimate style of looking that evokes the sense of touch 
through the movements, textures and surfaces of the skin. 
 
                                                
8 Donna Harraway’s influential paper ‘Situated Knowledge: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’ (1988), calls for scientific practice to 
acknowledge partial and situated knowledge. 
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Figures 3.16a & 3.16b (Top and Below) Two stills from Mind Wandering 3 animation, 2013, 
work by the author. 
 
In the final animation, Mind Wandering 3, a very fine tissue paper that is 
creased and crumpled, is used to take on a pronounced three-dimensional 
quality. As the sequence progresses, it folds and gathers into peaks and 
ridges, or gradually unfolds and opens out to reveal the drawing. There is a 
sense of interiority and exteriority, and the movement is suggests a rhythmic 
pulse, as if we are inside the body space (in the milieu). The movement has 
no clear beginning or end, and consequently the clip feels as if it has 
potential to continue indefinitely. I am drawing with powdered graphite using 
a dry brush with one hand, while I gently move the fine tissue paper with the 
other hand at the same time. The graphite powder is unfixed and is difficult to 
control. It gathers in folds and falls off edges, so that the image changes in 
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unpredictable ways as I move the paper. The drawing grows at the same 
time as the paper moves, and its folds conceal or reveal the image at 
different moments.  
 
Of the three animations, this is the most visceral. The tissue-like paper and 
its pulsing movements powerfully evokes the interiority of the body. The 
graphite powder has a surprisingly organic quality: it suggests 
microorganisms growing and multiplying rather than a drawing material. This 
way of physically and conceptually working with drawing generates images 
that are strangely unlike drawings. If ‘science uses imagery … as an 
essential part of its quest for ever more accurate accounts of material reality’ 
(Mitchell, 2015, p. 23), than here the materials take precedence over the 
imagery in ways that are difficult to contain. They are perceived more 
immediately (as more first-hand) than the image ‘information’ they describe. 
The ‘image-as-organism is, of course, “only” a metaphor, an analogy that 
must have some limits’ Mitchell tells us (2005, p.10). But he asks: ‘what are 
the limits of this analogy? Where does it take us?’ (ibid). The power of 
images to have a ‘life’ of their own is interrogated in Mitchells (2005) text, and 
he asserts that we have a ‘double consciousness’ (ibid) surrounding images 
that both believes and disbelieves that they can have life-like qualities. But I 
would like to make a distinction here, for the animation is life-like in a 
particular way. It’s materiality gives it a specificity that demands a 
presentness in its viewing (and disallows it to be seen in a symbolic way). 
The drawing spills out of itself; it is unpredictable and random. Lack of control 
and 'interferences' that are analogous to noise are given precedence. If the 
aim of the drawing is to depict an image of a brain scan, my methods 
introduce diagnostically irrelevant visual material into the drawing. On the 
other hand, my method succeeds in evoking the interactions of living 
systems that generate noise. This emphasis is in opposition to the medical 
visualisation, which dematerialises living bodies and eclipses its movements 
to generate ‘accurate accounts of material reality’ (ibid). The animation 
creates an environment where both the ground and drawing materials are in 
continual flux. Its folds and pulse like movements are highly suggestive of 
living tissue. I find myself looking at the drawing almost as if it is a living 
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thing. My next experiment takes this a step further by drawing with materials 
that are more closely connected to the body. 
 
3.5 Interactive materials 
The brain is perceived as less fleshly than the rest of the body, perhaps 
because of its bloodless grey colouration.9 It is nevertheless material and is 
largely composed of fat in the form of myelin – a fatty substance that 
surrounds nerve cells. The next drawing is instigated by a wish to break 
down the distinction between the representation (visualisation) and the 
materiality of the object (body) being represented.  
 
   
Figure 3.17 (Left) Fat Drawing, 2017, fat on paper, 68cm x 48cm, work by the author  
                                                
9 The blood vessels of the brain are lined with endothelial cells which create a barrier 
between brain and bloodstream. Please see Sage and Wilson (1982). 
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The drawing Figure 3.12 is made using goose fat and a resist varnish. The 
fat is heated to change its state from solid to liquid, and a paintbrush is used 
to draw. It gives off a pungent smell as I draw which, in this environment, is 
strangely disconcerting. I am conscious that the brush will become 
congealed with fat if left over time in the studio, and that I am drawing with a 
biological material that once inhabited a body. The image is first traced on a 
lightbox using a transparent varnish. This is allowed to dry overnight. Next, I 
draw inside the negative spaces of the varnish image with the heated fat. Fat 
typically moves across paper in an osmotic process from highly concentrated 
to less concentrated areas. This process is normally quite fast and difficult to 
control. Here the varnish acts as a temporary barrier, slowing down the fat’s 
movement. But over time, it seeps across the varnished areas and travels 
across the paper, changing the image in the process. 
 
The drawing itself can be quite difficult to see. The position of lighting – 
whether the drawing is backlit or from the front – radically alters its visibility. 
In certain conditions, it is perceived as a slight sheen on the surface of the 
paper and is almost invisible. When placed on a light box, the contrast 
between the fat and varnish increases and it resembles an X-ray. Fat 
Drawing is carefully lit in the exhibition space and hung away from the wall 
with clips so that it moves slightly in air currents. Reflecting upon the finished 
work, the delicacy of the image and its transparent qualities are more evident 
than the materiality of the fat, which becomes a secondary presence. The 
changes in the fat drawing take place slowly and imperceptibly, and a trace 
of the original image remains. A visually abstract form may enable me to 
focus upon the interactions that generate noise more directly. With this in 
mind, my next tests explore methods that engage with abstraction and 
materiality. I choose to draw data – numerical information – to move away 
from representation and to acknowledge that medical visualisations are in 
fact images generated from numbers. 
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3.6 Drawing data 
 
      
Figure 3.18 (Top) Slip Drawing, 2013, clay upon paper, 30cm x 42cm, work by the author. 
 
Slip Drawing utilises a variety of different types of clay and water – a slip – as 
drawing material. Clay is an interesting material to use because it is a 
substance that is associated with the symbolic ground (earth) that bodies 
ultimately become after decomposition. It stands in for bodies and the 
organic. I’m interested in the way clay changes state from liquid to solid very 
quickly and its responsiveness to the levels of heat and humidity in its 
environment. When I first source the (unfired) clay it is in the form of solid 
lumps. When placed in pots of water for a few days, it changes to a grainy 
sludge that resembles a gritty paint. Over time, if left untouched in the studio, 
the slip transforms into a fine powder that clings to the sides of the pot. This 
transformation can also take place within the drawing. If left in a hot dry 
environment the slip can revert back to a powdered state and fall off the 
surface of the paper. 
 
I collect a variety of different clays, such as fine white porcelain, deep red 
terracotta and a brown-grey grog (a material used in ceramics). By mixing 
different combinations of clays, I am able to create a palette of earthy 
colours. Drawing with slip is difficult: bits of gritty clay continually lodge into 
the brush. I try nevertheless to draw as precisely as I can, working against 
my medium. This brings to mind bodies trying to be as still as possible when 
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they are in a scanner, and visualisation processes that attempt to capture a 
fixed measurement of a moving living body (that generates noise). They are 
also working against their material; a completely motionless body would be 
far easier to measure. 
 
My source material is a series of data sheets of brain scans. I place them on 
a lightbox and trace each number meticulously with a fine brush. However I 
move the data sheets continually, so that I disrupt its uniform structure by 
layering numbers upon each other. As I do so, they begin to suggest forms. 
The contrast between the numerical information and the earthy, gritty slip is 
curious; it gives the data a material presence. But perhaps equally 
importantly, the drawing gives the numbers a pictorial form – albeit an 
abstract one. Debates about the relative values of abstraction and pictorial 
representation in science, and the conflict between the ‘abstract-concrete’ 
are on-going, as Galison asserts:  
 
At the heart of the scientific image is the search for rules; at the heart of 
the logical-algorithmic has been the hunt for the recognition that is the 
eternal promise of representation. Said another way: the impulse to draw 
the world in its particularity never seems to be able to shed itself of the 
impulse to abstract, and the search for abstraction is forever pulling back 
into the material-particular. (2002, p. 302) 
 
By representing data in a pictorial form and emphasising its materiality, the 
drawing holds the abstract and the concrete together. This is not unlike the 
presence of noise in data, which, I would like to suggest, is like the presence 
of the body in abstracted information. Noise is the grit in the system that 
destabilises scientific knowledge.  
 
My wish to destabilise the data further leads me to engage more closely with 
visualisation technologies in the final phase of activity. I work with bio-
sensors: small wearable devices that are designed for the consumer market. 
They consist of an EEG headset that measures electrical activity on the 
surface of the (front) brain and a skin galvanometer (worn on the finger), 
which measures slight changes in skin conductivity. According to the 
manufacturers, the EEG measures attention levels and the galvanometer 
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reading is an indicator of emotional arousal. The accuracy of these claims is 
not of concern for this project. More importantly, the sensors are relatively 
simple devices that enable experimentation, which more complex 
visualisation technologies preclude. I work with a creative coder who applies 
my ideas and writes the code for this project. My aim is to deliberately 
maximise the amount of noise in the data and to reconfigure how the data is 
visualised. To increase unpredictability, two sensors are used at the same 
time. A feedback loop allows data from both sensors to interact generating 
noise. Bio-sensor data is typically visualised as a bar chart, a moving dial or 
a continuous oscillating line. Imaging technologies regularly make use of in-
built algorithms to convert raw data into an image. The coder reprogrammes 
the visualisations to follow pathways dictated by my drawings, which have 
been previously scanned into the software. This radically changes the way in 
which the data is visualised, for it can no longer be read (decoded) for 
information about the data that is being transmitted. 
 
Following tests in the studio, the drawing activities take place in public 
spaces such as a gallery (FACT, Liverpool), an art school (Manchester 
School of Art) and an arts venue (Cornerhouse, Manchester). To 
acknowledge the interaction between environment and visualisation, a series 
of diagrammatic line drawings of the spaces where the activity occurs are 
used as a basis for the visualisation. The biosensor visualisations are 
projected in real time during performances, and programmed to follow 
pathways determined by my drawings in the form of an animated line. This 
path, however, is easily disrupted. Data interactions between both sensors – 
the noise – can cause the projected line to move off its predetermined 
pathway and into unknown pathways. The interaction can also trigger 
changes in the direction, speed, movement and intensity of the visualisation, 
which is projected on a large sheet of paper upon which I draw by attempting 
to trace the lines. The size of the paper is designed to ensure my movement 
as I draw, for it is wider than the span of my arms.  
 
 	 91	
   
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.19 (Top Left) Noise+Signal drawing performance at Cornerhouse, Manchester, 
2013. Author is wearing an EEG headset whilst drawing.  
Figure 3.20 (Top Right) Detail of drawing produced at FACT, Liverpool. Work by the author. 
Figure 3.21 (Below Left) Detail of drawing produced at Cornerhouse, Manchester, 2013. 
Work by the author. 
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I had not originally planned this phase as a drawing performance, but it 
seems fitting that tests in the studio lead to my making drawings in public 
spaces because they involve participants into the process. Observers are 
given the option to wear skin galvanometers during performances, and each 
new person changes the visualisation and drawing through the data 
generated by their bodies. This allows interactions between bodies, as well 
as the environment to generate noise. I am conscious that although this is an 
experimental process, participants nevertheless look for meanings in the 
visualisations, as if the drawing will reveal something to them. It is 
mesmerising to see the hidden functions of the body visualised, however 
indirectly and incomprehensibly. Nevertheless, there is a sense of perplexity 
and puzzlement in some participants for the drawings do not reveal 
knowledge about the sensor data, they are cognitively closed. There is 
minimal interpretive information about my process. My aim is to engage with 
noise and to make it visible through my drawing activity, rather than provide 
scientific explanations of the process. The drawing activity emphasises the 
role of my body in the process because of the scale of the paper, and 
through its inevitable focus upon my bodily response to the projected lines. 
This intensifies my experience, as I try to capture lines before they 
disappear, and respond to constant changes of direction and speed. It feels 
as if I am looking through my whole body rather than just the eyes, catching 
movements from the periphery of my vision. The body surface becomes 
highly sensitive to movements that cannot be seen directly, but are perceived 
indirectly. If ‘Nancy argues that thought possesses weight and movement; 
that it is lodged in the mass and motion of the thinking body’ (Maltz-Leca, 
2013, p. 139), then this style of indirect looking is experienced as rooted in 
bodily mass and movement.  
 
My mark-making often misses the exact point where the projected lines 
appears: it is less about precision and more about capturing patterns. I am in 
a sense looking beyond the data to draw. I am drawing from code, and as the 
drawings unfold, I find myself developing a code of marks for each 
performance. They resemble the signs and symbols of a map, but are 
without an agenda that clarifies their meanings. At times, I can decipher the 
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underlying drawing, which the projected line follows, but this drawing is 
something new and surprising. It compresses the time of the performance 
into one plane. Its map-like quality suggests space and movement, the 
repetition and multiplicity of the lines also suggest time. After the 
performances, I write a short text describing the experience: 
 
All my senses are alert, listening out for the scent of the signal. I scan the 
surface of the paper trying to register movement at the edges of my 
perception. The body and hand responds in their own time; a different speed 
to the data. I anticipate and almost capture the projected signal, organising 
the lines into a new structure.  
 
I am always out of step; the drawing evolves from off the side-lines, off 
centre. It is a trace of the almost captured. The live data has its own rhythm 
and structure. My hands learn how to connect with this unpredictable and 
fleeting line. Neurons reconfigure as I process the signals from alpha, beta, 
and theta waves... 
 
A new visual code evolves, as one system generates another. Its symbols 
are the enclosed line, the open trailing line and the repeated line. I allow the 
collision between the speed of the data and the pace of my body to manifest 
itself through the pencil. Pressure and movement become my tools. 
Hesitations become a series of dots punctuating quick, darting lines that 
speed off out of control. Slower marks hint at my uncertainty and my 
unknowing. These lines retrace missed signals, following pathways by 
memory. Smudges, creases, the marks of my hand upon the paper evidence 
the encounter between signal and body. 
 
Some drawings resemble electrical circuitry and diagrams. Others suggest 
an organic, pulsing, meandering trail. They are maps of the unknown: maps 
of losing my way through the data10. 
 
 
The text above describes a style of looking where all my senses are highly 
alert and seep into each other. I experience an acute sensitivity to my 
immediate environment (my milieu) through the body. It transforms the locus 
of looking from the eye to the whole body, as if the surface of the body sees. 
There is an intermingling of the senses, which seems to be a result of being 
immersed in an environment of unexpected, unintentional and unknown 
movements. The experience of not knowing where the next mark will go or 
                                                
10 The feminist theorist Patti Lather (2007) theorises about getting lost as a methodology in 
scientific practice.  
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where the next ‘signal’ will be triggers a different quality in my looking, and, 
consequently, in the drawing. The drawing process becomes a dialogue with 
the unknown. 
 
Thinking of of Nechvatal's viral works, I am conscious of similarities to 
Noise+Signal. We both use code to generate noise and allow interferences in 
signals to change the visualisation. The divergences between them, 
however, provide a counterpoint for me to reflect upon my own process. I 
respond to noise through the act of drawing; the movement of my body and 
changes in my perception are highly implicated in my response. 
Consequently, the drawing retains traces of my felt, embodied and 
experiential response to noise, which is quite dissimilar to viewing the 
disintegration of a digital image on a screen. Nechvatal's use of language 
nevertheless, points to the importance of the felt and the experiential in his 
work. He emphasises the idea of ‘immersion’ in relation to noise (as do other 
artists).11 Although I describe my own drawing process differently (in terms of 
the environment or milieu for instance), there is a sense of immersion during 
my drawing performance. This is linked to my very conscious perception of 
the drawing’s environment. Noise is connected to perception; it exists (or 
does not exist) in relation to how it is perceived. Altering ones perceptual 
responses can therefore change whether one can see the potential (of 
signal) coiled within it.  
 
Drawing in response to projected signals from technologies that are 
encrypted by cognitively closed information, leads me to experience my 
visual perceptions as highly embodied, as if the body surface becomes 
sensitised to movement and change in the visual field. The final drawings 
resemble open networks of connections, where each line has the possibility 
to connect with others. This brings to mind Latour’s ideas about networks 
where non-human, human, artistic and scientific 'signals' can connect with 
                                                
11 Immersion appears to be a recurring theme in noise music: the Japanese artist Merzbow 
immerses himself in a seemingly endless process of CD releases (over 400 to date). His 
harsh and discordant sounds and proliferation of output suggest the impossibility of 
meaning.	
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each other. However when noise is introduced, these connections break 
down, for knowledge cannot be generated. They are of diagnostic irrelevance 
in that they cannot be understood as direct manifestations of bio-sensor 
'signals'.  
 
Conclusion 
In the second chapter I explored noise equivalents in the visual arts. As it 
turns out, these are primarily the cognitively closed aspects of bodily 
experience (awareness) when the body is immersed in its environmental 
setting. With this definition in place the next step in my research has been to 
compare my own perceptions working as an artist in a studio with those of 
scientists at work in visualisation laboratories. This has been the task of 
Chapter 3. 
 
As a result, I have used this chapter to articulate a series of first-hand 
experiences of drawing processes that embrace cognitive closure and, I 
speculate, generate an artistic form of diagnostic irrelevance. Within this 
articulation, the key finding has been a recognition of my instinctive 
engagement with physical materials, a reaction that has enabled me to 
explore and extend dynamic ways of looking that are at one with the various 
environments which immerse me (my drawings, my studio, my body). These 
ways of looking heighten all my senses so that vision becomes perceived as 
intermingled with sound and touch and feels highly interactive. 
 
In addition, the point of my practice-based research is to use first-hand 
creative experiences to reflect back on my earlier descriptive discussion of 
noise in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. The consequence of these reflections has 
been that this third chapter concludes with the first sketch of the central 
hypothesis of my thesis: for an artist-in-residence immersed in the 
environment of a medical visualisation laboratory, scientific images contain 
traces of (noisy) interactions between living bodies and their environments 
that excite the same formal and interpretive interests I discovered in my 
studio. 
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Chapter 4. Listening to Noise (Nancy and Serres)  
 
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis examined theories and practices connected to 
scientific and artistic acts of looking and seeing, to interrogate how noise – 
which is in my terms cognitively closed – can be understood. I focused on the 
sense of vision because it is the primary sense that is utilised in medical 
visualisation practice, and the one which does not typically recognise 
methods that involve the full array of senses, unlike artistic practice. James 
Elkin’s ideas about looking as moving in multiple directions, and W.J.T. 
Mitchell’s conceptualisation of vision as an interactive process of exchanges 
between images, objects and the viewer provide a framework for thinking 
about sight that shares many of the attributes of noise I identify during my 
residency. Noise is cognitively closed information that is diagnostically 
irrelevant in medical visualisation practice, and I investigate whether there is 
an equivalence in artistic practice. In Chapter 3, I tested artistic methods that 
engaged with key characteristics of noise such as unknown movements and 
interactions, and ambiguous visual material. My experience tells me that 
despite my focus on the sense of vision, the other senses are highly 
implicated in my response and become activated as I draw in response to the 
stimuli that characterise noise. The ambiguous and unknown nature of noise 
precipitated this. 
 
My descriptions of noise in this thesis may, however, give it a status and 
meaning that are misleading. To elucidate I would like to cite the metaphor of 
a 'code' commonly employed by scientists when describing DNA. This term 
has become naturalised to such an extent that, over time, it functions as a 
figure of speech through a process that José van Dijck calls ’metaphorisation’ 
(1998, p.20). Umberto Eco notes that a great number of disciplines practise 
semiotics unwittingly – ‘it was not because biologists had been reading books 
on semiotics that they began talking about genetic “codes”’ (2000, p. 3). 
Similarly, medical scientists may not be using the term noise solely because 
they have been reading information theory. My use of the term 'noise' may 
suggest that it is a natural phenomenon that exists in its own right and has an 
observable actuality. It is important to point out that noise is essentially a 
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scientific construction that is used to describe data or information that is not 
available to scientific knowledge. It is a back-formation1 of signal, and as 
such is simply data that cannot be de-coded and which is expressed as a 
visual phenomenon in medical visualisations. Nevertheless, to describe 
something as cognitively closed is to define it as cognitive in some sense, if 
only as closure. But if one considers that noise has the potential to be re-
assigned as signal, as I demonstrate earlier in this thesis, then it has the 
possibility to become cognitive. For its status is not fixed but is relational. The 
potential of noise to become signal suggests its instability as a concept and, 
consequently, the ambiguity that is inherent in my use of 'cognitively closed' 
is somehow fitting. I address this in more detail later in this chapter, by 
referring to scientific studies that investigate tolerance of ambiguity in 
medical students. 
 
The phase of activity in the studio described in Chapter 3 highlighted the 
importance of my bodily perceptions and sensitivity to materials as I draw in 
response to stimuli that characterise noise. My artistic responses to visual 
and cognitive ambiguity employed the full sensorium and cannot be 
understood through scientific frameworks of theorising noise. The book 
Listening by Jean Luc Nancy (2007) provides a framework for understanding 
my artistic response in a somewhat paradoxical way. Nancy argues that the 
sense of vision is too closely linked to the generation of knowledge and that 
the act of listening is better placed to perceive without knowing in ways that 
vision cannot. He conceptualises listening as perceiving without explicitly 
knowing what is perceived. This resonates with my experiences during the 
phase of activity discussed in the previous chapter, and with the tension and 
implicit contradiction in the term ‘cognitively closed’. It is a contradiction that 
remains unresolved, and perhaps can only be experienced. Nancy’s ideas 
about listening and hearing provide a counterpoint to my investigation into 
looking and seeing, as I explore whether his text can elucidate the ways in 
which noise triggers changes in my visual perception. 
                                                
1 A back-formation in linguistics is a word formed by removing affixes from an exiting word. 
Although noise is not formed from the word signal, I am using the term backformation here 
to refer to its conceptual connection to signal.	
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In scientific discourse, noise is framed in terms of data, information and 
interferences in the signal being transmitted. How do I step outside this 
paradigm and conceptualise noise in artistic practice? The philosopher 
Michel Serres theorises about noise as the background sound of the 
universe. Similar to Nancy, his writing is poetic, fluid and open to 
interpretation. Noise is described in terms of multiplicity rather than fixed 
meanings. I would like to argue that this approach is closer to artistic 
responses and to the qualities of noise itself, which escapes from meaning 
and knowledge. When science conceptualises noise, it seems to have a 
limited vocabulary to describe its ambiguities, elusiveness and escape from 
knowledge. Just as an artistic practice can respond to noise from within an 
environment of ambiguity and uncertainty, so too can a poetic and 
philosophical investigation that offers a different perspective on noise. 
 
4.1 Listening and noise 
Nancy asks at the beginning of his text: ‘hasn’t philosophy superimposed 
upon listening, …or else substituted for listening, something else that might 
be more on the order of understanding?’ (2007, p. 1, italics in original). In 
questioning whether philosophy can listen (perceive without generating 
knowledge), he makes a distinction between entendre (hearing or listening 
with the intention of making meaning) and écouter (listening as an acute and 
open state of perception which does not generate knowledge or 
understanding). Earlier in this thesis, I described how theorists use the terms 
looking and seeing in different ways. Elkins (1996) asserts that the distinction 
between looking as the anatomical functioning of the eyes, and seeing as 
that which is perceived (meaning making and cognition) is fluid. Similarly, 
Nancy’s use of the term écouter cannot be completely separated from 
understanding; it is a question of emphasis and mode of listening as Brian 
Kane points out: ‘For the meaning comes not with the term itself [écouter] – 
but acts as a guide, offering etymological constraints and evoking historical 
connotations – but with the definition and characterisation on the listening 
mode’ (2013, p. 446). Nancy asks: ‘Isn’t the philosopher someone who 
always hears (and who hears everything), but who cannot listen, or who, 
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more precisely, neutralizes listening within himself, so that he can 
philosophize’ (2007, p. 1). This question could also be addressed to 
scientists. The motivation and driving force of science is to generate 
knowledge and understanding – often by making use of technologies and 
data – to make sense of the world. Technologies enable scientists to 'hear' in 
Nancy's terminology, and they are directly implicated in the generation of 
scientific theory.  
 
There are many layers of translation taking place as I respond to Nancy’s 
and Serres’ texts. Firstly, within French itself, from early meanings to 
contemporary usages of words, and secondly from French to English, with 
nuances in meanings do not translate from one language to the other.2 My 
interpretation of Nancy’s ideas about listening and hearing into ideas about 
looking and seeing3, is another layer of translation and transformation. There 
is much scope for ambiguity in meanings. However, this indirect and oblique 
approach to understanding is in keeping with attributes of noise itself. Noise 
evades direct knowledge and understanding; it remains on the edges of 
perception.  
 
Écouter is a state of perceptual attentiveness that is ‘an intensification and a 
concern’, and which Nancy describes as ‘tendre l’oreille – literally, to stretch 
the ear’ (2007, p. 5). He is evoking a heightened sense of perception that 
evades the accumulation of knowledge. Écouter in Nancy’s terms is not 
dissimilar to scientific understanding of cognitively closed, for cognition is 
being bypassed. However, écouter is not cognitively closed to artists, for it is 
a state that offers other kinds of information that is considered of value in 
their practice. The artists I refer to in Chapter 2 draw on methods that can be 
thought of in terms of Nancy’s concept of listening. They purposefully create 
strategies that circumvent cognition so that the felt knowledge of the body is 
relied upon. It is a different way of making meaning. My drawing activities in 
                                                
2	For this enquiry, I study the English translation of Listening by Geneviève James, but refer 
to key French terms.	
3	It is important to point out however, that Elkins (1996) uses looking and seeing 
interchangeably.	
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Chapter 3 emphasised that all my senses were acutely atune. Nancy’s 
metaphor of stretching the ear alludes to this. The intensification and concern 
is, I would like to suggest, triggered by disallowing conscious knowledge-
making. The other senses strain towards a different kind of meaning. 
 
Nancy’s ideas are very pertinent to my study for they can be applied to the 
question of how noise can be perceived. Noise poses a unique problem in 
relation to visual perception for the scientist because once something is 
defined as noise it is framed as cognitively closed and meaningless. There is 
nothing there to see, scientists tell Marilène Oliver (see Chapter 2 page 41). 
Écouter therefore becomes a closed-off state for scientists, where lack of 
meaning is a closing down rather than an opening up of opportunities to 
perceive differently. Perhaps for the artist, whose discipline is not commonly 
focused upon generating fixed knowledge, écouter  (listening to noise) can 
provide an opportunity to explore ambiguous forms of visual perception that 
are ‘straining towards a possible meaning, and consequently one that is not 
immediately accessible’ (Nancy, 2007, p. 6). The straining towards and being 
‘on the edge of meaning’, describes my experiences of drawing in response 
to noise characteristics. 
 
Nevertheless, Nancy makes a clear distinction between the visual and the 
auditory, describing the visual as ‘mimetic, and the sonorous as tendentially 
methexic (that is, as having to do with participation, sharing, or contagion)’ 
(2007, p. 10). He asks ‘Why, in the case of the ear, is there withdrawal and 
turning inward, a making resonant, but, in the case of the eye, there is 
manifestation and display, a making evident?’ (p.3, italics in original). 
Resonance is an important concept for Nancy, and is connected to the idea 
of sound reverberating within and without the body. It is a deeply experiential 
form of knowing. Nancy asks why there is a closer affinity between ‘spectacle 
and speculation’ than the ‘sonorous and the logical’ (p. 2). In doing so he 
contributes to the vast body of literature that critiques vision which I refer to 
previously in this thesis (see Introduction page 4 and Chapter 2 pages 51-
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52). My intention is not to contest this literature,4 but to explore whether noise 
– because of its intrinsic unknown qualities – triggers changes in how the 
artist looks in ways that are similar to Nancy’s conceptualisation of listening. 
 
When I activate an ambiguous (unknown) way of looking, it is a participation 
in my environment, what Nancy calls a ‘contagion’ (2007, p. 10) that seeps 
into me. There is a sense that all stimuli have an equal weight, all 
possibilities are held in balance: ‘to be listening is to be at the same time 
outside and inside, to be open from without and from within’ (p. 14, italics in 
original). This is quite different from highly focused and controlled methods of 
looking as I draw. This is experienced as a distancing and losing touch with 
my environment. When I am responding to unknown – cognitively closed – 
stimuli it feels as if there is a circular movement between my looking, my 
environment, my materials and the drawing. This continually brings me back 
to myself. It is experienced, in Nancy’s terms, as ‘renvoi’ (p. 9). The 
translator’s notes to Listening explain renvoi as a ‘return to sender’, a 
‘sending back’ or a ‘repetition (as in a phrase of music)’5. Kane suggests that 
renvoi is ‘manifest in the limits and contiguity of modes of listening’ (2013, p. 
446). When the object is at the limits of perception, it brings me back to 
myself. He observes: 
 
Nancy’s attention to the difference between entendre and écouter is 
ultimately a way of reformulating the question of the subject by 
encouraging a shift from the phenomenological subject – the subject of 
representation who constitutes the objectivity of things by its inherent yet 
unrepresentable power of representation – to a subject that is listening to 
the infinite renvoi of meaning, sound, and self. (2013, p. 446, italics in 
original) 
 
Noise, that is drawing from a position of ambiguity and not knowing, changes 
the quality of my looking into something that resembles Nancy’s 
conceptualisation of listening.  
                                                
4	It is important to note that alongside critiques of scientific vision as objectifying, other 
theorists call for an embodied vision in science, see, for example Harraway (1988), 
Chemero (2009) and Plunkett (2013). Furthermore, the interaction between digital 
technologies of vision and scientists has generated new theories about embodied visual 
responses between technologies and humans.	
5	See Charlotte Mandell’s Translator’s Notes (Nancy, 2007, p. xi).	
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4.2 Looking as listening 
Nevertheless, there is some fluidity in Nancy’s statements about vision, for 
despite his clear delineations between listening and looking, he also asks 
‘Why, however, does each of these facets also touch the other, and by 
touching, put into play a whole system of the senses?’ (2007, p. 3). Here he 
is acknowledging that the senses cannot be separated. Phenomenological 
insight recognises the interconnection between sight and the other senses 
and an embodied sense of vision. Nancy asks if there can be a visual sound: 
‘Although it seems simple enough to evoke a form – even a vision – that is 
sonorous, under what conditions, by contrast, can one talk about a visual 
sound?’ (p.3, italics in original). He seems to suggest that vision could be 
sonorous more easily than sound can be visual.  In Nancy’s usage, sonorous 
implies an environment (of sound), one that seeps into the body and 
resounds both externally and internally: ‘Sound is also made of referrals: it 
spreads into space, where it resounds while still resounding “in me”’ (p. 7). 
Resonance is an important concept for Nancy, one that describes a different 
way of making meaning. It is a way of knowing that is felt and does not 
generate explicit knowledge. Resonance is where listening, sound and self 
resonate in unison. I recall Elkins’ statement from Chapter 2: ‘looking is 
something I do but also something that happens to me’ (1996, p. 35). Bruno 
Latour on the other hand, describes a process that seems the opposite to 
resonance when he theorises about how science uses networks and 
inscriptions that fix knowledge by erasing noise-built knowledge systems 
(see Chapter 2 pages 52-53). This type of knowledge-making is external to 
self. 
 
When I draw from a position of not knowing I am continually brought back to 
myself; my process of reflection grows from my synthesis of external and 
internal stimuli. It is a style of looking that privileges the ‘touching’ of vision 
with the other senses in a continual interaction: vision becomes inseparable 
from the touch of the paper through the pencil, the sounds in my studio and 
the light of the projector. It has an intensity that is, in Nancy’s words, a 
‘feeling-oneself-feel’ (p. 8). Perhaps this is a critical difference between the 
imaging scientist’s and artist’s response to noise. The scientist is more likely 
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to be focused on solving a problem that is perceived as external to the self, 
as a splitting of subject and object. My sense of ‘feeling-oneself-feel’ grows 
out of an instinctive understanding that the knowledge I need in order to 
produce a drawing comes from an experience that resonates within me, and 
not from a logical, cognitive working out of methods. Imaging scientists do 
not have a disciplinary framework that values their sensual responses as 
they look at noise in a visualisation on a screen.6 For the artist this is familiar, 
as can be evidenced by (a long history of) the importance of touch, pressure, 
surface and responsiveness to materials in drawing practice (Garner, 2012; 
Maslen and Southern, 2011; Rawson, 1969). Listening elucidates a different 
way of perceiving noise. But how do I conceptualise noise? What does it 
mean to an artist? Scientific explanations cannot account for the ways in 
which I understand it. The book Genesis by Serres provides a different 
perspective that resonates with my experiences. 
 
4.3 Noise as environment 
Noise cannot be penetrated by language asserts Serres: ‘Before language, 
before even the word, the noise’ (1995, p. 54). His poetic text flows around 
the idea of noise, circulating around it without fixing it, employing language in 
fluid and open ways. His writing moves freely between diverse ranges of 
references from science to metaphysics, Greek mythology to information 
theory. For Serres, noise is always present (p. 65). It is ‘limitless, continuous, 
unending, unchanging’ and is part of ‘the ground of our being’ (p. 13). This 
way of thinking about noise feels both very far removed from scientific 
accounts, and yet is also strangely familiar. The cosmic background radiation 
described earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 1 page 33) also forms an 
environment of noise that is ‘limitless’ and ‘continuous’. Serres could be 
describing a scientific phenomenon. But the way in which he communicates 
is entirely different; he moves freely between a diverse range of references 
from Greek mythology to information theory, science to metaphysics: 'It is the 
function of the scientist to be right and rational ... the philosopher does not 
                                                
6 However, medical practice does recognise other senses, for doctors do undertake physical 
examinations of patients; they palpitate skin or listen to the heartbeat for instance.	
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wrap himself up in truth as in breastplate or shield... he wants to let the 
possibilities roam free' (p. 23). 
 
Possible meanings rather than fixed meanings run throughout the text. 
Serres emphasises partial knowledge: ‘a meagre amount, enough, quite a 
bit; there are various undulations, even in the hardest and most advanced 
sciences’ (1995, p. 5). Whereas scientific practice aims to fix meanings and 
to separate signal from the noise, Serres conceptualises noise as a unified 
whole and as the background to everything. In this paradigm, noise is larger 
than the information it contains. Underlying this is the difference between a 
(scientific) will to control and (artistic/philosophical) acceptance of lack of 
control. Similarly, ideas about transparency (complete knowledge) and 
opaqueness (the partially known) are at play.7 These differences reveal 
attitudes towards what constitutes knowledge, for in artistic practice to be in 
control and have complete knowledge of the drawing process would disallow 
the unexpected, the intuitive and the unknown from which new ideas can 
spring. Genesis invokes this place: 
 
Background noise is the ground of our perception, absolutely 
uninterrupted; it is our perennial sustenance, the element of the software 
of all our logic. It is the residue and the cesspool of our messages. No life 
without heat, no matter, neither: no warmth without air, no logos without 
noise, either. Noise is the basic element of the software of all our logic, or 
it is to the logos what matter used to be to form. Noise is the background 
of information, the material of that form. (Serres, 1995, p. 7) 
 
Serres brings together matter, life and heat with logos, information and 
messages. This clash of seemingly incompatible and incongruent things 
asserts the interdependence of the material and data. The background noise 
is elemental – heat and air – suggesting the ‘fury’ of thunderous storms whilst 
at the same time, it is ‘the element of the software of all our logic’. Here 
science, technology and data are taken out of the laboratories and placed in 
a different environment: one which is vital, chaotic and material. It more 
closely describes, I would like to suggest, the subjects of scientific enquiry. 
                                                
7	Haraway (1988) calls for the privileging of partial perspectives in science.	
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He emphasises the interdependence of matter, logos and noise.8 No 
information without noise he asserts (no visualisations without noisy bodies). 
Information scientists and medical imaging scientists agree that noise is 
inseparable from the medium and pathways that signals travel through. The 
interactions between materials and heat (which is the energy of movement) 
are the ground from where noise springs. These are the same materials that 
carry signals. All this is recognised and acknowledged, albeit using very 
different language, in medical imaging textbooks. It is the emphasis that is 
different, for Serres describes noise as if it has agency and power. Crucially, 
it is a force that sits outside understanding and will and this is precisely why 
noise has such a different status in science. 
 
Ideas about the unit and the multiple recur in Serres' text. The unit – the 
basic unit of information – is at the heart of scientific measurement. Once 
something can be measured systematically, it can be calculated and 
absorbed into knowledge systems. However, when Serres speaks about 
multiples he is not describing the grouping of things: 'it's neither flock, nor a 
school, nor a heap, nor a swarm, nor a herd, nor a pack' (1995, p. 5). It is not 
a unified collection of things, but rather an incalculable multiplicity. Elkins too 
evokes the multiple in terms of the immeasurable and the unknown: 'How 
can the observer look at the subject if it is multiplying and changing under his 
very eyes? The supposedly static object is a moving target, like the exit door 
in a hall of mirrors' (1996, p. 39). Elkins’ word ‘multiplying’ evokes a growing 
living thing that cannot be contained or measured. Serres contrasts the 
desire to measure and to know with the way in which that other way of 
knowing – sensory perception – functions: 'We are fascinated by the unit; 
only a unit seems rational to us. We scorn the senses, because their 
information reaches us in bursts' (p. 2). The movement suggested by his use 
of 'bursts' is also uncontainable, unexpected and uncontrollable. Here 
sensory information is experienced in ways that are similar to noise itself. 
They are in flux and immeasurable. He describes sensual perception as if it 
                                                
8 The materiality of data has been theorised from a variety of perspectives, such as the 
interactions between bodies, software and hardware (Raessens, 2009), and through the 
generative potential of data (Rushkoff, 2009).	
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is an environment: 'Perceptions bursts, inner and outer, how can they be told 
apart? How am I to tell any environment I've entered in, become immersed 
in, that this wood I'm confronted with doesn't go on forever, that I'll get to the 
edge of the forest some day?' (p. 6). 
 
Rather than complete knowledge, Serres is interested in the idea of the 
possible: 'The most common forgetting is that of the possible. It is so much 
forgotten that it is not visible' (p. 24). This statement illustrates how noise can 
be perceived in medical visualisation practice and theory. It becomes 
invisible once it is labelled as noise and the focus shifts towards signal (and a 
false dichotomy). But the invisibility of noise also conceals its possibility to 
become signal. For me, the potential of noise to transform into signal is a 
central concept. However, Serres contests the use of the word 'potential' and 
states that it is too closely associated with power, instead describing noise as 
'capaciousness' (p. 22) or as an environment of possibilities.9 Perhaps he is 
referring to power within the specific context of knowledge/power, or perhaps 
for Serres noise is a 'viscous' (p. 5) thing that refuses to become assimilated 
into any form of knowledge. More importantly, the possible is for Serres 
enmeshed in sensual perceptions: 'The raucous, anarchic, noisy, variegated, 
tiger-striped, zebra-streaked, jumbled-up, mixed-up multiple, criss-crossed by 
myriad colours and myriad shades, is possibility itself' (p. 22). He is 
describing possibility as an overwhelming sensual experience that cannot be 
contained within scientific knowledge; it cannot be divided into units of 
information. Noise is elusive; it cannot be measured and perhaps can only be 
experienced. Serres is suggesting that sensual experience opens up a way 
of knowing noise and the possibility contained within it, and in this my use of 
the word ‘potential’ is not dissimilar to his conceptualisation. My experience 
of drawing in response to noise resonates with Serres’ writing and points to 
ways of knowing noise that are closed to scientific methods. These ways of 
                                                
9 Ideas about the potential of noise (its possibilities) recur in music, new media and cultural 
theory. Noise is conceptualised as a catalyst that ‘has the potential to bring about a change 
in the system into which it is released’ (Hainge, 2013, p. 10) and as ‘a paradigm of 
innovation’ (Malsapina, 2012, p. 58) that ‘possesses the possibilities of liberation’ (Goddard 
et al, 2012, p. 9).	
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knowing are located in the subject who perceives: 'Noise, you see, is also a 
trace of the observer. There is noise in the subject, there is noise in the 
object' (p. 61). His ideas echo Nancy's evocation of the subject and 
emphasise the interaction between object and subject. It is through this 
interaction that knowledge is produced: 'Cognition is subtraction of the noise 
received and of the noise made by the subject' (p. 61). Something is lost – 
perhaps resisted – in the transference. 
 
4.4 Resisting noise 
Cécile Malsapina explores whether noise can be thought about as breaking 
down boundaries within disciplines to activate a ‘strategic use of ambiguity’ 
(2012, p. 59). She asserts that noise cannot remain ‘self-same’ (2012, p. 58); 
once it is assimilated into new genres or disciplines its status changes. This 
flux and ambiguity seems linked to its potential to trigger innovation. The 
strategic use of ambiguity is not uncommon in arts practice, as I explore 
earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 2). But what role does ambiguity play in 
science? The philosopher Miguel de Beistegui observes:  
 
Scientific thought is essentially interventionist and efficacious; it is a 
thought that measures and predicts. But science does think, and its 
thought is one that increasingly maps on to the phenomenality of 
phenomena, that is, to the reality of the world as we perceive it: it is a 
world of flux and becoming, and one that is often opaque. It would seem, 
therefore, that the distinction between the world of phenomena and the 
world of scientific objects no longer holds, at least no longer in the same 
rigid and absolute way.’ (2005, p. 113) 
 
‘[A] world of flux and becoming’ is full of noise; its opacity and ambiguities, its 
escape from absolute measurement are the conditions of noise. This 
paradigm is however not evident in scientific accounts of noise, as described 
to me in chapter one. They tend to focus upon technical procedures and 
mathematical approaches. Beistegui calls for philosophy to engage closely 
with science, for ‘many of the questions and issues that traditionally fell under 
the authority of philosophy, and which helped clarify the fundamental 
meaning of that which is, now fall under science’ (2005, p.109). The 
continuing evolution of science has radically transformed these questions in 
ways that increasingly destabilise fixed knowledge. Perhaps more than ever, 
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it is imperative that disciplines that have different approaches toward 
ambiguity such as art and philosophy engage with these questions. For 
science alone does not have the framework to utilise ambiguity and not 
knowing - cognitive closure - as methods. It does not recognise the potential 
of noise. If one considers the aims of science, tolerance of ambiguity is 
inimical to scientific practice. And yet, as the descriptions of noise in medical 
imaging in this thesis evidence, ambiguity is an inescapable aspect of 
scientific practice.  
 
The medical education theorist Alan Bleakley (2015) calls for uncertainty and 
ambiguity to be used as resources rather than perceived as hindrances in 
medical education. Investigations into tolerance of ambiguity are a growing 
field of study in medical education, particularly in highly visual specialisms 
such as dermatology, pathology and radiology.10 Studies indicate that art 
workshops can develop medical students’ visual acuity, visual diagnostic 
skills, pattern recognition, communication skills, team working and empathy 
(Friedlaender and Friedlaender, 2013; Naghshineh et al., 2008; Shapiro et 
al., 2006). Bleakley identifies some key challenges in the growing trend of 
arts integration into medical curricula. He questions whether processes of 
evaluation constitute a defence against tolerance of ambiguity and points out 
that there is a danger that artists working with medical institutions may 
‘suspend the innovation and radical nature of their practices in the service of 
becoming “educationalists”’ (2015, p. 352).11 This chimes with my own 
                                                
10 Low tolerance of ambiguity in medical practice has been defined as the tendency to 
perceive ambiguous situations as ‘sources of threat’ and is associated with ‘mental 
rigidity, conformity and ethnic prejudice’ (Weissenstein et al., 2014).  Visually examining 
an artwork can be a new experience to medical students; one which can be perceived as 
cognitively closed. This paradoxically can open up new ways of looking, for there is no 
visual distinction between areas of lesser or higher importance in an artwork - it is all 
relevant. As Bleakley points out: ‘where visual material is complex, ambiguous, or novel 
[it] calls for close, detailed attention’ (2003, p. 302). Habitual ways of (medical) looking 
that ‘occlude fresh seeing’ can become destabilised in gallery/museum contexts. A focus 
upon close observation over extended periods of time in not tied to one outcome, but is 
‘active looking – unbiased inspection’ (Naghshineh et. al. 2008). This encourages 
students to continue looking after a meaning emerges, to allow other meanings to 
emerge. 
11 An overview of different studies reveals a variety of approaches to evaluation – from short 
tick-box questionnaires at the end of workshops, to detailed assessments pre- and post-
workshop examining visual diagnostic skills, alongside detailed questionnaires.	
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experience of drawing in the laboratory. I became self-conscious and 
uncomfortable with taking risks, shying away from using unusual drawing 
materials or methods (health and safety notwithstanding). Perhaps 
workshops in the environment of an artist’s studio could be investigated. 
There is potential to explore this further. But nevertheless, scientist’s 
recourse to art in their medical training is an arguably belated and overdue 
recognition that their own discipline does not and cannot address the 
question of ambiguity. I am reminded of Latour and Woolgar’s observations 
of scientists working in the laboratory:  
 
Despite participants' well-ordered reconstructions and rationalisations, 
actual scientific practice entails the confrontation and negotiation of utter 
confusion. The solution adopted by scientists is the imposition of various 
frameworks by which the extent of background noise can be reduced and 
against which an apparently coherent signal can be presented.   
(1979, p. 37) 
 
In the twenty-first century, with the increasing capacity of visualisation 
technologies to ‘see’ what was previously invisible, their observations hold 
truer than ever. The visible world is becoming even more complex and 
confusing. The cognitively closed and diagnostically irrelevant aspects of 
medical visualisation practice may increase rather than decrease over time. 
New ways of looking, seeing, perceiving and thinking are needed. Artistic 
practice is well placed to respond to visual ambiguity and the cognitively 
closed aspects of noise in medical visualisations, as my investigation 
demonstrates. 
 
4.5 Noise and generation 
In the previous chapter I asserted that drawing is indeed a thinking practice, 
and yet thinking seems to be in contradiction to the notion of listening, feeling 
and intuiting through the senses. During the phases of activity described in 
Chapter 3, I knowingly formulated methods and strategies to explore aspects 
of noise through drawing by orchestrating unknown movements and 
interactions in my materials for instance. These methods were nevertheless, 
designed to precipitate a state of not knowing. Their aim was to place my 
body and perceptions into an environment of noise whilst drawing. Although 
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some of these strategies such as loss of control and the use of fugitive 
materials are not new to my practice, they were taken a step further. For 
instance, the use of bio-sensors or drawing on materials and grounds that 
are themselves moving are new ways of working for me. When my subject 
matter is cognitively closed, I cannot approach it directly. There is no clear 
way into my subject and, consequently, my methods and drawing strategies 
become more inventive and speculative. Cognitive closure as a starting point 
for a drawing (despite my knowledge of the characteristics of noise) is 
productive and generative in ways that I had not anticipated. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Untitled, (detail) 2017, slip on paper, 150 x 120cm, work by the author.  
 
The drawing above (Figure 4.1) is a detail from a new drawing made in 
response to the earlier Noise+Signal work (see Figures 3.15 and 3.16) 
described in the previous chapter. I return to this work because of the ways 
in which it merged my senses. I experienced the act of looking as if through 
the surface of my body, not just the eyes, and my hands seemed to become 
tools for thought. The work, perhaps more than other experiments, triggered 
the most intensely felt changes in my perceptions. This was connected to the 
physicality of the process and the unexpected movements I responded to, 
which seemed to provoke a deep sensitivity to my environment. The 
Noise+Signal drawing events involved a relationship with viewer and space. 
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My bio-sensor data was interacting with the participants’/viewers’ bio-data, 
and there was an audience for the drawing performance which inevitably 
changed my perceptions.  
 
My wish to explore this further, leads me to test different drawing materials – 
slip not graphite – and a different environment – the studio – for a new 
drawing with bio-sensors. Being in the studio space feels more reflective and 
allows me to test whether the ‘audience’ aspect of the Noise+Signal drawing 
performances was essential, or whether my methods triggered my drawing 
experiences. I wear both sensors myself, and the code is modified to reflect 
the studio space. The slip, which is a gritty suspension of clay in water, drips 
on the floor as I work, and hardens upon the brush as it dries. It is as if its 
grittiness on the paper provides an additional haptic dimension that 
intensifies my sense of thinking through touch. Its earthy colours suggest the 
body and flesh. However, the drawing remains untitled because I do not want 
to disclose meanings, and because I approach it without knowing what it will 
be. The studio is quiet as no one else is present. I can hear the faint hum of 
the projector and am aware of changes in light in the space caused by the 
projections. As I move forward slight vibrations from my steps transfer to the 
plinth that the projector rests on, causing further unexpected movements. 
Returning to this drawing process in the studio with different materials 
intensifies my sense of looking through the body and the mingling of touch, 
sight and sound as I work. Although an audience and public performance 
could be thought about in terms of adding an extra dimension of unexpected 
change and movements into the process, working alone in the studio allows 
me to feel the resonance of all my senses more acutely.  
 
Studios are nevertheless contested spaces that have been the subject of 
much debate. Daniel Buren’s essay ‘The function of the studio’ (1979) argues 
that artwork needs to be seen in the context where it was made. In a recent 
talk, Rebecca Fortnum (2014) discusses debates about the studio as a 
barrier between artist and audience and as theoretically indefensible. Without 
entering into debates that are outside the remit of this study, I would like to 
refer to a video by Bruce Naumann (which Fortnum also refers to). Mapping 
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the studio (Fat chance John Cage) (2001) was filmed at night in the artist’s 
studio. The only activity is the occasional appearance of a cat, insect or 
mouse. Here the studio is the central focus of the work, not a mythical artistic 
genius. Fortnum (2014) states: ‘As the artist is not present to make the work, 
the film makes itself. It literally enacts the drive in the making of the artwork, 
making that which is unknown available to him’. When I am in the studio, it 
feels as if the activity of drawing is more present than I am, and the 
interaction between the drawing and myself becomes acutely felt. I am more 
self-conscious during public performances. In the studio, it is easier to lose 
myself in the drawing, and it is this experience that sensitises me to unknown 
and unexpected stimuli. It is an oddly vulnerable experience, and perhaps 
the reason I return to the studio is because it feels less exposed.  
 
According to Elkins, everyday seeing (which he calls just looking) is 
accompanied by a blindness to things that we find too disturbing, puzzling or 
even too boring: ‘things that fall through the cracks of vision, things so odd 
we never figure them out, blurs, confusions, smudges, and smears’ (1996, p. 
205). Vision is full of interferences (noise) that we daily filter. Elkins points out 
that just as the eye filters what it does not want to see and at the same time 
searches for what it desires to see,12 so too do the ears actively search and 
ignore a range of sounds. He asserts that ‘[t]he same could be said about my 
tongue, or my fingertips, or the blind man’s cane’ (p. 34). The whole 
sensorium can be employed in evading unwanted stimuli: noise is the 
background to everything we perceive as Serres argues. When noise is my 
subject, I am attempting to prevent the blindness that Elkins describes. 
Perhaps this is why it is experienced so acutely (I am thinking here of 
Nancy’s notion of listening), for in daily life I do not practise this way of 
seeing, feeling or listening. This is then another layer of noise that sits below 
the scientific concept of noise. I understand this in terms of Elkins’ ideas 
about the ‘immensely troubled’ nature of visual perception, which he 
compares to ‘a skein of changing relations with objects and people’ (1995, p. 
                                                
12	I state earlier in this thesis (see page 22) that Elkins argues that vision is like hunting.	
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201). How can scientists see noise when they do not acknowledge the 
‘immensely troubled’ nature of vision? 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Untitled, (detail) 2017, graphite on paper, 42 x 30cm, work by the author.  
 
In a final drawing experiment, I test a method that navigates Nancy’s ideas 
about sound, the sonorous and resonance. I am interested in the idea of 
knowledge that resounds within and without the body. An exchange between 
the interiority of my body and the external environment  – my breath as it is 
expelled from the body – becomes a tool to produce the drawing. It seems 
apt that although I use breath, no sound is produced but instead an image is 
revealed. Nancy states that ‘visual presence is already there, available, 
before I see it, whereas sonorous presence arrives’ (2007, p. 14, italics in 
original). I wish to explore how I can reverse this statement and make the 
visual arrive through the body. When I first consider this method, I question 
whether it is too literal a translation of Nancy’s thought. But as I experiment 
with the materials, I am surprised by how immersive the process becomes. I 
become fully absorbed into this way of working, it demands my perceptual 
attention for there are elements of chance and the unexpected at every step. 
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I begin by drawing with a completely transparent material that is not unlike 
water – it is a diluted pigment binder. Using a brush, I draw quickly and 
without thinking beforehand, giving myself permission not to know before I 
start each drawing. It is a process of finding out through doing, and I produce 
many drawings in this way in quick succession. This is a method of thinking 
though materials and through making that is rooted in unexpected and 
unknown outcomes. Before the binder solution dries, I sprinkle natural 
pigments in the form of dry powders with a brush over the surface of the 
paper. They are made from organic materials: bone black is largely 
composed of burnt animal bones and burnt umber is a mineral compound 
mined from the earth. These materials are chosen because of their 
connection to bodies. Next I gently blow the pigment off the surface of the 
paper and where it adheres to the binder, a drawing is revealed. It is a very 
delicate image – a slight touch can dislodge the pigment. In some areas it 
adheres in clumps, whilst in others it leaves a fine powdery trace. As I look 
closely at the particles of pigment, my looking feels like a touching. This may 
be linked to its textural quality and the fact that I cannot touch the surface of 
the drawing. Perhaps my wish to do so becomes displaced into vision. It may 
also be connected to the drawing being revealed in a matter of seconds 
rather than growing over time. The speed of the revelation pulls me in close 
to the drawing. It holds not knowing and knowing together, for each time I do 
this the drawing is seen anew. The disjunction between my mark making 
(with the binder solution) and the final image also causes me to look with 
fresh eyes; each drawing is a surprise. Looking anew is important, for it is the 
only way of approaching noise. The drawing is revealed by breath, a life 
force that gives the drawing life.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have proposed an over-arching theoretical frame for the 
ideas developed in the first three chapters. Because these ideas associate 
noise with the embodied meanings experienced as a visual artist 
experiments in a productively noisy environment, Chapter 4 employed the 
phenomenological insights of Nancy’s Listening, and Serres’ Genesis to 
explain why terms such as ‘closed cognition’ and ‘diagnostic irrelevance’ are 
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useful to creative practitioners. Nancy’s text interrogates how it is possible to 
perceive the world, without reducing perceptual experience into knowledge 
systems. He argues that by evading knowledge-making (cognitive closure), a 
heightened perception of the world is experienced. He describes this state as 
listening, and in my experience, it is analogous to my perceptions as I draw 
in response to stimuli that are characteristic of noise. For Serres, noise is the 
background to the universe; it is a constant presence that asserts itself 
through the senses. His conceptualisation encompasses scientific 
understanding, but more importantly, embodies an understanding of noise 
that elucidates artistic responses through creative practice. 
 
Nancy and Serres provide a philosophical frame that equates body/world 
resonance with the most heightened forms of knowledge. Their ideas are 
negotiated and given substantial practical form through the final drawing 
experiments in this chapter. They evidence that noise can be a potent source 
of artistic ideas. Accordingly, this chapter builds intellectually on the 
hypothesis which I proposed in Chapter 3. The results demonstrate how 
artists can be open to ambiguity in their environment without needing to 
make sense of what is encountered.  
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Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, noise is generated by unknown movements and 
interactions within and without the human body and the bodies of 
technologies. However, signal – the informational opposite of noise – can 
also be generated by unknown movements and interactions. Therefore noise 
is embedded in the structures and processes of medical visualisation 
practice and the distinction between signal and noise is unstable. Although 
scientists recognised the difficulty of separating noise from signal in medical 
visualisation practice, when they ascribed information as noise, they 
perceived it differently as my thesis demonstrates. Noise is manifested as 
ambiguous visual traces in medical visualisations – images that have 
informed my drawings for a number of years. The presence of noise within 
them raised interesting questions about how visual ambiguity is perceived by 
scientists and artists. Despite continued advances in technology, noise 
cannot be erased from medical visualisations. It can be minimised in a 
number of ways, but it cannot be excluded. Its continued presence meant 
that an element of the unknown remains at the heart of scientific practice.  
 
Questions about perception – particularly how artists and scientists perceived 
noise – were central to this study and provided a framework for testing my 
ideas. Perception is a largely unconscious fusion of sensory information and 
its assimilation into cognitive processes. This research began by focusing on 
visual perception because vision is the dominant sense used by medical 
visualisation scientists. For instance, pattern recognition is an important 
component in the decoding of scans. However, noise complicates visual 
perception, for it is difficult to separate from signal. The ideas of art historians 
James Elkins and W.J.T. Mitchell about the ambiguous nature of visual 
perception were negotiated by a series of drawing experiments I carried out 
through the course of this research that explore the instability of vision (see 
Chapters 1, 3 and 4). Their ideas provide a method of thinking about how 
acts of looking and seeing are themselves interactive and full of unknown 
exchanges. As my study progressed, it became clear that vision is 
inseparable from other senses when artists responded to unknown or 
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ambiguous stimuli. They make use of wider sensory perceptions which are 
not recognised in medical visualisation practice. To resolve the on-going 
nature of my negotiation of the scientific concept of noise through artistic 
practice and to understand how artists perceive noise, I cited the works of 
philosophers Jean-Luc Nancy and Michel Serres. Their writing provides a 
way of conceptualising noise and my artistic responses to it, which could not 
be understood solely through my art historical readings. Nancy’s text 
Listening analyses and elucidates the state of being immersed in not 
knowing whilst also remaining highly alert to perceptions of your 
environment. He questions what is at stake when one truly listens, ‘that is, 
when one tries to capture or surprise the sonority rather than the message?’ 
(2007, p. 5). In Genesis, Serres asserts that noise is the background to the 
universe: it is both outside and inside (part) of us. These two ideas 
interconnect and resonate when I consider my understanding of and 
responses to noise. 
 
Throughout this thesis I used two terms – ‘cognitively closed’ and 
‘diagnostically irrelevant’ – to understand, articulate and pinpoint the 
divergences between scientific and artistic responses to noise. They are 
perhaps strangely incongruous when used to describe art-making. However, 
I use these terms purposefully because they can be clearly understood in the 
context of medical visualisation practice, and to negotiate between scientific 
and artistic practices. They describe important conceptual approaches in 
artistic practice in response to noise. My aim is to bridge two separate and 
distinct disciplines, while, at the same time, allowing the differences between 
them to become apparent. My strategic use of these terms and recognition 
that noise could be a valuable source of new ideas evidences that artist 
residencies in scientific institutions are a viable methodological tool. 
Furthermore, the subject matter of noise creates a productive dynamic for 
art-science residencies, because it is unknown to both science and art and 
thereby, it diffuses the role of scientific expertise and technological 
knowledge. 
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My research demonstrates that a number of contemporary artists actively 
engage with noise characteristics and utilise its attributes as strategies in 
their practice. I cite examples of artists whose methods intentionally generate 
unexpected and unknown interactions in their materials and perceptions. 
Claude Heath instigates slippages between vision, touch and cognition to 
draw – a process that would be considered diagnostically irrelevant by 
scientists. Beatriz Olabarrieta allows unknown (and uncontrollable) physical 
interactions to interfere with her drawing process. Emma McNally engages 
with a continual ‘feedback loop of exchanges and transmission’ (2017) 
between artist and drawing as she looks and intuitively perceives. Artists 
often invite ambiguity, the unknown and consequently noise into their work 
rather than attempt to control it. This ambiguity can, in turn, be perceived by 
the viewer. Scientists also perceive ambiguity in their practice, but their 
disciplinary framework typically attempts to control and minimise it in the 
outcomes of their research. Public perceptions of scientific visualisations 
similarly do not recognise that ambiguity, the unknown and noise are an 
integral part of them, as many theorists have observed (Briedbach, 2011; 
Dijck, 1998, 2005; Galison, 2002; Rose, 2006). Artists place different (often 
higher) values upon the unknown and unexpected. Artist and academic 
Rebecca Fortnum observes: ‘The search for the unknown outcome is not 
only welcome but actually provides the driving force within the creative 
process’ (2014). Scientists, on the other hand, actively exclude or minimise 
noise in their practice, and furthermore, they may refuse to see it, as my 
thesis demonstrates (see Chapter 2 page 41). If artists do not evade noise 
(the unknown) but immerse themselves in it, they are in a position to better 
understand – through their experiences and perceptions – how noise 
functions and how to use it productively in their practice. This difference in 
approach to noise between artist and scientist is an important one. Serres 
contrasts the function of the scientist: ‘to be right and rational’ with that of the 
philosopher who: ’keeps watch over unforeseeable and fragile conditions’ 
(1995, p. 23). The artist similarly functions to ‘let the possibilities roam free’ 
(ibid). 
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I observed during the residency (see Chapter 1) that signal is itself 
constructed from data that exhibits noise characteristics and that, in my view, 
‘signal/noise’ more accurately describes its status. Through my practice-led 
investigations, I have learned that I do not seek to distinguish between noise 
and signal. The dichotomy is a false one in my artistic practice. Furthermore, 
when noise is my subject matter and impetus for making work, it leads me to 
become responsive to all kinds of information, known and unknown, 
conscious and intuitive, felt and seen. They co-exist as different ways of 
knowing and at different levels of ambiguity. For example, when I was 
drawing from my memory (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4), I moved between 
conscious memory images, which I could ‘see’ in my imagination, and 
intuitively felt imaginings, which were not consciously known or available to 
me. My propensity and ability to remain in-between knowing and not knowing 
– in the middle – is not unique among artists. McNally has stated that she 
tries to remain in the middle ground. However, the ability to remain between 
knowing and not knowing – or in scientific terms, between cognitively closed 
and cognitively open information – may be less familiar to scientists. Given 
the ambiguous nature of information and data, and the instability of the terms 
noise and signal as I point out in this thesis, it would be beneficial to 
scientists to develop their ability to remain in the ‘middle ground’ as tolerance 
of ambiguity studies demonstrate (see Chapter 4 page 107).  
If noise is assumed to be open and not closed (as artists often perceive it to 
be), the ‘possibility’ contained within it – to use Serres’ term – can become 
available. It is from this possibility that new knowledge (in art and science) 
can spring. Therefore noise is potentially more fertile ground for investigation 
than signal when the dichotomy between them is understood as unstable and 
in flux. 
 
I was surprised at the interplay of a controlled planning of my drawing 
strategies and the unknown and unexpected outcomes they precipitated. The 
careful orchestration of drawing methods was designed to take me beyond 
thinking. Paradoxically, thinking through drawing was designed to take me to 
not thinking. Noise as subject matter triggered conceptual ways of working 
that were at the same time very embodied. The Noise+Signal work (see 
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Figures 3.15 and 3.16) is a good example. It entailed detailed and lengthy 
tests of base drawings, materials, scale of projections and code prior to 
events. My aim was to maximise unknown and unexpected outcomes during 
the drawing performances. Scale was an important consideration here. The 
drawings involved my whole body as it moved in response to projected 
signals that often registered on the edges of my visual field. This example is 
perhaps one of the more complex strategies I used in this study, but this 
holds for other much simpler approaches such as the pigment drawings (see 
Figure 4.2). Here the method was more direct, yet nevertheless, meticulous 
testing of different pigments and strengths of binders was undertaken to 
gauge the best combinations that would be most responsive to my breath as 
the pigment was blown across the paper.   
 
Connected to this, I observed that when I made work in response to noise, 
where my subject matter was highly ambiguous, it generated ideas and 
methods that were unusual and new in my practice. An important outcome of 
this project was that I extended my use of drawing strategies. I explored the 
use of technologies such as bio-sensors, used new materials such as fat and 
clay, created a box construction for looking through, as well as working with 
animation and performance for the first time. This multiplicity of approaches 
in response to one subject matter over a long period of time is unusual in my 
practice. Noise as a starting point for making new work was surprisingly 
productive. It does not feel as if I have reached an end point towards the end 
of my thesis, rather that this process could continue indefinitely. For noise is 
more than a subject matter: it seems to have become embedded in my 
practice as a process that will continue to evolve.  
 
The potential of noise to innovate and generate new meanings, as well as to 
function as a catalyst for change has been noted by many theorists in the 
humanities (Attali, 1985; Hainge, 2013; Hegarty, 2007). Noise triggers 
innovation in my (and other artists’) practice by activating risk taking and 
experimentation. Its inherent lack of meaning frees my imagination and 
allows me to make new connections between things. Its function as a 
catalyst for change is connected to my thinking, my making and my 
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perceptions, for it changes my sense of what is possible. However, the 
potential of noise to do this is less readily recognised in scientific practice. If 
science did not perceive noise as cognitively closed – it could unlock its 
potential to become a catalyst for change. The possibility contained within 
noise is evident in the implicit understanding within medical imaging practice 
that reducing noise inevitably reduces information and meaning (see Chapter 
1). The interplay of the unknown and the new knowledge it may potentially 
contain is central to the concept of noise in scientific practice. Nancy asks: 
‘What secret is at stake when one truly listens, that is, when one tries to 
capture or surprise the sonority rather than the message?’ (2007, p. 5). He is 
suggesting that looking specifically for a ‘message’, which is what science 
does, cannot unlock the ‘secret’. One needs to ‘truly listen’ and ‘surprise’ the 
secret. 
 
Materials played a key role when I attempted to explore noise through not 
knowing. I intentionally chose difficult to control materials that displayed a 
kind of agency by moving or interacting with the drawing ground. Materials 
stood in for the body – they generated unknown movements much as the 
human body generates noise in medical visualisations. But more importantly, 
my own body interacted with materials, and it was this interaction that was 
most keenly felt as noise. The body knows noise in a way that the eyes alone 
cannot. Painting with fat was strangely unsettling and visceral. Its pungent 
smell evoked peculiar sensations and associations as I was drawing. When it 
interacted with the paper transforming it into a translucent material, it felt as if 
the drawing ground was changing into something more bodily. Similarly, the 
grittiness of clay was felt with each brush stroke, so that my body knew the 
drawing through the clay. Noise became a catalyst for me to work with non-
usual materials that made drawings strange and unknown to me. This 
provoked a kind of noise in my own practice, enabling me to see with fresh 
eyes by activating an embodied and haptic style of vision. Elkins states: 
‘looking is something I do but also something that happens to me’ (1996, p. 
35).  
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Linked to this, and a central observation of this study was that when noise is 
my subject matter my sensory perceptions become very intensely felt. They 
change, and in the process so do I: 'When it comes to seeing, objects and 
observers alter one another, and meaning goes in both directions' (Elkins, 
1996, p. 43). It becomes difficult to separate vision from touch, sound and 
smell; they become displaced through each other. During Noise+Signal 
performances, as I strained to catch each new signal and to move quickly, I 
experienced the act of looking as if it was located on the surface of my body 
and not solely in my eyes. At the time, I described this experience as 
listening out for the scent of signals (see Chapter 3 page 91) that I could not 
see. It was as if the other senses tried to compensate when sight was 
compromised. Interestingly, this text was written earlier in my study during 
the phase of activity (2013), prior to my contextualisation of my experiences 
through my readings of Serres and Nancy. It was an instinctive 
understanding that noise precipitated acute sensory responsiveness to my 
environment that seemed to be searching for other kinds of information. This 
demonstrates that practice-led research was leading this investigation, and 
that my experiences of drawing prior to my cognitive formulation of ideas 
were a driving force.  
 
Nancy states that ‘[e]very sensory register thus bears with it both its simple 
nature and its tense, attentive, or anxious state’ (2007, p. 5). Noise triggers 
the ‘attentive and anxious state’ my experience tells me. It is difficult to 
determine whether this is solely connected to unknown movements, or 
whether my focus on unknown interactions in my environment during this 
enquiry (both conscious and imagined) precipitates this. Nevertheless, a key 
observation during the phase of activity was that strategies of not knowing 
whilst drawing intensified the sensory perceptions of my environment. This 
experience – which is not always comfortable – is becoming something I 
increasingly recognise and value. 
 
Being surprised by a drawing was another unexpected outcome of this 
enquiry. Looking at work anew is an important aspect of making, and artists 
often use strategies to look afresh at their work. In the past I have simply 
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covered up drawings and not looked at them for a while, or peered at them 
from different angles and positions. However, in this project the methods I 
used produced drawings that I could not anticipate, so the element of 
surprise was fundamentally connected to my process. The animation Mind 
Wandering 3 (see Figures 3.11a and 3.11b) was a peculiarly embodied 
drawing that resembled living tissues or cultures growing and multiplying. I 
am reminded of Mitchell’s observations about ‘the peculiar tendency of 
images to absorb and be absorbed by human subjects in processes that look 
suspiciously like those of living things’ (2005, p. 2). The strangeness of the 
drawing, its unknown quality precipitates a dynamic way of looking that gives 
it a kind of agency. As I was drawing on tissue paper with a brush and dry 
carbon powder, I made a decision not to fix or bind the medium, thereby 
allowing it to move freely. Consequently it was very difficult to control and 
whilst I was immersed in the drawings I could not perceive what the outcome 
would be. I was looking through a camera as I was drawing, with the paper 
just a few centimetres from the macro lens. This created a strong sense of 
dislocation in my perception of space for although the paper was quite small, 
it was perceived as very large. Slight movements were magnified, and my 
hand did not know where it was in space. Each mark I made seemed 
somehow disconnected from my body. Perceptual slippages such as these 
activated ways of drawing and with it imagery that was surprising to me. It is 
important to point out that this can be linked to quite small and subtle 
changes in my practice, such as the drawings discussed in Chapter 1 (see 
Figures 1.4 and 1.5) where I was simply turning my head to look at images 
behind me.  
 
There are wider, philosophical reasons why artists should research noise. 
Scientific theory and practice cannot account for how noise – in the form of 
unknown movements and interactions – changes my perceptions as I draw. 
This is not surprising given that it does not recognise multi-sensory 
responses to visualisations. Furthermore, scientific discourse about noise is 
limited to discussions about data, algorithms, interference in signals and 
highly technical information. To resolve the on-going nature of my negotiation 
of the scientific concept of noise through artistic practice, I look to 
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philosophical texts. Nancy describes a process of perceiving which sidesteps 
cognition and does not generate knowledge as ‘an intensification and a 
concern, a curiosity or an anxiety’ (2007, p.5). This eloquently describes what 
perceiving unknown stimuli (noise) feels like when I respond as an artist. The 
‘intensification’ that Nancy refers to is what I experience as the senses 
finding other ways of knowing and perceiving the unknown. This experience 
is my way of being in the world that Serres calls – a world full of noise. Both 
texts foreground the sense of hearing: sound, sonority and resonance are 
key concepts for Nancy. Sound is a very different metaphor for perceiving the 
environment compared to light and vision. It resounds without and within the 
body, suggesting other ways of knowing. The heightened sense of 
perception that is activated by noise is, I would like to assert, experienced as 
all the senses resounding together. This changes my vision so that it 
becomes enmeshed in the haptic and sonic. Consequently, the distancing 
and objectification that ocular-centric approaches have been associated with 
dissolve: 'Perceptions bursts, inner and outer, how can they be told apart' 
(Serres, 1995, p. 6). 
 
My study determines that the concept of noise can function as a catalyst for 
developing new methods and strategies in arts and science collaborative 
projects. It deepens understanding of how the particularity of noise can be 
applicable to art and science research. More importantly, noise allows me to 
understand and negotiate the differences between scientists and artists 
through the ways in which they respond to ambiguity, the unpredictable and 
the unknown. This is elaborated through my practice-led investigations, 
which navigated noise by immersing myself in it. My immersion into noise 
(and into not-knowing) reflects my understanding that noise is part of signal 
(see Chapter 1) and that in Serres’ statement, noise: ‘moves through the 
means and the tools of observation, whether material or logical, hardware or 
software’ (1995, p. 13).  
 
Furthermore, my project contributes to an under-represented area of 
research: the relationship between noise and analogue arts practice. Noise 
has been the subject of much investigation in new media and music theory. 
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New-media art is perhaps understandably interested in the scientific concept 
of noise because of its on-going experiments with glitch methods and 
processes. Similarly, noise music is an established genre in music theory 
and practice. Both new media and music engage with noise largely (although 
not solely) through digital interfaces of electronic music, electronic devices 
and code. Further research could be done into perceptions of noise in 
analogue art practices that involve a bodily engagement with materials. 
Noise has been theorised as having a profound effect on the body (Serres, 
1995; Hainge 2013; Hegarty, 2004), therefore analogue practices could offer 
different insights into its workings. Bruno Latour discusses the relationship 
between embodied knowledge and scientific notions of objectivity. He uses 
the example of the hand-made image (as opposed to computer generated) to 
question: ‘But what if hands were actually indispensable to reaching truth, to 
producing objectivity, to fabricating divinities? What would happen if, when 
saying that some image is human-made, you were increasing instead of 
decreasing its claim to truth?’ (2002, p. 16, italics in original). The ‘human-
made’ may also be the best way to understand noise, for it cannot be 
scientifically measured but can be known through the senses. 
 
This enquiry draws attention to what appears to be two distinct ways of 
perceiving noise in medical visualisations: scientific and artistic. They are 
built around different attitudes to the cognitive element of perception. Noise is 
perceived by scientists as cognitively closed and meaningless; artists on the 
other hand can perceive noise as a stimulus for new ideas. The 
consequence of this investigation is that it extends the scope that scientists 
and artists have to perceive and understand their distinct visual practices 
through bodily and environmental experiences. Medical education recognises 
that artistic practice can have a positive impact upon scientists’ tolerance of 
ambiguity. This is evidenced by recent scientific studies and the inclusion of 
arts workshops in medical curricula (see Chapter 4). Medical students’ 
interactions with artworks involve multi-sensory perceptions and multiple 
ways of thinking, feeling and responding to unknown stimuli. What if 
tolerance of ambiguity studies focused on experimental art making where 
highly interactive processes and difficult to control materials were given a key 
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role instead of the more commonly used approach of discussions about 
narrative-based paintings? Moreover, what would be the impact of an artist 
researcher – instead of a scientist – leading a tolerance of ambiguity study 
with medical students? There is potential to explore this further. 
 
In conclusion, this thesis and the body of practical work that accompanies it 
demonstrate that the concept of noise has the potential to profoundly 
transform practices in art. Although the accounts in Chapter 4 are of final 
drawing experiments, I am conscious that they do not represent a conclusive 
method for this enquiry. They are part of multiple experiments that are 
interconnected and explore different aspects of noise. There is a sense that I 
could continue to generate new methods and strategies in response to noise, 
for once a method becomes familiar and known to me, it cannot retain an 
element of surprise (the unexpected or unknown) in the same way. Noise as 
subject matter demands innovation and invention. Its resistance to 
knowledge calls for new ways of working. ‘To be listening is to be at the 
same time outside and inside, to be open from without and from within, 
hence from one to the other and from one in the other’ (Nancy, 2007, p. 14, 
italics in original). The fluidity of this process resists fixed knowledge. 
 
This thesis demonstrates that noise functions as a catalyst for change in 
artistic thinking, making and perception. The foundation of this potency is the 
instability and ambiguity of noise as a concept (which is made evident in this 
enquiry) and the possibility contained within it to become signal. This 
possibility becomes a source of new ideas in artistic practice. Serres states: 
‘The most common forgetting is that of the possible. It is so much forgotten 
that it is not visible’ (1995, p. 24). 
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